Turkey takes on its ‘deep state’

By Irfan Husain

I first went to Turkey as a young student in the early Sixties, and have returned many times to meet old friends, and explore this fascinating country. And while it has much to offer tourists, my attachment to it goes far deeper than the interest a casual visitor takes in a place he is travelling through briefly.

Over the years, I have followed the twists and turns of its politics, and have been happy to see the huge economic progress Turkey has made. I remember well the failed coup launched by the commandant of the military academy in 1963: a friend and I sneaked out of our university dormitory at dawn despite the curfew to watch as government troops ruthlessly put down the cadets. One was shot a dozen feet away from me.

Against this backdrop, the current tussle between the Turkish defence forces and the government carries echoes from the distant past. Ever since the Kemalist Revolution changed Turkey’s direction after the First World War, and declared it a republic after centuries of being the home of the Islamic Caliphate, the military has been seen as the guardian of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s secular, Western vision.

This worldview is enshrined in the Turkish constitution, and any attempt to subvert it is a crime. It was under this constitutional provision that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party has almost been disbarred from governing by the Constitutional Court. A mildly Islamic party, AK has stunned the secular establishment by winning two elections in a row with thumping majorities.

The party’s success reflects the ascendancy the conservative middle-class has acquired. The economy’s steady improvement has resulted in a transformation of the power balance, with the Westernised Istanbul elites now having to watch as their devout Anatolian cousins have captured the political high ground.

Although Erdogan has been mindful of the military’s sensitivities, he has been forced into the present confrontation by the constant destablization efforts he has had to contend with. Shadowy members of the so-called ‘deep state’ have agitated against what they see as an effort to Islamize Turkey. Journalists, politicians and businessmen have joined this campaign.

Indeed, the army openly expressed its opposition to the election of Abdullah Gul as the President as his wife wears the hijab, and under Turkish law, a woman wearing the headscarf is not allowed to attend official functions. Given these slights and provocations, it is easy to see why the government has chosen to counter-attack, using leaked details of a planned coup in 2003. A number of serving and retired military officers, including several generals, have been arrested as the investigation continues to reveal more lurid details. This follows on the heels of an earlier coup plot (known as the Ergenekon plot) in which scores of officers are being tried.

These episodes reveal two major fault-lines in Turkey’s political landscape. The first one is the growing divide between the urban, sophisticated elites and the conservative, but increasingly rich, middle class living in small towns and new suburbs. Secular Turks have wielded power, backed by the army, for decades, and now find it hard to come to terms with the changed political reality.

Most visitors to Turkey see Istanbul and the beautiful coastline along the Aegean Sea, but overlook the Anatolian heartland. For the foreseeable future, this is where political power will reside, barring the remote possibility of a military coup. Although the AK party has been hurt by scandals and charges of mismanagement, the truth is that it has been very successful in its handling of the economy.

The one thing that has united both sections of Turkish society is the burning desire to become members of the European Union. Over the years, their frustration at Brussels’s foot-dragging over its application has increased. Turks have watched angrily as others from East Europe have jumped the queue to join the Union, while Turkish aspirations have been placed on hold. Nevertheless, this government has skilfully used the requirements for joining the EU to chip away at the army’s powers. The need to implement the EU’s human rights clauses has served as a useful tool.

For the defence forces, this ongoing struggle has been a sobering experience. For senior officers to be arrested under the glare of publicity is an unprecedented humiliation for a proud and powerful institution. Just a few years ago, this political drama would have been unthinkable.

The military is one of the few remaining forces in the world to retain compulsory service by all adult male Turks. Thus, it is truly a national institution in which every citizen serves. But as the majority moves away from Ataturk’s secularist ideals, the generals and the ‘deep state’ become more and more isolated from the mainstream.

This brings us to the second major fault-line: the growing gap between the political leadership and the military high command. Long accustomed to calling the shots where defence and foreign policy were concerned, the generals now find they are subservient to the elected politicians they despise.

A case in point is the refusal to allow Turkish soil to be used by the Americans during their invasion of Iraq in 2003. Membership of Nato and a close alliance with the US has been a cornerstone of Turkish defence policy for decades, and both American and Turkish generals were aghast when the National Assembly voted to deny facilities to the invading forces.

Another major shift caused by the assertive civilian government is a distancing from Israel. Traditionally, the Turkish military cooperated closely with the Israeli Defence Forces, conducting joint exercises, and permitting Israeli pilots to train in Turkish airspace. But a recent incident in which the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv was humiliated by the Israeli foreign minister has soured relations between the two countries, a trend begun when the Turkish PM publicly rebuked the Israeli president for his country’s outrageous conduct in Gaza last year.

It is clear that power has seeped away from the secular elites of Istanbul and Ankara; simultaneously, the High Command is feeling the ground shift from under its feet. Both developments are good for Turkey’s future as a modern, democratic state. My friends in Istanbul might feel their lifestyle is being threatened by the steady encroachment of conservative forces, but that’s what democracy is about.

Having lived there as a boy, Musharraf has expressed his admiration for Turkey on more than one occasion. In later life, the Turkish military’s unquestioned power no doubt made him see the country as a role model for Pakistan. But what is much more relevant for us now is the way the military has been made to accept that it is subordinate to the elected government. Even though this remains a distant goal for us, this is what we need to strive for.