By Mohsin Qasmi
Oxford professor John Ronald Reuel Tolkien (J.R.R. Tolkien), who created The Lord of the Rings trilogy, was intent on making his magical world real.
An imaginary world must be realistically equipped down to the last whisker of the last monster; Tolkien put close to 20 years into the creation of Middle Earth, the three volumes Lord of the Rings (1954-55) and its predecessor, The Hobbit (1937). He also equipped readers with 157 pages of History, Appendixes, Indexes, Tables of Consanguinity and Philogically impeccable Notes on all the Languages, including Elvish and Sindarin, spoken on Middle Earth.
Professor Tolkien died aged 81 in 1973.
THE HOBBIT
The Hobbit is a tale of high adventure. Bilbo Baggins, a hobbit who enjoys a comfortable, unambitious life, rarely traveling any further than his pantry or his cellar. But his contentment is disturbed when the wizard, Gandalf, and a company of dwarves arrive on his doorstep one-day to whisk him away on an adventure. They have a plot to raid the treasure hoard guarded by Smaug the Magnificent, a large and very dangerous dragon. Bilbo is most reluctant to take part in this quest, but he surprises even himself by his resourcefulness and his skill as a burglar!
Encounters with the trolls, goblins, dwarves, elves and giant spiders, conversation with the dragon, smaug the magnificent and rather unwilling presence at the battle of the five armies are some of the adventures that befall Bilbo. But there are lighter moments as well: Good fellowship, welcome meal laughter and songs.
The Hobbit became an instant success when it was first published in 1937, and more than fifty years later Tolkien's epic tale of elves, dwarves, trolls, goblins, myth, magic and adventure, with its reluctant hero Bilbo Baggins, has lost none of its appeal.
THE LORD OF THE RINGS
Sauron, the Dark Lord, has gathered to him the Rings of power-the means by which he will be able to rule the world. All he lacks in his plan for dominion is the ruling Ring, which has fallen into the hands of the Hobbit Bilbo Baggins.
In a sleepy village in the Shire, young Frodo Baggins finds himself faced with an immense task, as the Ring is entrusted to his care. He must leave his home and make a perilous journey across the realms of Middle-earth to the Cracks of Doom, deep inside the territories of the Dark Lord. There he must destroy the Ring forever and foil the Dark Lord in his evil purpose.
The Lord of the Rings cannot be describe in a few words. J.R.R Tolkien’s great work of imaginary fiction has been labeled both a heroic romance and a classic of science fiction. It is, however, impossible to convey to the new reader all of the book’s qualities, and the range of its creation.
By turns comic, homely, epic, monstrous and diabolic, the narrative moves through countless changes of scenes and character in an imaginary world, which is totally convincing in its detail. Tolkien created a new mythology in an invented world, which has proved timeless in its appeal.
An extraordinary book, it deals with a stupendous theme. It leads us through a succession of strange and astonishing episodes, some of them magnificent, in a region where everything is invented, forest, moors, river, wilderness, town, and the races which inhabit them. As the story goes on the world of the Ring grows more vast and mysterious and crowded with curious figures, horrible, delightful or comic. The story itself is superb.
Since it was first published in 1954, The Lord of the Rings has been a book people have treasured. Steeped in unrivalled magic and other worldliness, its sweeping fantasy has touched the hearts of young and old alike. Fifty million copies of its many editions have been sold around the world, and occasional collectors' editions become prized and valuable items of publishing.
ABOUT SILMARILLION
The tales of The Silmarillion were the underlying inspiration and source of J.R.R. Tolkien's imaginative writing; he worked on the book throughout his life, but never brought it to a final form. Long preceding in its origins The Lord of the Rings, it is the story of the First Age of Tolkien's world, the ancient drama to which characters in The Lord of the Rings look back, and in which some of them, such as Elrond and Galadriel, took part.
The title Silmarillion is shortened from Quenta Silamarillion, 'The History of the Silmarils', the three great jewels created by FÎanor, most gifted of the Elves, in which he imprisoned the light of the Two Trees that illuminated Valinor, the land of the gods. When Morgoth, the first Dark Lord, destroyed the Trees, that light lived on only in the Silmarils; and Morgoth seized them and set them in his crown, guarded in the impenetrable fortress of Angband in the north of Middle-earth. The Silmarillion is the history of the rebellion of FÎanor and his people against the gods, their exile in Middle-earth, and their war, hopeless despite all the heroism of Elves and Men, against the great Enemy.
UNFINISHED TALES
Unfinished Tales is a collection of narratives ranging in time from the Elder Days of Middle-earth to the end of the War of the Ring and provides those who have read The Lord of the Rings with a whole collection of background and new stories from the twentieth century’s most acclaimed popular author. The book concentrates on the realm of Middle-earth and comprises such elements as Gandalf’s lively account of how it was that he came to send the Dwarves to the celebrated party at Bag-End, the emergence of the sea-god Ulmo before the eyes of Tuor on the coast of Beleriand, and an exact description of the military organization of the Riders of Rohan. Unfinished Tales also contains the only story about the long ages of Numenor before its downfall, and all that is known about such matters as the Five Wizards, the Palantiri and the legend of Amroth.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
From protests to movement
By Rahimullah Yusufzai
The campaign for creation of Hazara province is gaining momentum. The “Sooba Hazara Tehrik,” or Movement for Hazara Province, was able to shut down much of Hazara division on May 2 by giving a call for a wheels-jam and shutter-down strike. While continuing to hold public meetings in different parts of Hazara to rally support for its cause, the movement’s leadership is threatening to march on Islamabad as a last resort to force the government to accede to its demand.
Abbottabad, the picturesque hill station known as the City of Schools, has become the nerve centre of the movement. In fact, the movement is strongest in Abbottabad district, followed, in that order, by Haripur and Mansehra. Its weakest link is Battagram, a Pashto-speaking district where most people appear uncomfortable with the idea of their area becoming part of a new province dominated by non-Pashto-speakers. They would be happy to remain part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa after getting a new administrative division by the name of Abaseen comprising Battagram and Kohistan districts of Hazara and Shangla district of Malakand division.
The proposed division of Abaseen, which is the name given locally to the River Indus passing through this area, would also include the Provincially Administered Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka, or Torghar in Pashto, which is presently part of Mansehra district.
Kohistan, the fifth district in Hazara, seems divided on the issue of Hazara province. Its people would certainly support creation of Abaseen division and could eventually back Hazara province if it offers them greater political and economic benefits. The vast Kohistan district has two geographic parts, Swat Kohistan and Indus Kohistan. The main language is Kohistani, though many people are bilingual and can speak Pashto as well. One of its lawmakers, Abdul Sattar Khan of the PML-N, has moved a resolution in the provincial assembly demanding Hazara province while the others are pushing for creation of Abaseen division.
The renaming of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa provoked a strong reaction in Hazara, mostly in its Hindko-speaking areas of Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra. The PML-Q, defeated in Hazara in the 2008 general elections by Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, seized the opportunity and led protests against the new name of the province. It accused PML-N lawmakers from Hazara of failing to protect the identity of Hazarawals. As the protests grew, the campaign turned into a movement for Hazara province.
The movement was lucky to have a leader in the person of Sardar Haider Zaman, a fatherly figure who is largely uncontroversial and could keep Hazara’s often fractious politicians together. He has been contesting almost every assembly election from Abbottabad district and losing, except for a solitary win in the 1985 partyless polls when he went on to become a provincial minister. Twice he lost to Nawaz Sharif and this could be one reason for him to try and settle scores with the PML-N leader. His last and most recent public office was that of District Nazim of Abbottabad.
Defying his age, Baba Haider Zaman, 80, goes about the task of organising and leading public protests. With his flowing white beard, he has been inspiring his followers, promising them a prosperous future once Hazara province comes into being.
He is being helped in this cause by other leading figures of the movement such as former foreign minister and National Assembly Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan and his son Omar Ayub Khan, who served as minister of state for finance in Gen Musharraf’s PML-Q government. In their speeches at public meetings, father and son come up with fantastic figures as to how Hazara would prosper by utilising its abundant forests and minerals, tapping its tourism potential and getting its share of profits from Tarbela Dam, the Ghazi-Barotha Barrage and the proposed Basha-Diamer Dam. It is another matter if, at the end of the day, there is no change in the standard of living of the majority of people and only the rich and powerful benefit from the creation of a new province after getting to rule a smaller, easily manageable administrative unit.
Hazara has been more of an administrative unit than a distinct home of people of the same ethnicity. The term Hazarawal also didn’t confer a cultural, ethnic or linguistic identity on its people. The late Dr Sher Bahadur Khan, in his book Tareekh-e-Hazara, writes that 1,000 Qarliq Turks in 1282 settled in the area now known as Haripur and that is how Haripur alone got the name Hazara. The place now called Abbottabad was in old times known as Rush and Mansehra as Wadi-e-Pakhal. Haripur is named after a Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa from the court of Ranjit Singh, Abbottabad after the British official Major Abbott who administered the area and Mansehra after Man Singh. Those names haven’t been changed even though they belong to the colonial era and remind one of the subjugation of our people by alien rulers.
Though Hindko-speakers are in a majority in Hazara, it also has a fair share of people speaking Pashto, Gojri and Kohistani. But the chant, “Aik hi naara, Sooba Hazara” (One slogan, Hazara province) seems to be galvanising most of Hazara’s population and bringing them together. The idea is catching up and the movement’s leaders are so confident of success that they argue it is a matter of time before Hazara province becomes a reality. They are refusing to hold talks with the ANP-led government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa despite numerous offers from it and would like to negotiate only with the PPP-headed federal government, and that too on the one-point agenda of Hazara province.
The demand for Hazara province isn’t new, but it is now that it has come to occupy centre-stage. Years ago, an Abbottabad lawyer, Asif Malik, launched the movement for Hazara province and never got any significant support. It even put up candidates in elections, only to be trounced by the mainstream parties. Asif Malik is now dead and his group is still a player, though a marginal one, in Hazara politics, but the idea he gave has caught on. Though the intensity of opposition to a Pakhtun-specific name for NWFP was understandable among Hazara’s non-Pakhtun population, the strong criticism of Pakhtuns, or “Attockonpar,” meaning those living beyond Attock, as exploiters was surprising. Many Pakhtuns have been critical of Punjab as the unkind big brother, and here we are faced with a situation in which non-Pakhtuns living in the Pakhtun-majority Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa complaining of exploitation at their hands. For right or wrong reasons, such feelings arise when the cake to be shared is small or there is uneven distribution of resources. The same reasons led to the alienation of the majority Bengalis and separation of East Pakistan. This is also fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan and has enabled ethnic- and region-based political parties to retain substantial followings.
Things could have been different had the ruling PPP and ANP handled the situation wisely. Their insistence on renaming NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa was justified on the ground that it gave an identity to its majority Pakhtun population and this objective was achieved through a democratic process. But there was a need to consult the people not only in Hazara but also in other non-Pashto-speaking areas in the province and address their concerns as well. The issue of identity for Hazarawals was also important and this could have been tackled by prefixing “Hazara” to Pakhtunkhwa, instead of “Khyber.” Nobody demanded it and yet it was added on the insistence of the PML-N. It is probably too late now to think of reconciliation on these lines because the demand for Hazara province seems to have become non-negotiable. The creation of Abaseen division, which the provincial government is promoting, may weaken the Hazara movement, but it won’t be able to stop it.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
The campaign for creation of Hazara province is gaining momentum. The “Sooba Hazara Tehrik,” or Movement for Hazara Province, was able to shut down much of Hazara division on May 2 by giving a call for a wheels-jam and shutter-down strike. While continuing to hold public meetings in different parts of Hazara to rally support for its cause, the movement’s leadership is threatening to march on Islamabad as a last resort to force the government to accede to its demand.
Abbottabad, the picturesque hill station known as the City of Schools, has become the nerve centre of the movement. In fact, the movement is strongest in Abbottabad district, followed, in that order, by Haripur and Mansehra. Its weakest link is Battagram, a Pashto-speaking district where most people appear uncomfortable with the idea of their area becoming part of a new province dominated by non-Pashto-speakers. They would be happy to remain part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa after getting a new administrative division by the name of Abaseen comprising Battagram and Kohistan districts of Hazara and Shangla district of Malakand division.
The proposed division of Abaseen, which is the name given locally to the River Indus passing through this area, would also include the Provincially Administered Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka, or Torghar in Pashto, which is presently part of Mansehra district.
Kohistan, the fifth district in Hazara, seems divided on the issue of Hazara province. Its people would certainly support creation of Abaseen division and could eventually back Hazara province if it offers them greater political and economic benefits. The vast Kohistan district has two geographic parts, Swat Kohistan and Indus Kohistan. The main language is Kohistani, though many people are bilingual and can speak Pashto as well. One of its lawmakers, Abdul Sattar Khan of the PML-N, has moved a resolution in the provincial assembly demanding Hazara province while the others are pushing for creation of Abaseen division.
The renaming of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa provoked a strong reaction in Hazara, mostly in its Hindko-speaking areas of Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra. The PML-Q, defeated in Hazara in the 2008 general elections by Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, seized the opportunity and led protests against the new name of the province. It accused PML-N lawmakers from Hazara of failing to protect the identity of Hazarawals. As the protests grew, the campaign turned into a movement for Hazara province.
The movement was lucky to have a leader in the person of Sardar Haider Zaman, a fatherly figure who is largely uncontroversial and could keep Hazara’s often fractious politicians together. He has been contesting almost every assembly election from Abbottabad district and losing, except for a solitary win in the 1985 partyless polls when he went on to become a provincial minister. Twice he lost to Nawaz Sharif and this could be one reason for him to try and settle scores with the PML-N leader. His last and most recent public office was that of District Nazim of Abbottabad.
Defying his age, Baba Haider Zaman, 80, goes about the task of organising and leading public protests. With his flowing white beard, he has been inspiring his followers, promising them a prosperous future once Hazara province comes into being.
He is being helped in this cause by other leading figures of the movement such as former foreign minister and National Assembly Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan and his son Omar Ayub Khan, who served as minister of state for finance in Gen Musharraf’s PML-Q government. In their speeches at public meetings, father and son come up with fantastic figures as to how Hazara would prosper by utilising its abundant forests and minerals, tapping its tourism potential and getting its share of profits from Tarbela Dam, the Ghazi-Barotha Barrage and the proposed Basha-Diamer Dam. It is another matter if, at the end of the day, there is no change in the standard of living of the majority of people and only the rich and powerful benefit from the creation of a new province after getting to rule a smaller, easily manageable administrative unit.
Hazara has been more of an administrative unit than a distinct home of people of the same ethnicity. The term Hazarawal also didn’t confer a cultural, ethnic or linguistic identity on its people. The late Dr Sher Bahadur Khan, in his book Tareekh-e-Hazara, writes that 1,000 Qarliq Turks in 1282 settled in the area now known as Haripur and that is how Haripur alone got the name Hazara. The place now called Abbottabad was in old times known as Rush and Mansehra as Wadi-e-Pakhal. Haripur is named after a Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa from the court of Ranjit Singh, Abbottabad after the British official Major Abbott who administered the area and Mansehra after Man Singh. Those names haven’t been changed even though they belong to the colonial era and remind one of the subjugation of our people by alien rulers.
Though Hindko-speakers are in a majority in Hazara, it also has a fair share of people speaking Pashto, Gojri and Kohistani. But the chant, “Aik hi naara, Sooba Hazara” (One slogan, Hazara province) seems to be galvanising most of Hazara’s population and bringing them together. The idea is catching up and the movement’s leaders are so confident of success that they argue it is a matter of time before Hazara province becomes a reality. They are refusing to hold talks with the ANP-led government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa despite numerous offers from it and would like to negotiate only with the PPP-headed federal government, and that too on the one-point agenda of Hazara province.
The demand for Hazara province isn’t new, but it is now that it has come to occupy centre-stage. Years ago, an Abbottabad lawyer, Asif Malik, launched the movement for Hazara province and never got any significant support. It even put up candidates in elections, only to be trounced by the mainstream parties. Asif Malik is now dead and his group is still a player, though a marginal one, in Hazara politics, but the idea he gave has caught on. Though the intensity of opposition to a Pakhtun-specific name for NWFP was understandable among Hazara’s non-Pakhtun population, the strong criticism of Pakhtuns, or “Attockonpar,” meaning those living beyond Attock, as exploiters was surprising. Many Pakhtuns have been critical of Punjab as the unkind big brother, and here we are faced with a situation in which non-Pakhtuns living in the Pakhtun-majority Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa complaining of exploitation at their hands. For right or wrong reasons, such feelings arise when the cake to be shared is small or there is uneven distribution of resources. The same reasons led to the alienation of the majority Bengalis and separation of East Pakistan. This is also fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan and has enabled ethnic- and region-based political parties to retain substantial followings.
Things could have been different had the ruling PPP and ANP handled the situation wisely. Their insistence on renaming NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa was justified on the ground that it gave an identity to its majority Pakhtun population and this objective was achieved through a democratic process. But there was a need to consult the people not only in Hazara but also in other non-Pashto-speaking areas in the province and address their concerns as well. The issue of identity for Hazarawals was also important and this could have been tackled by prefixing “Hazara” to Pakhtunkhwa, instead of “Khyber.” Nobody demanded it and yet it was added on the insistence of the PML-N. It is probably too late now to think of reconciliation on these lines because the demand for Hazara province seems to have become non-negotiable. The creation of Abaseen division, which the provincial government is promoting, may weaken the Hazara movement, but it won’t be able to stop it.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
Opaque and unaccountable counter-terror
By Mosharraf Zaidi
The murder of Pakistan’s international man of mystery, Khalid Khawaja, should awaken Pakistanis on all points in the political, religious and social spectrum to the depth and complexity of the terrorists’ challenge to Pakistan. Khawaja was, what many investment bankers would call, a relationship manager. Along with a small group of others, he helped manage Pakistan’s various and increasingly complex relationships with terrorist groups. That he had spent an increasing share of his time in recent months trying to cool down and temper the responses of terrorists to the Pakistani state’s full-scale war on terror is ironic. Khawaja was the quintessential 21st century holy warrior — the anti-thesis of a counter-radicalisation strategy. That he was an asset in Pakistan’s strategy speaks volumes about how poorly prepared Pakistan is for this challenge.
As far back as 1987, Khalid Khawaja was seen to be too blunt, too extreme and too much of a risk for the piety-stricken Gen Ziaul Haq. It is ironic indeed that Daniel Pearl once harangued Khawaja for greater access to some of the Al Qaeda and Taliban figures he was on personal terms with. In the end, the extremist disease that beheaded Daniel Pearl was unable to distinguish between what Pearl represented, and what Khawaja stood for. When Pakistan’s violent extremists cannot tell the difference between Islamist activists like Khalid Khawaja and reporters for the Wall Street Journal like Daniel Pearl, we should all be very scared about what the hell it is, that is actually going on, in Pakistan. (That is of course if you haven’t yet been scared by the more than 25,000 lives that terrorism and counter-terror operations have claimed).
We know through the intrepid reporting of Zafar Abbas and Hamid Mir of course that Khawaja’s killers were not garden variety ‘Taliban’. We know that none of the so-called ‘good’ Pakistani Taliban — Gul Bahadur, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and their ilk — have any control over any of the ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban — Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Ilyas Kashmiri, and their latest ilk, the Asian Tigers. We know that the Asian Tigers, the group that took Khawaja’s life, was inspired by the tragedy at Lal Masjid. We know that the Afghan Taliban, no matter how hard clash-of-civilisations-analysts try, are not the same thing at all, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban, or their splinter groups, like the Asian Tigers.
Yet somehow, the word Taliban continues to be used in the broader Pakistani discourse wantonly, without any context. This enables a sanitised and simplified civilisational version of the world in which black and white caricatures are pitted against one another. On one side are the supposed frappuccino-sipping, sun-block dripping, dogma-ripping globalised liberals, on-side with the west and all things modern. On the other are the ‘Taliban’. If you don’t fit squarely into one group, you are automatically the other. This is why it is so easy to equate criticism of the PPP as a right-wing conspiracy, why it is so easy to label as anti-Pakistan anyone that questions the conduct of the military on and off the field of battle, and why it is so easy to brand those that condemn and oppose the tyranny of terrorists as American and Indian agents.
This “us versus them” formulation of a very complex set of incentives, stimuli and events had produced a dangerous culture of simplified good and evil in Pakistan. As we know from global experience, simpleton good v. evil is bush league — George W Bush League to be precise. If the American people have smartened up to the nuance and delicacy of dealing with different parts of the world, and different Muslim populations, differently, it seems ridiculous that Pakistanis should need any prodding at all to be convinced that nuance and delicacy might be in order in Pakistan’s own struggle against terrorists.
It stands to reason that among terrorist threats, there are both the reconcilables and irreconcilables. The reconcilable may include the so-called ‘good’ Taliban, like Haqqani and Co. Or they may not. We don’t actually know if there are any terrorists that are reconcilable. The possibility of openly exploring the space for armistices has been captured by the military, and shrunk due to the secrecy and failure surrounding previous attempts. The disastrous Nizam-e-Adl fiasco and the ensuing Rah-e-Rast operation in Swat buried the little political space that existed to consider engaging reconcilables. Many that had long advocated a zero-tolerance for terror groups’ demands were buoyed by the shrinkage of space for negotiations and talks with terrorists — at least partly, myself included. But Pakistanis have paid a high institutional price for the shrinking of the space for dialogue.
That price is the relevance of mysterious figures like Khawaja and Hamid Gul in Pakistani public life. In an environment that condemns talking to terrorists as a sign of weakness, and an existential threat, the only way the Pakistani state can communicate with terrorists is through these kinds of interlocutors. These interlocutors do the dirty work of the Pakistani state. The fact that Pakistanis don’t trust these interlocutors, any more than they trust their enemies, is not surprising. Operators like Hamid Gul can never enjoy the legitimacy to act on behalf of the Pakistani people. The only actors in the public space that do enjoy the luxury of legitimate agency are politicians.
Of course, the political space has not demonstrated its capacity for the courage to sit with, stare down, and negotiate with terrorists. Unless the mainstream parties, led by the PPP and the PML-N, produce politicians capable of travelling to the tribal agencies and sitting down with the Sirajuddin Haqqanis and Mullah Nazeers of the world, we can be certain of two things. One, public policy ‘trouble-shooters’ like Khawaja and Hamid Gul will continue to exercise power on behalf of the people of Pakistan, without the burden of accountability. Two, the Pakistani military will continue to conduct military operations — and charge taxpayers in Pakistan (and outside) a sizeable amount of money to do so, without any oversight at all.
If Pakistan’s military will ever be the impregnable wall of defence for Pakistan that it aspires to be, it needs to be subservient to civilian oversight. Only visible and demonstrable civilian oversight can help internalise the human cost of Pakistan’s war on terrorism. That cost begins and ends with innocent civilian casualties, or collateral damage. If there is one single issue that drives and motivates the rank and file of the irreconcilable terrorist threat in Pakistan, it is innocent civilian deaths.
We often speak of innocent civilian deaths in the abstract. The reason is simple. There is very little verifiable information about civilian deaths available to the public. All access to victims is controlled by the state — which is not too keen to allow a balanced national conversation. Still, two events stick out strikingly, in the chronology of the terrorism and counter-terrorism story of Pakistan since 2002. The first is the October 30, 2006, military attack on the Chenagai madressah in Bajaur, which killed more than 80 (mostly children). The second is the July 10, 2007, storming of Lal Masjid.
Innocent civilian deaths are often seen as a Trojan Horse, or a proxy for ideological opposition to war. And perhaps there needs to be an ideological debate about the merits and demerits of a Pakistani war on terrorism. But the implications of innocent civilian deaths on the actual war effort as it exists are here and now. They are real life, not ideological. The Asian Tigers’ are a direct correlate of the killing fields of Lal Masjid. Their murder of Khalid Khawaja is a manifestation of just how irreconcilable these groups have become.
The take-no-prisoners, kill-’em-all approach to the Pakistan’s terrorism problem has been arguably successful in some respects. But if the fallout from Lal Masjid is anything to go by, its failures and their extent is unknowable. That is a dangerous and scary prospect.
Killing innocent civilians is what terrorists do. That’s how terrorists should be branded. Those Pakistani soldiers that are bravely fighting terrorists should never be seen as aggressors of innocent people. The manner in which Pakistan is countering terrorism undermines the sacrifices of its soldiers, and perpetuates the presence of Khalid Khawajas and Hamid Guls in our national conversation. Pakistan and democracy can do better than this.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy.
The murder of Pakistan’s international man of mystery, Khalid Khawaja, should awaken Pakistanis on all points in the political, religious and social spectrum to the depth and complexity of the terrorists’ challenge to Pakistan. Khawaja was, what many investment bankers would call, a relationship manager. Along with a small group of others, he helped manage Pakistan’s various and increasingly complex relationships with terrorist groups. That he had spent an increasing share of his time in recent months trying to cool down and temper the responses of terrorists to the Pakistani state’s full-scale war on terror is ironic. Khawaja was the quintessential 21st century holy warrior — the anti-thesis of a counter-radicalisation strategy. That he was an asset in Pakistan’s strategy speaks volumes about how poorly prepared Pakistan is for this challenge.
As far back as 1987, Khalid Khawaja was seen to be too blunt, too extreme and too much of a risk for the piety-stricken Gen Ziaul Haq. It is ironic indeed that Daniel Pearl once harangued Khawaja for greater access to some of the Al Qaeda and Taliban figures he was on personal terms with. In the end, the extremist disease that beheaded Daniel Pearl was unable to distinguish between what Pearl represented, and what Khawaja stood for. When Pakistan’s violent extremists cannot tell the difference between Islamist activists like Khalid Khawaja and reporters for the Wall Street Journal like Daniel Pearl, we should all be very scared about what the hell it is, that is actually going on, in Pakistan. (That is of course if you haven’t yet been scared by the more than 25,000 lives that terrorism and counter-terror operations have claimed).
We know through the intrepid reporting of Zafar Abbas and Hamid Mir of course that Khawaja’s killers were not garden variety ‘Taliban’. We know that none of the so-called ‘good’ Pakistani Taliban — Gul Bahadur, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and their ilk — have any control over any of the ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban — Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Ilyas Kashmiri, and their latest ilk, the Asian Tigers. We know that the Asian Tigers, the group that took Khawaja’s life, was inspired by the tragedy at Lal Masjid. We know that the Afghan Taliban, no matter how hard clash-of-civilisations-analysts try, are not the same thing at all, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban, or their splinter groups, like the Asian Tigers.
Yet somehow, the word Taliban continues to be used in the broader Pakistani discourse wantonly, without any context. This enables a sanitised and simplified civilisational version of the world in which black and white caricatures are pitted against one another. On one side are the supposed frappuccino-sipping, sun-block dripping, dogma-ripping globalised liberals, on-side with the west and all things modern. On the other are the ‘Taliban’. If you don’t fit squarely into one group, you are automatically the other. This is why it is so easy to equate criticism of the PPP as a right-wing conspiracy, why it is so easy to label as anti-Pakistan anyone that questions the conduct of the military on and off the field of battle, and why it is so easy to brand those that condemn and oppose the tyranny of terrorists as American and Indian agents.
This “us versus them” formulation of a very complex set of incentives, stimuli and events had produced a dangerous culture of simplified good and evil in Pakistan. As we know from global experience, simpleton good v. evil is bush league — George W Bush League to be precise. If the American people have smartened up to the nuance and delicacy of dealing with different parts of the world, and different Muslim populations, differently, it seems ridiculous that Pakistanis should need any prodding at all to be convinced that nuance and delicacy might be in order in Pakistan’s own struggle against terrorists.
It stands to reason that among terrorist threats, there are both the reconcilables and irreconcilables. The reconcilable may include the so-called ‘good’ Taliban, like Haqqani and Co. Or they may not. We don’t actually know if there are any terrorists that are reconcilable. The possibility of openly exploring the space for armistices has been captured by the military, and shrunk due to the secrecy and failure surrounding previous attempts. The disastrous Nizam-e-Adl fiasco and the ensuing Rah-e-Rast operation in Swat buried the little political space that existed to consider engaging reconcilables. Many that had long advocated a zero-tolerance for terror groups’ demands were buoyed by the shrinkage of space for negotiations and talks with terrorists — at least partly, myself included. But Pakistanis have paid a high institutional price for the shrinking of the space for dialogue.
That price is the relevance of mysterious figures like Khawaja and Hamid Gul in Pakistani public life. In an environment that condemns talking to terrorists as a sign of weakness, and an existential threat, the only way the Pakistani state can communicate with terrorists is through these kinds of interlocutors. These interlocutors do the dirty work of the Pakistani state. The fact that Pakistanis don’t trust these interlocutors, any more than they trust their enemies, is not surprising. Operators like Hamid Gul can never enjoy the legitimacy to act on behalf of the Pakistani people. The only actors in the public space that do enjoy the luxury of legitimate agency are politicians.
Of course, the political space has not demonstrated its capacity for the courage to sit with, stare down, and negotiate with terrorists. Unless the mainstream parties, led by the PPP and the PML-N, produce politicians capable of travelling to the tribal agencies and sitting down with the Sirajuddin Haqqanis and Mullah Nazeers of the world, we can be certain of two things. One, public policy ‘trouble-shooters’ like Khawaja and Hamid Gul will continue to exercise power on behalf of the people of Pakistan, without the burden of accountability. Two, the Pakistani military will continue to conduct military operations — and charge taxpayers in Pakistan (and outside) a sizeable amount of money to do so, without any oversight at all.
If Pakistan’s military will ever be the impregnable wall of defence for Pakistan that it aspires to be, it needs to be subservient to civilian oversight. Only visible and demonstrable civilian oversight can help internalise the human cost of Pakistan’s war on terrorism. That cost begins and ends with innocent civilian casualties, or collateral damage. If there is one single issue that drives and motivates the rank and file of the irreconcilable terrorist threat in Pakistan, it is innocent civilian deaths.
We often speak of innocent civilian deaths in the abstract. The reason is simple. There is very little verifiable information about civilian deaths available to the public. All access to victims is controlled by the state — which is not too keen to allow a balanced national conversation. Still, two events stick out strikingly, in the chronology of the terrorism and counter-terrorism story of Pakistan since 2002. The first is the October 30, 2006, military attack on the Chenagai madressah in Bajaur, which killed more than 80 (mostly children). The second is the July 10, 2007, storming of Lal Masjid.
Innocent civilian deaths are often seen as a Trojan Horse, or a proxy for ideological opposition to war. And perhaps there needs to be an ideological debate about the merits and demerits of a Pakistani war on terrorism. But the implications of innocent civilian deaths on the actual war effort as it exists are here and now. They are real life, not ideological. The Asian Tigers’ are a direct correlate of the killing fields of Lal Masjid. Their murder of Khalid Khawaja is a manifestation of just how irreconcilable these groups have become.
The take-no-prisoners, kill-’em-all approach to the Pakistan’s terrorism problem has been arguably successful in some respects. But if the fallout from Lal Masjid is anything to go by, its failures and their extent is unknowable. That is a dangerous and scary prospect.
Killing innocent civilians is what terrorists do. That’s how terrorists should be branded. Those Pakistani soldiers that are bravely fighting terrorists should never be seen as aggressors of innocent people. The manner in which Pakistan is countering terrorism undermines the sacrifices of its soldiers, and perpetuates the presence of Khalid Khawajas and Hamid Guls in our national conversation. Pakistan and democracy can do better than this.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy.
Achieving economic stability
By Dr Ashfaque H Khan
Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh is the fourth person appointed by the present government in two years to look after the ministry of finance. Finance is the only portfolio which witnessed changes in faces in quick succession which speaks volume about the importance given to the economy by the present regime.
Dr Sheikh has inherited an extremely fragile economy which was badly handled for the last two years by those who had little understanding of the subject. Adverse internal and external developments of an extraordinary nature apart, the inept handling of the economy for over two years has brought miseries and pain for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic growth has slowed; the economy’s capacity to create jobs has shrunk, unemployment and poverty have risen; persistence of higher double-digit inflation has hurt the poor and the fixed income group the most; senseless borrowing coupled with sharp depreciation of exchange rate has drowned the country into debt (thanks to Shaukat Tarin); the country’s monetary policy has become subservient to fiscal slippages; power shortages and the persistence of circular debt have had crippling effects on the economy; and the confidence of the private sector is at all time low. Dr Sheikh does not have the capacity to address all the challenges simultaneously. He needs to prioritise these challenges and address the core issue first.
Restoring macroeconomic stability in a reasonable time frame should be the top most priority of Dr Sheikh. Empirical evidences suggest that macroeconomic instability has generally been associated with poor growth and a consequent rise in unemployment and poverty. Hence, growth cannot be revived on sustained basis without achieving macroeconomic stability. Thus, macroeconomic stability is sine quo non for achieving higher economic growth and poverty alleviation.
How can we achieve macroeconomic stability? Reducing fiscal deficit by mobilising more resources, rationalising current expenditure and prioritising development expenditure are some of the critical steps that are needed in order to achieve macroeconomic stability. Dr Sheikh must ensure that fiscal deficit remains at 5.1 per cent of the GDP in the current fiscal year. For the next fiscal year (2010-11), budget deficit target should be fixed at 4.0 per cent of the GDP for which he needs the total support of the prime minister.
Budget deficit is the mother of economic problems. It gives birth to many economic ills and hence creates macroeconomic instability. Reduction in budget deficit would reduce the borrowing needs of the government, slow the pace of accumulation of public debt, release pressure on interest rate, would enable the SBP to reduce discount rate which in turn would encourage the private sector to undertake new investments. Reduction in budget deficit would also help improve current account balance.
Bringing inflation down to a single-digit level is also needed for macroeconomic stability. Keeping the budget deficit low, maintaining stability in exchange rate, pursuance of tight monetary policy and freezing the support price of wheat for two more years will help bring inflation down to a single-digit level.
Restoring investors’ confidence should be the second most priority of Dr Sheikh. Establishing a channel of communication with the stakeholders should be the first step in this direction. Dr Sheikh is not communicating either with the print and electronic media or with the private sector and hence the uncertainty on economic policy continues to prevail. He must talk to a select group of economic journalists and TV channels and explain the government’s position on the economy. He must visit the leading chambers of both domestic and foreign investors; talk to the leading industrialists and address the president of the banks. Constant engagement with the private sector is vital for restoring their confidence on economic management.
Resource mobilisation through tax system and tax administration reforms should be the third most priority of Dr Sheikh. An issue at hand is the imposition of the Value Add Tax (VAT) with effect from July 1, 2010. The VAT has gained favour over traditional sales tax worldwide. The government has neither trained the tax collectors nor educated the tax payers about the VAT. As such, the VAT has not been properly understood by the tax payers and hence there is resistance from different quarters. If the VAT is implemented without proper homework, it will create chaos and will hurt the revenue generation efforts of the government.
Let me make a suggestion here. The government should impose VAT with budget 2010-11 but its implementation may take effect from July 1, 2011 instead of 2010. The government must use the time for training the tax collectors and educating the tax payers. The IMF must set some performance criteria regarding the education of the tax payers on quarterly basis. The World Bank must assist the government in educating the tax payers and training the tax collectors on the field. It must assure the IMF through highest level that the VAT will be effective from July 2011.
Addressing the challenges of power management should be the fourth priority of Dr Sheikh. Conservation and augmentation of power should be the guiding principals in addressing such a challenge. The government has already taken several measures to conserve power. On augmentation side, there are 50 power projects totaling 12,150MW in different stages of completion and will come into operation during October 2008 to December 2015. At least four of them have been completed and inaugurated by the prime minister. The government must ensure that these projects are completed in time.
Dr Sheikh has inherited a badly damaged economy. He has to take a pro-active approach to address the challenges. He will also have to take politically difficult decisions to restore macroeconomic stability for which he will need support from the prime minister.
The writer is director general and dean at NUST Business School, Islamabad.
Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh is the fourth person appointed by the present government in two years to look after the ministry of finance. Finance is the only portfolio which witnessed changes in faces in quick succession which speaks volume about the importance given to the economy by the present regime.
Dr Sheikh has inherited an extremely fragile economy which was badly handled for the last two years by those who had little understanding of the subject. Adverse internal and external developments of an extraordinary nature apart, the inept handling of the economy for over two years has brought miseries and pain for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic growth has slowed; the economy’s capacity to create jobs has shrunk, unemployment and poverty have risen; persistence of higher double-digit inflation has hurt the poor and the fixed income group the most; senseless borrowing coupled with sharp depreciation of exchange rate has drowned the country into debt (thanks to Shaukat Tarin); the country’s monetary policy has become subservient to fiscal slippages; power shortages and the persistence of circular debt have had crippling effects on the economy; and the confidence of the private sector is at all time low. Dr Sheikh does not have the capacity to address all the challenges simultaneously. He needs to prioritise these challenges and address the core issue first.
Restoring macroeconomic stability in a reasonable time frame should be the top most priority of Dr Sheikh. Empirical evidences suggest that macroeconomic instability has generally been associated with poor growth and a consequent rise in unemployment and poverty. Hence, growth cannot be revived on sustained basis without achieving macroeconomic stability. Thus, macroeconomic stability is sine quo non for achieving higher economic growth and poverty alleviation.
How can we achieve macroeconomic stability? Reducing fiscal deficit by mobilising more resources, rationalising current expenditure and prioritising development expenditure are some of the critical steps that are needed in order to achieve macroeconomic stability. Dr Sheikh must ensure that fiscal deficit remains at 5.1 per cent of the GDP in the current fiscal year. For the next fiscal year (2010-11), budget deficit target should be fixed at 4.0 per cent of the GDP for which he needs the total support of the prime minister.
Budget deficit is the mother of economic problems. It gives birth to many economic ills and hence creates macroeconomic instability. Reduction in budget deficit would reduce the borrowing needs of the government, slow the pace of accumulation of public debt, release pressure on interest rate, would enable the SBP to reduce discount rate which in turn would encourage the private sector to undertake new investments. Reduction in budget deficit would also help improve current account balance.
Bringing inflation down to a single-digit level is also needed for macroeconomic stability. Keeping the budget deficit low, maintaining stability in exchange rate, pursuance of tight monetary policy and freezing the support price of wheat for two more years will help bring inflation down to a single-digit level.
Restoring investors’ confidence should be the second most priority of Dr Sheikh. Establishing a channel of communication with the stakeholders should be the first step in this direction. Dr Sheikh is not communicating either with the print and electronic media or with the private sector and hence the uncertainty on economic policy continues to prevail. He must talk to a select group of economic journalists and TV channels and explain the government’s position on the economy. He must visit the leading chambers of both domestic and foreign investors; talk to the leading industrialists and address the president of the banks. Constant engagement with the private sector is vital for restoring their confidence on economic management.
Resource mobilisation through tax system and tax administration reforms should be the third most priority of Dr Sheikh. An issue at hand is the imposition of the Value Add Tax (VAT) with effect from July 1, 2010. The VAT has gained favour over traditional sales tax worldwide. The government has neither trained the tax collectors nor educated the tax payers about the VAT. As such, the VAT has not been properly understood by the tax payers and hence there is resistance from different quarters. If the VAT is implemented without proper homework, it will create chaos and will hurt the revenue generation efforts of the government.
Let me make a suggestion here. The government should impose VAT with budget 2010-11 but its implementation may take effect from July 1, 2011 instead of 2010. The government must use the time for training the tax collectors and educating the tax payers. The IMF must set some performance criteria regarding the education of the tax payers on quarterly basis. The World Bank must assist the government in educating the tax payers and training the tax collectors on the field. It must assure the IMF through highest level that the VAT will be effective from July 2011.
Addressing the challenges of power management should be the fourth priority of Dr Sheikh. Conservation and augmentation of power should be the guiding principals in addressing such a challenge. The government has already taken several measures to conserve power. On augmentation side, there are 50 power projects totaling 12,150MW in different stages of completion and will come into operation during October 2008 to December 2015. At least four of them have been completed and inaugurated by the prime minister. The government must ensure that these projects are completed in time.
Dr Sheikh has inherited a badly damaged economy. He has to take a pro-active approach to address the challenges. He will also have to take politically difficult decisions to restore macroeconomic stability for which he will need support from the prime minister.
The writer is director general and dean at NUST Business School, Islamabad.
A committee and a half
Kamran Shafi
The committee set up to fix responsibility for the hosing down of the site of Benazir Bhutto’s dastardly assassination is something to behold: a federal secretary, a provincial additional secretary and the vice chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army.
What a committee indeed, with a real general on it whose presence must strike the fear of God into the other members, one of whom is reportedly best buddies with the general being investigated! Only a very unique government of a very unique country could have set up such a committee.
The point is this: a lowly official such as a CPO (city police officer) would not, even in his wildest imagination, even in a horrible nightmare, on his own order the hosing down of a site where a personage as illustrious as Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated.
Neither would a functionary of state so cockily and with such nonchalance dismiss a senior doctor’s request to carry out a post-mortem on a leader of the stature of Benazir Bhutto, a post-mortem that was legally binding on the state to carry out, mind, unless he had friends in very high (and very secure) places who were egging him on. Don’t we know this; don’t we come from the same country as Mr Saud Aziz and his friends? Are we Martians?
The government must get real; it must bend every sinew to get to the bottom of this horrendous crime. Benazir was no ordinary person: she was the daughter of a very great man in whose name the PPP still gets the votes of the poor and the dispossessed of our country. She herself bravely led the PPP for well on 33 years and had an unusual and strong bond with the poor with whom she empathised in a very real way; never cynically. Why, I have seen her weep hearing an old man tell her his problems, and herself making a call to some minor government functionary asking him to please help.
I write what I write only to point out to those that matter, both in government and ‘outside’, not to take Benazir’s cruel and cold-blooded murder lightly. Benazir’s blood will be avenged, mark my words, for there are too many people out there whose lives she touched very deeply. I would caution anyone whose name is being bandied about in the press in relation to this horrible crime to review their stand immediately: to wit, the threesome of Rehman Malik and Babar Awan and Farhatullah Babar to at the very least agree with each other regarding the minutes immediately following the shooting/bombing.
They must tell us why they drove to Zardari House in Islamabad when, according to some of them, they knew that Benazir had come under attack. Rehman Malik must tell us who it was that told him on the telephone that Benazir had survived the attempt on her life when the fact is that she fell down dead immediately after the second shot of the pistol shooter from barely two metres away, and which made her dupatta flutter at what surely must be the exit point of the bullet.
Let me say here and now, that one of the above mentioned, Farhatullah Babar, is well known to me as a gentleman for 22 years now when both of us worked for Benazir — him as speechwriter, I as her press secretary. I cannot for a moment believe that he could ever tell an untruth, and more than that, that he could ever think a bad thought about Benazir. So why the confusion?
Questions: why did the ‘follow-car’ become an ‘advance car’? Did the occupants hear the blast? If so, why did the car not immediately turn back to see what had happened to the leader? Who told Rehman Malik Benazir was unhurt? Why did the car not stop and wait for Benazir’s SUV to overtake them and then follow her to Zardari House? These questions simply must be answered and answered immediately. Remember, the avenging spirit of the very poor is very great, indeed.
One Shaukat Ali, in a letter reminiscent of many others that are written when the establishment is upset (!) has alleged that I lost my temper while on a TV talk show with Sheikh Rashid and said that the corps commanders had no right to object to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Wrong. I did firmly correct Sheikh Rashid when he suggested that I had ‘abused’ the army which was like a second mother to me for I had served it for 11 of the best years of my life, and that I would not let him get away with raising his voice at me as he was in the habit of doing with others.
As for the Kerry-Lugar Bill, I did not bring it up. Sheikh Rashid did. However, I have always said, and continue to maintain, that it is a perfect piece of legislation that says words to the effect that unless the US secretary of state certifies from time to time that the army is not interfering in the political life of the country it will not receive US aid.
My point has always been that in spite of expressing their ‘fury’ at the KLB the army top brass had no compunction in asking for US aid in a meeting between Generals Kayani and Petraeus exactly nine days after venting their ‘fury’. So why the ‘fury’?
As for our soldiers and officers fighting bravely the enemies of Pakistan, what in the world does that have to do with a handful of senior generals stepping out of line? Indeed, it is because of the wrongheaded policies of our brass hats that we are in the soup we are in, and why brave young men are losing their precious lives.
Incidentally, let me tell Shaukat Ali that while I am well over the age of recall to active duty, I have volunteered my services to my battalion whenever needed. So, no one please lecture me on probity and ‘love’ of the army/country. Not Master Rashid, not Master Ali. Incidentally, a search on the Internet showed that 95 per cent of viewers supported what I had said.
PS I made the mistake of my life when I appeared, against better counsel, on Dr Shahid Masood’s Meray Mutabiq which was recorded and then edited. And by golly was it edited! Suffice it to say that I was shocked out of my wits, and greatly saddened, at the show as aired.
The committee set up to fix responsibility for the hosing down of the site of Benazir Bhutto’s dastardly assassination is something to behold: a federal secretary, a provincial additional secretary and the vice chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army.
What a committee indeed, with a real general on it whose presence must strike the fear of God into the other members, one of whom is reportedly best buddies with the general being investigated! Only a very unique government of a very unique country could have set up such a committee.
The point is this: a lowly official such as a CPO (city police officer) would not, even in his wildest imagination, even in a horrible nightmare, on his own order the hosing down of a site where a personage as illustrious as Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated.
Neither would a functionary of state so cockily and with such nonchalance dismiss a senior doctor’s request to carry out a post-mortem on a leader of the stature of Benazir Bhutto, a post-mortem that was legally binding on the state to carry out, mind, unless he had friends in very high (and very secure) places who were egging him on. Don’t we know this; don’t we come from the same country as Mr Saud Aziz and his friends? Are we Martians?
The government must get real; it must bend every sinew to get to the bottom of this horrendous crime. Benazir was no ordinary person: she was the daughter of a very great man in whose name the PPP still gets the votes of the poor and the dispossessed of our country. She herself bravely led the PPP for well on 33 years and had an unusual and strong bond with the poor with whom she empathised in a very real way; never cynically. Why, I have seen her weep hearing an old man tell her his problems, and herself making a call to some minor government functionary asking him to please help.
I write what I write only to point out to those that matter, both in government and ‘outside’, not to take Benazir’s cruel and cold-blooded murder lightly. Benazir’s blood will be avenged, mark my words, for there are too many people out there whose lives she touched very deeply. I would caution anyone whose name is being bandied about in the press in relation to this horrible crime to review their stand immediately: to wit, the threesome of Rehman Malik and Babar Awan and Farhatullah Babar to at the very least agree with each other regarding the minutes immediately following the shooting/bombing.
They must tell us why they drove to Zardari House in Islamabad when, according to some of them, they knew that Benazir had come under attack. Rehman Malik must tell us who it was that told him on the telephone that Benazir had survived the attempt on her life when the fact is that she fell down dead immediately after the second shot of the pistol shooter from barely two metres away, and which made her dupatta flutter at what surely must be the exit point of the bullet.
Let me say here and now, that one of the above mentioned, Farhatullah Babar, is well known to me as a gentleman for 22 years now when both of us worked for Benazir — him as speechwriter, I as her press secretary. I cannot for a moment believe that he could ever tell an untruth, and more than that, that he could ever think a bad thought about Benazir. So why the confusion?
Questions: why did the ‘follow-car’ become an ‘advance car’? Did the occupants hear the blast? If so, why did the car not immediately turn back to see what had happened to the leader? Who told Rehman Malik Benazir was unhurt? Why did the car not stop and wait for Benazir’s SUV to overtake them and then follow her to Zardari House? These questions simply must be answered and answered immediately. Remember, the avenging spirit of the very poor is very great, indeed.
One Shaukat Ali, in a letter reminiscent of many others that are written when the establishment is upset (!) has alleged that I lost my temper while on a TV talk show with Sheikh Rashid and said that the corps commanders had no right to object to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Wrong. I did firmly correct Sheikh Rashid when he suggested that I had ‘abused’ the army which was like a second mother to me for I had served it for 11 of the best years of my life, and that I would not let him get away with raising his voice at me as he was in the habit of doing with others.
As for the Kerry-Lugar Bill, I did not bring it up. Sheikh Rashid did. However, I have always said, and continue to maintain, that it is a perfect piece of legislation that says words to the effect that unless the US secretary of state certifies from time to time that the army is not interfering in the political life of the country it will not receive US aid.
My point has always been that in spite of expressing their ‘fury’ at the KLB the army top brass had no compunction in asking for US aid in a meeting between Generals Kayani and Petraeus exactly nine days after venting their ‘fury’. So why the ‘fury’?
As for our soldiers and officers fighting bravely the enemies of Pakistan, what in the world does that have to do with a handful of senior generals stepping out of line? Indeed, it is because of the wrongheaded policies of our brass hats that we are in the soup we are in, and why brave young men are losing their precious lives.
Incidentally, let me tell Shaukat Ali that while I am well over the age of recall to active duty, I have volunteered my services to my battalion whenever needed. So, no one please lecture me on probity and ‘love’ of the army/country. Not Master Rashid, not Master Ali. Incidentally, a search on the Internet showed that 95 per cent of viewers supported what I had said.
PS I made the mistake of my life when I appeared, against better counsel, on Dr Shahid Masood’s Meray Mutabiq which was recorded and then edited. And by golly was it edited! Suffice it to say that I was shocked out of my wits, and greatly saddened, at the show as aired.
An open letter to the PM
By Ikramullah
Mr Prime Minister, now that the 18th Amendment has been passed unanimously, I take this as an opportunity to highlight the areas that have been neglected by your government.
One such area is the energy sector. Though the current power crisis has not erupted overnight, but Mr Prime Minister your government has been in power for the past two years. And despite several achievements to your credit, including the 18th Amendment and NFC Awards, many parallel initiatives could have been undertaken at the federal, as well provincial levels, to bring immediate relief to the masses from this constant agony.
Sir, time is running out and who should know it better than the prime minister of the country. Something has to be done, urgently, before the present situation worsens.
Unfortunately, the ‘elected ‘ and ‘selected’ ministers have delivered nothing substantial as far as the water and power crisis is concerned. Please sir, screen them out before you are blamed for their failures or misdeeds and worst involvement in corruption charges.
In my quest, at personal level, to understand and resolve the water and power crisis, presently threatening Pakistan’s national security, my study revealed two major shortcomings. One, I failed to understand why all the successive governments have focussed more on building major dams – doing nothing after constructing Mangla and Tarbela – while ignoring other sources at the local level as many opportunities existed on the ground to complete small hydel projects. Indeed, a fact-finding mission needs to discover whether it was sheer incompetence of the previous governments or their vested interest that motivated them to pursue other high cost projects like thermal and rental.
Two, the natural alternative to hydel source of power is coal and biomass. It is good that both are abundantly available in Pakistan to meet the country’s total shortfall of 4000 MW. My quests, by way of production through coal, lead me to Khushab where I was told that a project is functioning for the last 10 years. Therefore, I visited that plant which is unbelievably producing 8MW for their operational use through coal. The daily requirement of coal for this plant for steam and power generation is 500 tonnes and the supply of which is obtained from Azad Kashmir, Baluchistan, Punjab and Thar. But it is strange that with enough coal available in the country this source has not being utilised extensively to meet the energy shortage at an approximate cost of Rs 3.5 per unit, instead of a rental at Rs 15 per unit.
Various plants in the range of 100 MW or more can be made operational in less than two years on a war-footing. If this initiative had been taken by the present government in 2008, most of these plants would have been operational or nearing completion. Thus, overcoming the present acute shortage and resultant loadshedding.
Mr Prime Minister, you definitely have to do something soon for the progress and solidarity of the nation.
The writer is the president of the Pakistan National Forum.
Mr Prime Minister, now that the 18th Amendment has been passed unanimously, I take this as an opportunity to highlight the areas that have been neglected by your government.
One such area is the energy sector. Though the current power crisis has not erupted overnight, but Mr Prime Minister your government has been in power for the past two years. And despite several achievements to your credit, including the 18th Amendment and NFC Awards, many parallel initiatives could have been undertaken at the federal, as well provincial levels, to bring immediate relief to the masses from this constant agony.
Sir, time is running out and who should know it better than the prime minister of the country. Something has to be done, urgently, before the present situation worsens.
Unfortunately, the ‘elected ‘ and ‘selected’ ministers have delivered nothing substantial as far as the water and power crisis is concerned. Please sir, screen them out before you are blamed for their failures or misdeeds and worst involvement in corruption charges.
In my quest, at personal level, to understand and resolve the water and power crisis, presently threatening Pakistan’s national security, my study revealed two major shortcomings. One, I failed to understand why all the successive governments have focussed more on building major dams – doing nothing after constructing Mangla and Tarbela – while ignoring other sources at the local level as many opportunities existed on the ground to complete small hydel projects. Indeed, a fact-finding mission needs to discover whether it was sheer incompetence of the previous governments or their vested interest that motivated them to pursue other high cost projects like thermal and rental.
Two, the natural alternative to hydel source of power is coal and biomass. It is good that both are abundantly available in Pakistan to meet the country’s total shortfall of 4000 MW. My quests, by way of production through coal, lead me to Khushab where I was told that a project is functioning for the last 10 years. Therefore, I visited that plant which is unbelievably producing 8MW for their operational use through coal. The daily requirement of coal for this plant for steam and power generation is 500 tonnes and the supply of which is obtained from Azad Kashmir, Baluchistan, Punjab and Thar. But it is strange that with enough coal available in the country this source has not being utilised extensively to meet the energy shortage at an approximate cost of Rs 3.5 per unit, instead of a rental at Rs 15 per unit.
Various plants in the range of 100 MW or more can be made operational in less than two years on a war-footing. If this initiative had been taken by the present government in 2008, most of these plants would have been operational or nearing completion. Thus, overcoming the present acute shortage and resultant loadshedding.
Mr Prime Minister, you definitely have to do something soon for the progress and solidarity of the nation.
The writer is the president of the Pakistan National Forum.
Madhuri Gupta – spy or scapegoat?
By Farooq Hameed Khan
Madhuri Gupta, in a Delhi court, said: “I am being framed”, facing charges of passing on “information” to her “Pakistani handlers”, while posted as second secretary in the Media and Information Wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. As per Indian news reports, the 53 year old, unmarried, specialist Urdu interpreter was arrested after being summoned to New Delhi in connection with the SAARC Summit.
Hawks and power groups within the Indian establishment are known to influence the political decision making, especially when related to Pakistan. It is still a widely accepted view that the Mumbai tragedy was staged by the Indian intelligence agencies with external help to derail the peace process. Furthermore, despite PM Manmohan Singh’s agreement with PM Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Sharm El-Sheikh Declaration to delink the peace process with acts of terrorism, yet the Establishment prevailed and Manmohan Singh took a U-turn on his return to India.
Nevertheless, the Indian establishment’s plan to cast a shadow or act as a spoiler over the SAARC Summit was clearly exposed in its timing and the manner that the Madhuri Gupta case hit the Indian media waves. More surprising was the speed at which the Indian media unfolded the “story”. The media hype was observed to be specially high and sensational during the period of the SAARC Summit, slowing down after the summit concluded. However, Pakistan responded with a cool, stating that “it is India’s internal affair.”
The Madhuri Gupta episode raises many questions. Why was the disclosure of this “spy scandal” in Indian media timed to coincide with the SAARC Summit? Was it aimed to malign and embarrass the Pakistani prime minister, who heads the country’s elite intelligence agencies? Was it designed to sabotage the much-awaited Gilani-Manmohan meeting the next day, on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit?
For once, these negative efforts backfired as both prime ministers went ahead with their over an hour long one-to-one meeting. So one hopes that the Indian prime minister will honour his agreement to resume the composite dialogue and not allow it to be hijacked again by the Indian establishment through the well engineered and crafted Madhuri’s breaking news.
A few contradictions seem obvious in this case. It is being stated that Madhuri was a low level “B” grade official with no access to classified material, who had not transferred any vital information to her “Pakistani contacts.” At the same time, she has been booked under the Official Secrets Act for leaking out “Indian plans in Afghanistan.” Who would believe that such a junior level functionary whose primary job was to prepare daily news clippings or monitor local media reports could play around with such critical information?
What’s more, the Indian media reported that Madhuri was discreetly recalled from Islamabad in connection with the SAARC Summit. One wonders, if the Indian government required such a high level pretext when dealing with an official of her status.
Given the unique nature of Indo-Pak relationship, diplomats posted in either country’s High Commission must surely be amongst the best and most trustworthy of the lot. If the experienced Madhuri Gupta, who had reportedly served earlier in other Indian foreign missions, “compromised” while serving in perhaps India’s most sensitive Islamabad mission, it reflects the deep sense of insecurity and disloyalty that seem to permeate Indian officials selected for such prized appointments. More so, when there have been similar cases in the past as reported in Indian media.
When foreign missions host parties and receptions, they aim to improve their country’s image and relations with the host country, by interacting with local personalities of diverse backgrounds. In case of country like India, such occasions also provide a good opportunity to develop contacts with selected personalities and even cultivate them to promote Indian interests.
The Indian High Commission is specially known for its lavish ‘booze parties’ and musical evenings that attract some of the so-called Pakistani secularists, politicians, businessmen, NGO activists, media men and even senior retired government officers etc. While the nation mourned the shocking Parade Lane and Moon Market tragedies in December last year, the Indian High Commission went ahead with one such party that was attended by many from the Islamabad elite.
The commonly employed and easily understandable spying modus operandi would therefore involve cultivation of local Pakistanis by the Indian intelligence sleuths posted in their High Commission. Why would the low ranking Madhuri Gupta take the risk of communicating with Pakistani intelligence officials (and vice versa) in the presence of surveillance and security systems installed in high security missions, like the Indian High Commission? It just does not make sense!
Previously, the Indian media has reported few recent cases of breach of trust and national security by Indian officials, while posted in missions abroad. There have also been reports of some Indian army generals being court martialed on financial corruption charges. Isn’t the betrayal of national trust by the Indian government elite a stain on “Rising and Shining” India? Are these the early signs of a degeneration of Indian pride and nationalism?
Then again, the Indian media’s biggest revelation that Madhuri Gupta may have converted to Shia Islam must come as a bombshell to Hindu India pride. Given the apparent anger and hostility by the Indian media, as well as extremist groups, towards the Shoaib-Sania wedding affair, Madhuri Ji may also be heading for difficult times.
Was Madhuri indeed an undercover Indian intelligence agent? Was she and her undercover boss “recovered” in time to pre-empt the embarrassment of their blown up cover? Will Madhuri Gupta be made the scapegoat for the intra-intelligence rivalry that rocked the Indian High Commission? Her lawyer, Joginder Dahiya, however maintains that his conversation with Madhuri showed that she had not fallen into any “honey trap.”
The writer is a retired brigadier.
Madhuri Gupta, in a Delhi court, said: “I am being framed”, facing charges of passing on “information” to her “Pakistani handlers”, while posted as second secretary in the Media and Information Wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. As per Indian news reports, the 53 year old, unmarried, specialist Urdu interpreter was arrested after being summoned to New Delhi in connection with the SAARC Summit.
Hawks and power groups within the Indian establishment are known to influence the political decision making, especially when related to Pakistan. It is still a widely accepted view that the Mumbai tragedy was staged by the Indian intelligence agencies with external help to derail the peace process. Furthermore, despite PM Manmohan Singh’s agreement with PM Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Sharm El-Sheikh Declaration to delink the peace process with acts of terrorism, yet the Establishment prevailed and Manmohan Singh took a U-turn on his return to India.
Nevertheless, the Indian establishment’s plan to cast a shadow or act as a spoiler over the SAARC Summit was clearly exposed in its timing and the manner that the Madhuri Gupta case hit the Indian media waves. More surprising was the speed at which the Indian media unfolded the “story”. The media hype was observed to be specially high and sensational during the period of the SAARC Summit, slowing down after the summit concluded. However, Pakistan responded with a cool, stating that “it is India’s internal affair.”
The Madhuri Gupta episode raises many questions. Why was the disclosure of this “spy scandal” in Indian media timed to coincide with the SAARC Summit? Was it aimed to malign and embarrass the Pakistani prime minister, who heads the country’s elite intelligence agencies? Was it designed to sabotage the much-awaited Gilani-Manmohan meeting the next day, on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit?
For once, these negative efforts backfired as both prime ministers went ahead with their over an hour long one-to-one meeting. So one hopes that the Indian prime minister will honour his agreement to resume the composite dialogue and not allow it to be hijacked again by the Indian establishment through the well engineered and crafted Madhuri’s breaking news.
A few contradictions seem obvious in this case. It is being stated that Madhuri was a low level “B” grade official with no access to classified material, who had not transferred any vital information to her “Pakistani contacts.” At the same time, she has been booked under the Official Secrets Act for leaking out “Indian plans in Afghanistan.” Who would believe that such a junior level functionary whose primary job was to prepare daily news clippings or monitor local media reports could play around with such critical information?
What’s more, the Indian media reported that Madhuri was discreetly recalled from Islamabad in connection with the SAARC Summit. One wonders, if the Indian government required such a high level pretext when dealing with an official of her status.
Given the unique nature of Indo-Pak relationship, diplomats posted in either country’s High Commission must surely be amongst the best and most trustworthy of the lot. If the experienced Madhuri Gupta, who had reportedly served earlier in other Indian foreign missions, “compromised” while serving in perhaps India’s most sensitive Islamabad mission, it reflects the deep sense of insecurity and disloyalty that seem to permeate Indian officials selected for such prized appointments. More so, when there have been similar cases in the past as reported in Indian media.
When foreign missions host parties and receptions, they aim to improve their country’s image and relations with the host country, by interacting with local personalities of diverse backgrounds. In case of country like India, such occasions also provide a good opportunity to develop contacts with selected personalities and even cultivate them to promote Indian interests.
The Indian High Commission is specially known for its lavish ‘booze parties’ and musical evenings that attract some of the so-called Pakistani secularists, politicians, businessmen, NGO activists, media men and even senior retired government officers etc. While the nation mourned the shocking Parade Lane and Moon Market tragedies in December last year, the Indian High Commission went ahead with one such party that was attended by many from the Islamabad elite.
The commonly employed and easily understandable spying modus operandi would therefore involve cultivation of local Pakistanis by the Indian intelligence sleuths posted in their High Commission. Why would the low ranking Madhuri Gupta take the risk of communicating with Pakistani intelligence officials (and vice versa) in the presence of surveillance and security systems installed in high security missions, like the Indian High Commission? It just does not make sense!
Previously, the Indian media has reported few recent cases of breach of trust and national security by Indian officials, while posted in missions abroad. There have also been reports of some Indian army generals being court martialed on financial corruption charges. Isn’t the betrayal of national trust by the Indian government elite a stain on “Rising and Shining” India? Are these the early signs of a degeneration of Indian pride and nationalism?
Then again, the Indian media’s biggest revelation that Madhuri Gupta may have converted to Shia Islam must come as a bombshell to Hindu India pride. Given the apparent anger and hostility by the Indian media, as well as extremist groups, towards the Shoaib-Sania wedding affair, Madhuri Ji may also be heading for difficult times.
Was Madhuri indeed an undercover Indian intelligence agent? Was she and her undercover boss “recovered” in time to pre-empt the embarrassment of their blown up cover? Will Madhuri Gupta be made the scapegoat for the intra-intelligence rivalry that rocked the Indian High Commission? Her lawyer, Joginder Dahiya, however maintains that his conversation with Madhuri showed that she had not fallen into any “honey trap.”
The writer is a retired brigadier.
SAARC revisited
By Javid Husain
The absence of a long-term sense of direction has been a perennial feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy since its independence. This shortcoming has been the direct result of the lack of vision on the part of our policy makers about the place and the role of our country in the comity of nations and the disease of day-to-day thinking which afflicts our leaders and officials collectively. There is no issue which has suffered more from these collective failings of ours than our membership of the SAARC. It appears from a close examination of the way we have handled the SAARC issues that neither our leadership, nor our officials have paid serious attention to the long-term goals that we wish to achieve through our participation in this regional cooperation organisation. We have not bothered to carry out an in-depth study of the long-term potential of the SAARC as well as its limitations. The focus instead has been on making tired clichés, frivolous statements and invalid comparisons with the experience of the European Union. The cacophony of voices coming out of the Pakistani leadership after the recently concluded 16th SAARC Summit at Thimphu reflects this confused state of mind rather than clarity of thought.
It is true that regional economic cooperation has been successful in accelerating the economic progress of the member states of many regional cooperation organisations, the foremost being the European Union. The process of economic integration within the EU has resulted in unprecedented economic prosperity of its member states thus providing an impetus for the establishment of similar regional cooperation organisations in other regions like ASEAN, MERCOSUR, GCC, ECO and SAARC. However, the record of these organisations in promoting regional economic cooperation and accelerating the economic growth and development of their respective member states varies from region to region depending upon their economic conditions, cultural affinities, political and security conditions, and strategic goals.
The economic rationale for a regional economic grouping rests primarily on the advantages of free trade among the member states. The operation of the law of comparative advantage through the dismantling of trade barriers among the member states leads to an efficient allocation of resources and increase in their gross domestic product. The greater the economic comple-mentarities among the member states, the greater would be the potential for intra-regional trade and the resultant beneficial effect in the form of increase in gross domestic product. The ability of a regional economic grouping to realise fully its potential for economic cooperation depends upon the political will of the member states which in turn is determined by three main factors: firstly, the state of political relations and climate among the member states, in particular the existence or absence of serious disputes between the member states; secondly, the harbouring of hegemonic ambitions by one or more member states; and thirdly, the feeling of cultural commonality and affinities among the peoples of the member states.
The trajectory of the evolution of regional economic groupings moves from the establishment of free trade areas to customs union, and then to economic union in which for all practical purposes the member states are unified as one market and one economy. Inevitably, as the process of economic integration takes place in a regional economic grouping leading to an economic union, stresses and strains do develop because of the restructuring of the economies of the member states. In addition, the market forces operate in such a manner as to shift the locus of economic decision making to the economically powerful member states. The feeling of cultural commo-nality helps in overcoming these strains. The European Union has been able to move successfully through the various stages of the evolution of a regional economic organisation because it fulfils the necessary conditions for its success. Above all, the peoples of the EU member states feel that they have a common cultural heritage whose roots can be traced to ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and Christianity.
On the other hand, the SAARC has failed to take off because it lacks the necessary conditions for the success of a regional economic organisation. As far as the economic side is concerned, the economies of many of the SAARC member states are competitive rather than complementary thus limiting the scope for increase in intra-regional trade and the resultant beneficial effect in the form of increase in GDP. This is particularly so between the economies of Pakistan and India which are competitive rather than complementary in such sectors as textiles, agriculture (e.g. rice), carpets, simple manufactured goods, etc. This, however, is not to deny that a more liberal trade regime between Pakistan and India on a level playing field will be to the advantage of the two countries.
More importantly, the SAA-RC lacks the necessary political conditions for its success. Its biggest member, India, harbours hegemonic ambitions in the region with the objective of bringing its neighbouring states in South Asia under its domination. India again has serious disputes with many of its neighbours, particularly with Pakistan with which its relations have been bedevilled because of wars, the Kashmir dispute and differences on many other important issues such as Siachin, Sir Creek, the water issue and terrorism. In short, the political relations and climate between Pakistan and India are not conducive to the deepening of economic cooperation and integration between the two countries within the framework of the SAARC on the lines of the European Union. Finally, the peoples of Pakistan and India lack cultural affinities and the feeling of cultural commonality which form the bedrock for the process of the deepening of economic cooperation and integration within a regional economic organisation. After all, Pakistan’s creation was based on the well-considered view that the Muslims were culturally distinct from the Hindus and constituted a separate nation. Therefore, the process of economic and political integration within the framework of the SAARC would negate the very rationale for the creation of Pakistan.
For all of these reasons, our leaders and senior officials would be well-advised to order a detailed specific study on the long-term pros and cons for Pakistan of the process of economic integration in SAA-RC. We should deal with the various SAARC related issues in the light of the findings and conclusions of such a study. My belief is that a comparative study of the SAARC and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) would conclude that for Pakistan it would be much more beneficial to concentrate its energies on the deepening of economic cooperation and integration within the framework of the ECO, which fulfils all the necessary conditions for the success of a regional economic organisation, rather than SAARC which can be useful only for limited schemes of economic, commercial and cultural cooperation. An economic union within the framework of the SAARC will rob Pakistan of its economic independence by shifting the locus of economic decision making to New Delhi.
The writer is a retired ambassador.
The absence of a long-term sense of direction has been a perennial feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy since its independence. This shortcoming has been the direct result of the lack of vision on the part of our policy makers about the place and the role of our country in the comity of nations and the disease of day-to-day thinking which afflicts our leaders and officials collectively. There is no issue which has suffered more from these collective failings of ours than our membership of the SAARC. It appears from a close examination of the way we have handled the SAARC issues that neither our leadership, nor our officials have paid serious attention to the long-term goals that we wish to achieve through our participation in this regional cooperation organisation. We have not bothered to carry out an in-depth study of the long-term potential of the SAARC as well as its limitations. The focus instead has been on making tired clichés, frivolous statements and invalid comparisons with the experience of the European Union. The cacophony of voices coming out of the Pakistani leadership after the recently concluded 16th SAARC Summit at Thimphu reflects this confused state of mind rather than clarity of thought.
It is true that regional economic cooperation has been successful in accelerating the economic progress of the member states of many regional cooperation organisations, the foremost being the European Union. The process of economic integration within the EU has resulted in unprecedented economic prosperity of its member states thus providing an impetus for the establishment of similar regional cooperation organisations in other regions like ASEAN, MERCOSUR, GCC, ECO and SAARC. However, the record of these organisations in promoting regional economic cooperation and accelerating the economic growth and development of their respective member states varies from region to region depending upon their economic conditions, cultural affinities, political and security conditions, and strategic goals.
The economic rationale for a regional economic grouping rests primarily on the advantages of free trade among the member states. The operation of the law of comparative advantage through the dismantling of trade barriers among the member states leads to an efficient allocation of resources and increase in their gross domestic product. The greater the economic comple-mentarities among the member states, the greater would be the potential for intra-regional trade and the resultant beneficial effect in the form of increase in gross domestic product. The ability of a regional economic grouping to realise fully its potential for economic cooperation depends upon the political will of the member states which in turn is determined by three main factors: firstly, the state of political relations and climate among the member states, in particular the existence or absence of serious disputes between the member states; secondly, the harbouring of hegemonic ambitions by one or more member states; and thirdly, the feeling of cultural commonality and affinities among the peoples of the member states.
The trajectory of the evolution of regional economic groupings moves from the establishment of free trade areas to customs union, and then to economic union in which for all practical purposes the member states are unified as one market and one economy. Inevitably, as the process of economic integration takes place in a regional economic grouping leading to an economic union, stresses and strains do develop because of the restructuring of the economies of the member states. In addition, the market forces operate in such a manner as to shift the locus of economic decision making to the economically powerful member states. The feeling of cultural commo-nality helps in overcoming these strains. The European Union has been able to move successfully through the various stages of the evolution of a regional economic organisation because it fulfils the necessary conditions for its success. Above all, the peoples of the EU member states feel that they have a common cultural heritage whose roots can be traced to ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and Christianity.
On the other hand, the SAARC has failed to take off because it lacks the necessary conditions for the success of a regional economic organisation. As far as the economic side is concerned, the economies of many of the SAARC member states are competitive rather than complementary thus limiting the scope for increase in intra-regional trade and the resultant beneficial effect in the form of increase in GDP. This is particularly so between the economies of Pakistan and India which are competitive rather than complementary in such sectors as textiles, agriculture (e.g. rice), carpets, simple manufactured goods, etc. This, however, is not to deny that a more liberal trade regime between Pakistan and India on a level playing field will be to the advantage of the two countries.
More importantly, the SAA-RC lacks the necessary political conditions for its success. Its biggest member, India, harbours hegemonic ambitions in the region with the objective of bringing its neighbouring states in South Asia under its domination. India again has serious disputes with many of its neighbours, particularly with Pakistan with which its relations have been bedevilled because of wars, the Kashmir dispute and differences on many other important issues such as Siachin, Sir Creek, the water issue and terrorism. In short, the political relations and climate between Pakistan and India are not conducive to the deepening of economic cooperation and integration between the two countries within the framework of the SAARC on the lines of the European Union. Finally, the peoples of Pakistan and India lack cultural affinities and the feeling of cultural commonality which form the bedrock for the process of the deepening of economic cooperation and integration within a regional economic organisation. After all, Pakistan’s creation was based on the well-considered view that the Muslims were culturally distinct from the Hindus and constituted a separate nation. Therefore, the process of economic and political integration within the framework of the SAARC would negate the very rationale for the creation of Pakistan.
For all of these reasons, our leaders and senior officials would be well-advised to order a detailed specific study on the long-term pros and cons for Pakistan of the process of economic integration in SAA-RC. We should deal with the various SAARC related issues in the light of the findings and conclusions of such a study. My belief is that a comparative study of the SAARC and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) would conclude that for Pakistan it would be much more beneficial to concentrate its energies on the deepening of economic cooperation and integration within the framework of the ECO, which fulfils all the necessary conditions for the success of a regional economic organisation, rather than SAARC which can be useful only for limited schemes of economic, commercial and cultural cooperation. An economic union within the framework of the SAARC will rob Pakistan of its economic independence by shifting the locus of economic decision making to New Delhi.
The writer is a retired ambassador.
Sunday, April 18, 2010
The Summit
By M A Niazi
The Nuclear Security Summit has taken place, and is over with a commitment from countries attending to stop the movement of fissile material in the next four years. This replaces the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), hitherto the sole instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. The USA used the Summit for three purposes: first, to demonstrate in its ability to host it, its status as the sole superpower. Second, to beat up on Iran, and finally, but perhaps most important, to show that it retained the lead on nuclear issues in the new unipolar world, they previously having been tackled only with the consent, assistance, and perhaps initiative of the USSR. The USA did not mean to use it to fulfil any of the hopes that were being placed in it in Pakistan, that it would address any of the concerns of Pakistan, which along with India and North Korea is in a kind of limbo, having carried out a nuclear explosion, but not admitted into the nuclear club.
The USA succeeded in calling the Summit apart from the United Nations, the mechanism it has favoured so far for multilateral operations of this sort. This may cause some worry in UN circles, as the response indicates that the USA may well no longer need its fig-leaf to carry out such activities. That it no longer wants the fig-leaf, which it used to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, indicates the dominance (at least to American eyes) of non-Americans in the world body. However, it also respects the expertise that it has developed, and the joint communiqué issued after the Summit mentions it as the lead agency in monitoring compliance.
Summoning the Summit was easy compared to getting it to condemn Iran, which did not happen, summoned to agree to a new package was another matter. However, while the USA is over-stretched, it will engage in an adventure there as soon as it can release sufficient forces from one or both theatres. Meanwhile, the next Summit has been agreed upon, and it was President Obama who announced that it would take place in two years, and would be hosted by South Korea. That would serve to apply more pressure to North Korea than the present Summit. Again as a sort of replacement for the UN, at least for participants, the next step would be the setting up of a Secretariat, and entering negotiations about having the IAEA report to the new body. The USA is not just concerned about its UN dues, but it has multiple issues of control, associated with its payment of dues, which this mechanism would help resolve.
At the same time, the USA has demonstrated that it has primacy on nuclear issues. By an agreement on the example of Iran should provide enough evidence of the limits placed by the USA on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Fissile material is the key. This is to go back a step in the nuclear cycle, and recognises that the same fissile material, or rather radioactive metal, which can be used for generating power can also be used for bringing about an unimaginable explosion. The focus on fissile materials came because it was realised that any nuclear material that went into peaceful uses was not available for weapons use. This was proposed through the original compact proposed, “Atoms for Peace”, through which developed countries gave peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for a promise to eschew weapons development. However, the cornerstone of this edifice was that the winners of World War II would have nuclear weapons, along with their veto power in the UN, and none of the countries which won independence after that War, were supposed to have these weapons.
However, within the newly independent countries, there were several with their own reasons to achieve nuclear weapons status. India in particular has been the leader, because it has harboured superpower ambitions from the time of its independence in 1947. It has no real motive beyond the ambition of its rulers to be acknowledged as a superpower. However, its pursuit of nuclear weapons status, which culminated in the tests of 1998, made Pakistan respond in kind, making it the first country without global ambitions to become a nuclear power. In the two decades and more that it pursued this technology, it did not see a global role for itself beyond what it could fulfil without nuclear weapons. Similarly, North Korea used its possession of nuclear weapons more as a bargaining chip with the USA, than as a real threat to force South Korea into any action.
Israel also developed nuclear weapons after fighting two wars with its Arab neighbours. Israel’s nuclear weapons are based on technology stolen from the USA. However, the Israeli nuclear threat to the peace of the world could not be tackled at a Summit hosted by the USA.
The movement of fissile material was thought the best possible step after the failure of the proliferation regime in the shape of multilateral treaties. However, as the Summit itself shows, there is still a lot of fissile material floating around, and if it is not necessarily used to make bombs be used to replace material that could be. Fissile material is the datum of information on which all of those estimates of bombs manufactured are made. The motive of the nuclear powers in ensuring weapons non-proliferation remained maintaining the monopoly. Though its reasons for participating in the “war on terror” have nothing to do with the Summit, Pakistan is so subordinate to the USA that its participation in the latter was assured. And if it can be fobbed off with statements about its weapons being safe, then it is probably not only not a danger, but it will not get a civilian nuclear deal that allows it to put fissile material to military use, as India is doing.
More importantly, the Summit did nothing towards solving the problem of the ‘limbo’ nuclear powers, who may or may not be accommodated, but who undoubtedly exist. When the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was brought in, much was made of the promise of the nuclear powers to give up these weapons. However, they did not. And this was not pursued at the Summit, which the USA not only had the effrontery to attend as a nuclear power, but which it convened as the leader of the nuclear haves. Without some adjustment of the new nuclear powers, who are now almost as many as the original nuclear club, there will be no real purpose to such Summits.
The Nuclear Security Summit has taken place, and is over with a commitment from countries attending to stop the movement of fissile material in the next four years. This replaces the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), hitherto the sole instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. The USA used the Summit for three purposes: first, to demonstrate in its ability to host it, its status as the sole superpower. Second, to beat up on Iran, and finally, but perhaps most important, to show that it retained the lead on nuclear issues in the new unipolar world, they previously having been tackled only with the consent, assistance, and perhaps initiative of the USSR. The USA did not mean to use it to fulfil any of the hopes that were being placed in it in Pakistan, that it would address any of the concerns of Pakistan, which along with India and North Korea is in a kind of limbo, having carried out a nuclear explosion, but not admitted into the nuclear club.
The USA succeeded in calling the Summit apart from the United Nations, the mechanism it has favoured so far for multilateral operations of this sort. This may cause some worry in UN circles, as the response indicates that the USA may well no longer need its fig-leaf to carry out such activities. That it no longer wants the fig-leaf, which it used to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, indicates the dominance (at least to American eyes) of non-Americans in the world body. However, it also respects the expertise that it has developed, and the joint communiqué issued after the Summit mentions it as the lead agency in monitoring compliance.
Summoning the Summit was easy compared to getting it to condemn Iran, which did not happen, summoned to agree to a new package was another matter. However, while the USA is over-stretched, it will engage in an adventure there as soon as it can release sufficient forces from one or both theatres. Meanwhile, the next Summit has been agreed upon, and it was President Obama who announced that it would take place in two years, and would be hosted by South Korea. That would serve to apply more pressure to North Korea than the present Summit. Again as a sort of replacement for the UN, at least for participants, the next step would be the setting up of a Secretariat, and entering negotiations about having the IAEA report to the new body. The USA is not just concerned about its UN dues, but it has multiple issues of control, associated with its payment of dues, which this mechanism would help resolve.
At the same time, the USA has demonstrated that it has primacy on nuclear issues. By an agreement on the example of Iran should provide enough evidence of the limits placed by the USA on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Fissile material is the key. This is to go back a step in the nuclear cycle, and recognises that the same fissile material, or rather radioactive metal, which can be used for generating power can also be used for bringing about an unimaginable explosion. The focus on fissile materials came because it was realised that any nuclear material that went into peaceful uses was not available for weapons use. This was proposed through the original compact proposed, “Atoms for Peace”, through which developed countries gave peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for a promise to eschew weapons development. However, the cornerstone of this edifice was that the winners of World War II would have nuclear weapons, along with their veto power in the UN, and none of the countries which won independence after that War, were supposed to have these weapons.
However, within the newly independent countries, there were several with their own reasons to achieve nuclear weapons status. India in particular has been the leader, because it has harboured superpower ambitions from the time of its independence in 1947. It has no real motive beyond the ambition of its rulers to be acknowledged as a superpower. However, its pursuit of nuclear weapons status, which culminated in the tests of 1998, made Pakistan respond in kind, making it the first country without global ambitions to become a nuclear power. In the two decades and more that it pursued this technology, it did not see a global role for itself beyond what it could fulfil without nuclear weapons. Similarly, North Korea used its possession of nuclear weapons more as a bargaining chip with the USA, than as a real threat to force South Korea into any action.
Israel also developed nuclear weapons after fighting two wars with its Arab neighbours. Israel’s nuclear weapons are based on technology stolen from the USA. However, the Israeli nuclear threat to the peace of the world could not be tackled at a Summit hosted by the USA.
The movement of fissile material was thought the best possible step after the failure of the proliferation regime in the shape of multilateral treaties. However, as the Summit itself shows, there is still a lot of fissile material floating around, and if it is not necessarily used to make bombs be used to replace material that could be. Fissile material is the datum of information on which all of those estimates of bombs manufactured are made. The motive of the nuclear powers in ensuring weapons non-proliferation remained maintaining the monopoly. Though its reasons for participating in the “war on terror” have nothing to do with the Summit, Pakistan is so subordinate to the USA that its participation in the latter was assured. And if it can be fobbed off with statements about its weapons being safe, then it is probably not only not a danger, but it will not get a civilian nuclear deal that allows it to put fissile material to military use, as India is doing.
More importantly, the Summit did nothing towards solving the problem of the ‘limbo’ nuclear powers, who may or may not be accommodated, but who undoubtedly exist. When the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was brought in, much was made of the promise of the nuclear powers to give up these weapons. However, they did not. And this was not pursued at the Summit, which the USA not only had the effrontery to attend as a nuclear power, but which it convened as the leader of the nuclear haves. Without some adjustment of the new nuclear powers, who are now almost as many as the original nuclear club, there will be no real purpose to such Summits.
Side-effect
By Harris Khalique
The senators belonging to different factions of Pakistan Muslim League staged a walk-out from the current session of the Senate protesting against the remarks made by an Awami National Party senator in one of the appearances he made on a television talk show. He perhaps mentioned that the leadership of the Muslim League included people who ate pork and consumed alcohol. I couldn’t watch the programme but supposedly morality of parliamentarians and Islamic values in the backdrop of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the republic were being discussed. It was alleged that the ANP senator made a reference to the eating habits of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, father of the nation and president of the All India Muslim League which later became the Pakistan Muslim League. The senator denied the allegation and said he did not mean to imply the Quaid-e-Azam and respected him fully. He asserted that his comments were being blown up disproportionately.
To the citizens of Pakistan, is it really of any consequence today what Mr Jinnah ate or drank when young? Or for that matter whether Allama Iqbal used to drink or not? What matters to us now is the governance and state of affairs in the country Mohammed Ali Jinnah envisioned and struggled for. None of the factions of the Muslim League have anything to do with the ideals, views and practices of Jinnah. Their claim to being the successor party or parties of Jinnah’s Muslim League and staging a walk-out on that pretext is totally unjustified. Jinnah’s Muslim League soon became Unionist League after partition. Following his (expedited) death, feudal lords of West Pakistan, in cahoots with the protégé of the Indian Civil Service we inherited, took over the country. Then we saw a long drawn martial rule of General Ayub Khan and the formation of the dictator’s party which was named Muslim League with a prefix. A lame opposition party in dictator’s parliament was also another Muslim League with a different prefix. Then there was a Muslim League formed by General Ziaul Haq. Some years later, another was formed under the instructions of General Pervez Musharraf. The various factions of Muslim League we have today, PML-Nawaz, PML-Quaid-e-Azam, PML-Ziaul Haq, Awami Muslim League, All Pakistan Muslim League (Musharraf’s new antic), to name a few, have nothing whatsoever to do with either Jinnah or his party. They are the direct successors or derivatives of different parties formed by feudal lords, retired bureaucrats, business magnates and autocrats. To use a cliché, Jinnah would be turning in his grave when referred to as the president of a party whose factions today perpetuate a politics that revolves around interests of the wealthy, repression of the poor and bigotry when it comes to matters of religion.
The tragedy is that the same has happened to other parties. They have gone on a complete tangent from what their initiators stood for. Today, the PPP struggles to harmonise the interests of feudal lords and ladies with those who believe in neo-liberal management of economy. Common populace and programmes for their uplift seem no more than penance. The firebrand National Awami Party of yesteryear, which linked its politics to global emancipation of the working classes and realisation of the rights of oppressed nationalities, is now reduced to a group of politicians calling themselves ANP who pursue narrow local interests and behave as the counterparts of Karzai on this side of the border. None of them are true successors of their erstwhile leadership.
The senators belonging to different factions of Pakistan Muslim League staged a walk-out from the current session of the Senate protesting against the remarks made by an Awami National Party senator in one of the appearances he made on a television talk show. He perhaps mentioned that the leadership of the Muslim League included people who ate pork and consumed alcohol. I couldn’t watch the programme but supposedly morality of parliamentarians and Islamic values in the backdrop of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the republic were being discussed. It was alleged that the ANP senator made a reference to the eating habits of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, father of the nation and president of the All India Muslim League which later became the Pakistan Muslim League. The senator denied the allegation and said he did not mean to imply the Quaid-e-Azam and respected him fully. He asserted that his comments were being blown up disproportionately.
To the citizens of Pakistan, is it really of any consequence today what Mr Jinnah ate or drank when young? Or for that matter whether Allama Iqbal used to drink or not? What matters to us now is the governance and state of affairs in the country Mohammed Ali Jinnah envisioned and struggled for. None of the factions of the Muslim League have anything to do with the ideals, views and practices of Jinnah. Their claim to being the successor party or parties of Jinnah’s Muslim League and staging a walk-out on that pretext is totally unjustified. Jinnah’s Muslim League soon became Unionist League after partition. Following his (expedited) death, feudal lords of West Pakistan, in cahoots with the protégé of the Indian Civil Service we inherited, took over the country. Then we saw a long drawn martial rule of General Ayub Khan and the formation of the dictator’s party which was named Muslim League with a prefix. A lame opposition party in dictator’s parliament was also another Muslim League with a different prefix. Then there was a Muslim League formed by General Ziaul Haq. Some years later, another was formed under the instructions of General Pervez Musharraf. The various factions of Muslim League we have today, PML-Nawaz, PML-Quaid-e-Azam, PML-Ziaul Haq, Awami Muslim League, All Pakistan Muslim League (Musharraf’s new antic), to name a few, have nothing whatsoever to do with either Jinnah or his party. They are the direct successors or derivatives of different parties formed by feudal lords, retired bureaucrats, business magnates and autocrats. To use a cliché, Jinnah would be turning in his grave when referred to as the president of a party whose factions today perpetuate a politics that revolves around interests of the wealthy, repression of the poor and bigotry when it comes to matters of religion.
The tragedy is that the same has happened to other parties. They have gone on a complete tangent from what their initiators stood for. Today, the PPP struggles to harmonise the interests of feudal lords and ladies with those who believe in neo-liberal management of economy. Common populace and programmes for their uplift seem no more than penance. The firebrand National Awami Party of yesteryear, which linked its politics to global emancipation of the working classes and realisation of the rights of oppressed nationalities, is now reduced to a group of politicians calling themselves ANP who pursue narrow local interests and behave as the counterparts of Karzai on this side of the border. None of them are true successors of their erstwhile leadership.
Parallel worlds beginning to collide
By Shafqat Mahmood
The disconnect between different layers of Pakistani society has never been more visible than today. The political elite and intelligentsia are celebrating the passage of the 18th Amendment. The people are angry and on the streets, rioting.
The elite have good reason to be happy. The virtues of democracy need advertising in a state that has seen frequent interruptions of military rule. And what better commercial than a broad political consensus that has endorsed a National Finance Commission Award and now the 18th Amendment.
The people have good reason to be angry. Inflation, particularly of basic food items, has decimated their savings. Without electricity, the summer heat is boiling their bones. And there is no care in hospitals, no education in their schools, no security, no justice, and no relief, anywhere.
The concerns of the elite are mumbo jumbo to the people. Strategic depth in Afghanistan, nuclear parity with India, supremacy of parliament, independent judiciary, provincial autonomy, etc., are all worthwhile pursuits. At some level they affect the lives of everyone.
But go and tell this to the parent whose child is visibly dying and no decent care is available, or whose earnings can no longer feed the kids. Say this to the family that lives in fear of qabza groups, neighbourhood gangsters, swindlers and cheats. Pass this on to those who have to deal with a marauding police, uncaring bureaucracy and a corrupt and inefficient justice system.
This is the reality of their existence. The elite, in one form or the other, are insulated from this. Not that they do not have issues; their children need education and family members do fall sick. Occasionally someone gets into trouble and has to deal with the police, the courts or the bureaucracy.
Money takes care of some of these problems. Private education and private hospitals provide a reasonably decent service. And confronted with the state system, the social and familial network comes into play. Everyone knows someone in the police or the bureaucracy. And good lawyers can be hired to manage the courts.
This framework of comfort and support frees the mind to focus on abstract reality. Structures of democracy and their philosophical pillars occupy the thoughts. The country’s place in the world and how it can be enhanced becomes a justifiably patriotic concern. Not unimportant, yet so divorced from people’s existence.
Our accidental prime minister Shaukat Aziz and his cohorts believed in the trickledown theory or what the development economists call unbalanced growth. Its basics were that economic progress, even if it makes the rich richer, would eventually find its way to the poor. How long will it take and how much disruption it will cause before the trickle is felt, was never full explained.
The same trickle down model can be applied to alternative realities of the elite and the people. No doubt, a better democracy is good for everyone. A fearless judiciary and a truly paramount parliament will eventually improve lives; as will enhanced security, impregnable defence and a better image of the country in the world.
The question is what happens in the interim? If we had a small population, the discontent could be contained. But we don’t, we are a hundred and seventy million. Most of this population is poor and there is a huge youth bulge: people between the ages of 15 and 24. Since we did not do much for them, we have anarchy, if not a revolution, on our hand.
While the elite were busy building fancy castles in the air and fighting grand strategic battles, some of the poor were finding their way into schools of hate and terror. It took a while for them to get organised and realise their destructive potential. But they have, and with devastating effect.
The elite, blind to the blowback capacity, helped them in this task. They used them to fight some of the elite’s strategic wars. Once the strength of the alienated had been built up and their understanding of the state better, their attack against it was inevitable. Now we are busy fighting the children of our own creation.
Fighting organised terror groups is very tough, but at least there is an identifiable enemy. More dangerous are spontaneous eruptions of public anger and random acts of destruction. This can neither be anticipated nor contained. We see this happening every day.
The easy way to look at the turmoil in Hazara is that it relates to marginalisation of the Hindko ethnicity. Some of it is there, and it has been shamelessly exploited by out-of-work politicians. But underneath it lies people’s anger with the quality of their lives.
In essence, these eruptions signify failure of the elitist state. One example of it is the way we order the priorities of our public expenditure. People who own cars in the country are maybe ten percent of the population, or even less. Yet the amount of resources being spent on improving their driving experience is scandalous.
We need better roads and motorways and ring roads around our cities, but how many people truly benefit from them? Railways are universally seen as the mode of mass transportation. Yet, how much do we spend on that? We were lucky to inherit a very good railway system from the British, and what have we done to it? It is in a shambles, and deteriorating by the day.
Within cities, how much time effort and money have we devoted to public transport? It is true that the state does not have to do everything, but it can create the enabling environment for the private sector to fulfil this and other public needs.
It boils down to priorities. Elites have their needs and their capture of the state is nowhere more obvious than in our part of the world. Hence, state resources are targeted towards priorities that the elites have.
This does not mean that elite control is not happening in Europe, the US and other parts of the developed world. It is, but there is a strong realisation that the people have to be given the basics, or they will revolt. Thus, public education and health, public transportation and basic food items are kept within everyone’s reach.
We are failing in this. The result is insurgencies and spontaneous eruptions of violence. India is in the same trap. Maoist insurgency in 300 districts is a revolt of the poor. Its global ambitions and horrendous domestic reality is a classic example of elite priorities underneath the facade of democracy.
The elites in Pakistan have to wake up in their own self-interest. They are barely safe today in their protected homes and air-conditioned cars. The flames of anger from below are already singeing their safe cocoon. If priorities are not turned towards the people, the flames will engulf them.
The disconnect between different layers of Pakistani society has never been more visible than today. The political elite and intelligentsia are celebrating the passage of the 18th Amendment. The people are angry and on the streets, rioting.
The elite have good reason to be happy. The virtues of democracy need advertising in a state that has seen frequent interruptions of military rule. And what better commercial than a broad political consensus that has endorsed a National Finance Commission Award and now the 18th Amendment.
The people have good reason to be angry. Inflation, particularly of basic food items, has decimated their savings. Without electricity, the summer heat is boiling their bones. And there is no care in hospitals, no education in their schools, no security, no justice, and no relief, anywhere.
The concerns of the elite are mumbo jumbo to the people. Strategic depth in Afghanistan, nuclear parity with India, supremacy of parliament, independent judiciary, provincial autonomy, etc., are all worthwhile pursuits. At some level they affect the lives of everyone.
But go and tell this to the parent whose child is visibly dying and no decent care is available, or whose earnings can no longer feed the kids. Say this to the family that lives in fear of qabza groups, neighbourhood gangsters, swindlers and cheats. Pass this on to those who have to deal with a marauding police, uncaring bureaucracy and a corrupt and inefficient justice system.
This is the reality of their existence. The elite, in one form or the other, are insulated from this. Not that they do not have issues; their children need education and family members do fall sick. Occasionally someone gets into trouble and has to deal with the police, the courts or the bureaucracy.
Money takes care of some of these problems. Private education and private hospitals provide a reasonably decent service. And confronted with the state system, the social and familial network comes into play. Everyone knows someone in the police or the bureaucracy. And good lawyers can be hired to manage the courts.
This framework of comfort and support frees the mind to focus on abstract reality. Structures of democracy and their philosophical pillars occupy the thoughts. The country’s place in the world and how it can be enhanced becomes a justifiably patriotic concern. Not unimportant, yet so divorced from people’s existence.
Our accidental prime minister Shaukat Aziz and his cohorts believed in the trickledown theory or what the development economists call unbalanced growth. Its basics were that economic progress, even if it makes the rich richer, would eventually find its way to the poor. How long will it take and how much disruption it will cause before the trickle is felt, was never full explained.
The same trickle down model can be applied to alternative realities of the elite and the people. No doubt, a better democracy is good for everyone. A fearless judiciary and a truly paramount parliament will eventually improve lives; as will enhanced security, impregnable defence and a better image of the country in the world.
The question is what happens in the interim? If we had a small population, the discontent could be contained. But we don’t, we are a hundred and seventy million. Most of this population is poor and there is a huge youth bulge: people between the ages of 15 and 24. Since we did not do much for them, we have anarchy, if not a revolution, on our hand.
While the elite were busy building fancy castles in the air and fighting grand strategic battles, some of the poor were finding their way into schools of hate and terror. It took a while for them to get organised and realise their destructive potential. But they have, and with devastating effect.
The elite, blind to the blowback capacity, helped them in this task. They used them to fight some of the elite’s strategic wars. Once the strength of the alienated had been built up and their understanding of the state better, their attack against it was inevitable. Now we are busy fighting the children of our own creation.
Fighting organised terror groups is very tough, but at least there is an identifiable enemy. More dangerous are spontaneous eruptions of public anger and random acts of destruction. This can neither be anticipated nor contained. We see this happening every day.
The easy way to look at the turmoil in Hazara is that it relates to marginalisation of the Hindko ethnicity. Some of it is there, and it has been shamelessly exploited by out-of-work politicians. But underneath it lies people’s anger with the quality of their lives.
In essence, these eruptions signify failure of the elitist state. One example of it is the way we order the priorities of our public expenditure. People who own cars in the country are maybe ten percent of the population, or even less. Yet the amount of resources being spent on improving their driving experience is scandalous.
We need better roads and motorways and ring roads around our cities, but how many people truly benefit from them? Railways are universally seen as the mode of mass transportation. Yet, how much do we spend on that? We were lucky to inherit a very good railway system from the British, and what have we done to it? It is in a shambles, and deteriorating by the day.
Within cities, how much time effort and money have we devoted to public transport? It is true that the state does not have to do everything, but it can create the enabling environment for the private sector to fulfil this and other public needs.
It boils down to priorities. Elites have their needs and their capture of the state is nowhere more obvious than in our part of the world. Hence, state resources are targeted towards priorities that the elites have.
This does not mean that elite control is not happening in Europe, the US and other parts of the developed world. It is, but there is a strong realisation that the people have to be given the basics, or they will revolt. Thus, public education and health, public transportation and basic food items are kept within everyone’s reach.
We are failing in this. The result is insurgencies and spontaneous eruptions of violence. India is in the same trap. Maoist insurgency in 300 districts is a revolt of the poor. Its global ambitions and horrendous domestic reality is a classic example of elite priorities underneath the facade of democracy.
The elites in Pakistan have to wake up in their own self-interest. They are barely safe today in their protected homes and air-conditioned cars. The flames of anger from below are already singeing their safe cocoon. If priorities are not turned towards the people, the flames will engulf them.
Defiance Iranian style
By M Saeed Khalid
Diplomatic manoeuvres around Iran’s nuclear programme have gathered pace in recent weeks, creating suspense and anxiety about a looming showdown between Iran and the United States. Washington’s efforts to bring greater political and economic pressure to bear on Iran could reduce the short-term risk of a military clash, which could result in an uncontrollable hike in oil prices, with frightening consequences for the global economy.
Even limited strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites are bound to draw retaliation from Iran’s considerable missile defence system. The US is, therefore, trying extra hard to carry along the four other permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in devising a new set of UN sanctions on Iran. Top emissaries are logging extra air miles to power centres like Brussels and Beijing to find a formula which can satisfy Iran’s national pride while fulfilling non-proliferation goals set by the leading powers.
The origins of the complexities of the imbroglio are deeply rooted in history. The year of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election also witnessed the publication of British historian Tom Holland’s book Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West.
Echoing American Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, Holland traces the origins of East-West tensions to the epic battles between the Persian Empire and the Greek city-states 2,500 years ago. After recounting the emergence of the Persian Empire in the sixth century BC by Cyrus, and its extension into Central Asia and Africa and beyond the Danube, Holland takes the reader to the clash with Greece. He acknowledges Persia’s status as the first great empire and notes that, in many ways, Greek culture was more primitive compared to Persian civilisation.
Relying largely on the narrative of Herodotus, Holland recounts how the revolt in some of the Greek areas under Persian control led to an unsuccessful invasion by Xerxes against Greece and provoked the Spartan expedition under Alexander, which brought Persia to its knees. Holland goes on to conclude that by virtue of their victory over Persia, the Greeks succeeded in carving a destiny for themselves and Europe while intentionally denigrating Eastern culture.
The cumulative effect on Iranians’ psyche was a constant urge to reassert their cultural identity. But it also extends to defending national sovereignty over their resources, as witnessed in the challenge launched by Mohammad Mossadeq. The Shah’s efforts to Westernise the Iranian people while assuming the role of a Western post in the region met a terrible backlash in the form of a leftist movement and eventually by the Islamic revolution. Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear capability and the West’s efforts to thwart that plan represents the latest episode in the age-old rivalry.
In 2005, after the US and allies had overrun Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran was identified as the next target by the likes of Cheney and Rumsfeld. However, an important development took place at the time as Iran went through the spectacular shift of power with the election of Ahmadinejad, a hardline Islamist, populist, ultra-nationalist and anti-reformist.
No one was surprised at his vocal pride in Iran’s glorious past, but many eyebrows were raised at his assertion that a clash with America was not a matter of “if” but of “when.” In a change of policy, Iran assigned the highest priority to the attainment of nuclear capability. To ensure success Ahmadinejad undertook the parallel effort of keeping Iran’s defences prepared for any showdown along the way.
Iran’s latest bout with the West has two important new features. The first is Europe’s aversion to military operations. Trying to enlist European nations in another war would only accentuate divisions among them. Their preferred solution is to give Iran sufficient inducements to give up nuclear-weapons development. The second feature is the role assumed by Israel in the American calculus to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability.
While time is a critical factor in further actions contemplated by Tel Aviv and Washington, the Europeans could counsel the US to give greater emphasis to diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran than military pressure, since any military action is unlikely to discourage Iran from continuing on its path. Ahmadinejad’s critics in Iran say that confrontation with the US is his calculated tactic for projection of an external threat so that the revolutionary regime receives a new lease on life. If so, he has found the perfect cause to rally support, that of Iran’s right to nuclear technology.
Viewed from Pakistan’s perspective, no discussion of the Iran-US confrontation is complete without reference to natural gas from Iran to meet our pressing needs. Our final decision on the gas pipeline project will have a bearing on Pakistan’s future. To put it plainly, friendship with America is a requirement for our immediate economic well being but assured gas supplies are vital for Pakistan’s long-term economic survival.
We should look at the way Turkey made the right choices to ensure gas supplies. In the days of the Cold War, Turkey, like many other European nations, built a gas pipeline with Russia. Then, the Turks did not hesitate to open negotiations with Iran for a second source of gas, even while they accused Tehran of fomenting trouble in Turkish universities.
By virtue of these timely decisions, Turkey enjoys gas supplies from Russia as well as Iran, while remaining a key Western ally and a member of Nato. The writing is on the wall. By exercising our sovereign right to build the gas pipeline with Iran without losing time, we will go up, rather than down, in America’s estimation. The world respects only the courageous.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Diplomatic manoeuvres around Iran’s nuclear programme have gathered pace in recent weeks, creating suspense and anxiety about a looming showdown between Iran and the United States. Washington’s efforts to bring greater political and economic pressure to bear on Iran could reduce the short-term risk of a military clash, which could result in an uncontrollable hike in oil prices, with frightening consequences for the global economy.
Even limited strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites are bound to draw retaliation from Iran’s considerable missile defence system. The US is, therefore, trying extra hard to carry along the four other permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in devising a new set of UN sanctions on Iran. Top emissaries are logging extra air miles to power centres like Brussels and Beijing to find a formula which can satisfy Iran’s national pride while fulfilling non-proliferation goals set by the leading powers.
The origins of the complexities of the imbroglio are deeply rooted in history. The year of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election also witnessed the publication of British historian Tom Holland’s book Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West.
Echoing American Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, Holland traces the origins of East-West tensions to the epic battles between the Persian Empire and the Greek city-states 2,500 years ago. After recounting the emergence of the Persian Empire in the sixth century BC by Cyrus, and its extension into Central Asia and Africa and beyond the Danube, Holland takes the reader to the clash with Greece. He acknowledges Persia’s status as the first great empire and notes that, in many ways, Greek culture was more primitive compared to Persian civilisation.
Relying largely on the narrative of Herodotus, Holland recounts how the revolt in some of the Greek areas under Persian control led to an unsuccessful invasion by Xerxes against Greece and provoked the Spartan expedition under Alexander, which brought Persia to its knees. Holland goes on to conclude that by virtue of their victory over Persia, the Greeks succeeded in carving a destiny for themselves and Europe while intentionally denigrating Eastern culture.
The cumulative effect on Iranians’ psyche was a constant urge to reassert their cultural identity. But it also extends to defending national sovereignty over their resources, as witnessed in the challenge launched by Mohammad Mossadeq. The Shah’s efforts to Westernise the Iranian people while assuming the role of a Western post in the region met a terrible backlash in the form of a leftist movement and eventually by the Islamic revolution. Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear capability and the West’s efforts to thwart that plan represents the latest episode in the age-old rivalry.
In 2005, after the US and allies had overrun Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran was identified as the next target by the likes of Cheney and Rumsfeld. However, an important development took place at the time as Iran went through the spectacular shift of power with the election of Ahmadinejad, a hardline Islamist, populist, ultra-nationalist and anti-reformist.
No one was surprised at his vocal pride in Iran’s glorious past, but many eyebrows were raised at his assertion that a clash with America was not a matter of “if” but of “when.” In a change of policy, Iran assigned the highest priority to the attainment of nuclear capability. To ensure success Ahmadinejad undertook the parallel effort of keeping Iran’s defences prepared for any showdown along the way.
Iran’s latest bout with the West has two important new features. The first is Europe’s aversion to military operations. Trying to enlist European nations in another war would only accentuate divisions among them. Their preferred solution is to give Iran sufficient inducements to give up nuclear-weapons development. The second feature is the role assumed by Israel in the American calculus to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability.
While time is a critical factor in further actions contemplated by Tel Aviv and Washington, the Europeans could counsel the US to give greater emphasis to diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran than military pressure, since any military action is unlikely to discourage Iran from continuing on its path. Ahmadinejad’s critics in Iran say that confrontation with the US is his calculated tactic for projection of an external threat so that the revolutionary regime receives a new lease on life. If so, he has found the perfect cause to rally support, that of Iran’s right to nuclear technology.
Viewed from Pakistan’s perspective, no discussion of the Iran-US confrontation is complete without reference to natural gas from Iran to meet our pressing needs. Our final decision on the gas pipeline project will have a bearing on Pakistan’s future. To put it plainly, friendship with America is a requirement for our immediate economic well being but assured gas supplies are vital for Pakistan’s long-term economic survival.
We should look at the way Turkey made the right choices to ensure gas supplies. In the days of the Cold War, Turkey, like many other European nations, built a gas pipeline with Russia. Then, the Turks did not hesitate to open negotiations with Iran for a second source of gas, even while they accused Tehran of fomenting trouble in Turkish universities.
By virtue of these timely decisions, Turkey enjoys gas supplies from Russia as well as Iran, while remaining a key Western ally and a member of Nato. The writing is on the wall. By exercising our sovereign right to build the gas pipeline with Iran without losing time, we will go up, rather than down, in America’s estimation. The world respects only the courageous.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Commodifying drinking water
By Ahmad Rafay Alam
A few months ago, the Lahore High Court had taken suo motu notice of the quality of water served up by bottled-water companies. I happened to be in court that morning, and overheard the judge say something that has stayed with me since: when he was growing up in Lahore, it was unthinkable that water was something that could be sold. This is true even for my lifetime. I have seen drinking water in my city of Lahore go from being a common resource to a commodity. There is much to make of such a radical change.
It was the colonialist who first tapped Lahore’s underground water resources for the purposes of domestic consumption, that is, drinking and for sanitation. The old water pipe that sucked water from the ground still stands behind the Paani wala Talaab in the Walled City. The management of the water resource lay in the hands of the municipality, which laid out water and sewerage pipes throughout the old city, as well as the rapidly sprawling rest of the city. Water was thus available to those who were served by the municipality and who paid their water dues on time. It was clean, readily available and, importantly, considered “free.”
At the moment, the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) of the Lahore Development Authority estimates it manages something in excess of 1,700 kilometres of water and sewage pipes in the city – some new, some nearly a century old, many in-between. But this does not include management of water pipes in the Cantonment, which vests in the Cantonment Board (the Cantonment in Lahore has no sewage system; its residents work with on-site soakage pits), or the management of water by the many phases within the Defence Housing Authority or properties receiving water from the Services and General Administration Department. And here lies an interesting thought.
Most people I ask will readily admit to knowledge of the concepts of the sale or mortgage of land, though few, if any, have ever entered into such transactions themselves. But none will offer any insight into any of the rights to drinking water. It’s odd how there’s a vacuum of knowledge surrounding the rights we have in something as existential as water.
The very many local authorities that are responsible for providing drinking water to the eight million Lahoris are not coordinated in any way. Thus, WASA tends to think it has the rights, under statute, to the city’s underground water resource. But even if it did, it can do nothing about the water extracted, say, by the DHA.
Lack of coordination of how we use our underground water resource wouldn’t be a problem if Lahore’s underground water table were in abundant supply. Since the Indus Basin Treaty apportioned the waters of the River Ravi to India, Lahore has been cut off from its traditional source of groundwater replenishment. There’s no water to replace the water we are currently extracting. You could be allowed to mistakenly think that rainwater is a source of recharging the water table. It would be, if only we weren’t so adamant in paving over green areas and emitting all manner of liquid pollution into the soil as well.
The tube-wells installed in the city are now extracting drinking water from a depth of some 700 feet and more. Water immediately under the soil is too polluted to drink.
One of the problems of going so far down to get drinking water is that it requires enormous amounts of electricity. Last year, in a remarkable example of ignoring the potential of solar electricity, the Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif ordered that the city’s tube-wells be fitted with diesel generators so that residents would still get water during prolonged periods of load-shedding. Not only will the cost of diesel soon become part of our water charges but, because of the use of diesel generators, our use of water is now completely environmentally unsustainable.
Lahoris must not take for granted whatever water they have available to them now. In almost all of Pakistan’s major urban areas, drinking water is either unavailable, is unhygienic or just not there. In these alarming circumstances, it is completely understandable how private interests can take up where the local authorities are simply not up to the task. Witness the commodification of water.
In the last 15 years, as drinking water problems have exacerbated as much as they have been ignored, private companies have overseen a subtle propaganda campaign which, in essence, has been nothing less than a reversal of priorities. Instead of citizens demanding more from their local authorities when it comes to clean water, they have sat back and allowed drinking water to be allocated a commercial value and be considered in economic terms. Their jobs were made considerably easier by the attitude of the urban elite, who think nothing of spending Rs15 for a glass or two of water when the vast majority of urban Pakistanis cannot afford such an expense, on a daily basis. In a city where only 20 years ago water was a common resource, it is now commonplace to see drinking water for sale.
I have it on good authority that the only water available at the recent workshop in Islamabad on drinking water organised by the ministry of the environment – which, it seems, is devoid of a sense of irony – was bottled water.
Meanwhile, the water and sanitation infrastructure in Lahore is in disrepair. The persistent rate of gastroenteritis in the city is testament to the fact that, on too many occasions, rusted pipes discharge sewage into pipes carrying drinking water. The health and environmental impacts of this do not require elaboration. The great challenge facing WASA is not, however, mending the pipes. Because of the rapid urbanisation expected in the future, WASA will need to lay as many kilometres of pipes in the next 20 years as it has since Partition. For anyone who appreciates the magnitude of this challenge, drinking water in Lahore is now something that cannot be ignored any longer.
On war footing we must repair the existing water and sewerage infrastructure. On war footing we must plan for future urbanisation. On war footing we must put in place drastic water-use legislation and water-conservation measures. And we must ensure our efforts yield positive results. The goal should not just be the availability of clean drinking water, but its availability as a right. We cannot allow the commodification of water. It is against our ethos.
The writer is an advocate of the high court and a member of the adjunct faculty at LUMS. He has an interest in urban planning.
A few months ago, the Lahore High Court had taken suo motu notice of the quality of water served up by bottled-water companies. I happened to be in court that morning, and overheard the judge say something that has stayed with me since: when he was growing up in Lahore, it was unthinkable that water was something that could be sold. This is true even for my lifetime. I have seen drinking water in my city of Lahore go from being a common resource to a commodity. There is much to make of such a radical change.
It was the colonialist who first tapped Lahore’s underground water resources for the purposes of domestic consumption, that is, drinking and for sanitation. The old water pipe that sucked water from the ground still stands behind the Paani wala Talaab in the Walled City. The management of the water resource lay in the hands of the municipality, which laid out water and sewerage pipes throughout the old city, as well as the rapidly sprawling rest of the city. Water was thus available to those who were served by the municipality and who paid their water dues on time. It was clean, readily available and, importantly, considered “free.”
At the moment, the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) of the Lahore Development Authority estimates it manages something in excess of 1,700 kilometres of water and sewage pipes in the city – some new, some nearly a century old, many in-between. But this does not include management of water pipes in the Cantonment, which vests in the Cantonment Board (the Cantonment in Lahore has no sewage system; its residents work with on-site soakage pits), or the management of water by the many phases within the Defence Housing Authority or properties receiving water from the Services and General Administration Department. And here lies an interesting thought.
Most people I ask will readily admit to knowledge of the concepts of the sale or mortgage of land, though few, if any, have ever entered into such transactions themselves. But none will offer any insight into any of the rights to drinking water. It’s odd how there’s a vacuum of knowledge surrounding the rights we have in something as existential as water.
The very many local authorities that are responsible for providing drinking water to the eight million Lahoris are not coordinated in any way. Thus, WASA tends to think it has the rights, under statute, to the city’s underground water resource. But even if it did, it can do nothing about the water extracted, say, by the DHA.
Lack of coordination of how we use our underground water resource wouldn’t be a problem if Lahore’s underground water table were in abundant supply. Since the Indus Basin Treaty apportioned the waters of the River Ravi to India, Lahore has been cut off from its traditional source of groundwater replenishment. There’s no water to replace the water we are currently extracting. You could be allowed to mistakenly think that rainwater is a source of recharging the water table. It would be, if only we weren’t so adamant in paving over green areas and emitting all manner of liquid pollution into the soil as well.
The tube-wells installed in the city are now extracting drinking water from a depth of some 700 feet and more. Water immediately under the soil is too polluted to drink.
One of the problems of going so far down to get drinking water is that it requires enormous amounts of electricity. Last year, in a remarkable example of ignoring the potential of solar electricity, the Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif ordered that the city’s tube-wells be fitted with diesel generators so that residents would still get water during prolonged periods of load-shedding. Not only will the cost of diesel soon become part of our water charges but, because of the use of diesel generators, our use of water is now completely environmentally unsustainable.
Lahoris must not take for granted whatever water they have available to them now. In almost all of Pakistan’s major urban areas, drinking water is either unavailable, is unhygienic or just not there. In these alarming circumstances, it is completely understandable how private interests can take up where the local authorities are simply not up to the task. Witness the commodification of water.
In the last 15 years, as drinking water problems have exacerbated as much as they have been ignored, private companies have overseen a subtle propaganda campaign which, in essence, has been nothing less than a reversal of priorities. Instead of citizens demanding more from their local authorities when it comes to clean water, they have sat back and allowed drinking water to be allocated a commercial value and be considered in economic terms. Their jobs were made considerably easier by the attitude of the urban elite, who think nothing of spending Rs15 for a glass or two of water when the vast majority of urban Pakistanis cannot afford such an expense, on a daily basis. In a city where only 20 years ago water was a common resource, it is now commonplace to see drinking water for sale.
I have it on good authority that the only water available at the recent workshop in Islamabad on drinking water organised by the ministry of the environment – which, it seems, is devoid of a sense of irony – was bottled water.
Meanwhile, the water and sanitation infrastructure in Lahore is in disrepair. The persistent rate of gastroenteritis in the city is testament to the fact that, on too many occasions, rusted pipes discharge sewage into pipes carrying drinking water. The health and environmental impacts of this do not require elaboration. The great challenge facing WASA is not, however, mending the pipes. Because of the rapid urbanisation expected in the future, WASA will need to lay as many kilometres of pipes in the next 20 years as it has since Partition. For anyone who appreciates the magnitude of this challenge, drinking water in Lahore is now something that cannot be ignored any longer.
On war footing we must repair the existing water and sewerage infrastructure. On war footing we must plan for future urbanisation. On war footing we must put in place drastic water-use legislation and water-conservation measures. And we must ensure our efforts yield positive results. The goal should not just be the availability of clean drinking water, but its availability as a right. We cannot allow the commodification of water. It is against our ethos.
The writer is an advocate of the high court and a member of the adjunct faculty at LUMS. He has an interest in urban planning.
The damage-control ploy
By Sardar Mumtaz Ali Bhutto
Pakistan is ready to explode. The politicians, despite their deep differences, are entwined in the net of reconciliation which is a poor camouflage for abandoning all conflicting ideologies, principles and pride to join the feast of government. This has smothered all complaint and objections, opening the door to a state of hear no evil and see no evil, just do all evil.
Transparency International has disclosed that whereas in 2004 Rs45 billion were pilfered from Pakistan’s treasury, in 2009 corruption has cost the people Rs195 billion. This is in addition to the nurturing of the useless MNAs and MPAs, each of whom is paid about 500,000 rupees per month, hordes of ministers, each of whom receives a salary of around three million rupees per month. The prime minister costs about 25 million a month and the president 30 million. The VIPs’ security costs us Rs165 billion per year. Last but not least, Rs860 billion is the up-to-date cost of the civil war going on in the north. Of course, the cost of lives lost and property damaged is unfathomable, but Amnesty International has said that in the drone attacks alone, while only five high-value targets have been eliminated, more than 700 innocent lives have been lost as the government just looks on.
Of course, the above is not all that afflicts the nation. The process of accountability has been buried so deep that not a single case has been filed against anyone in the top echelons of government and politics since the Musharraf takeover in 1999, even though the stench of corruption reaches the sky. When a minister’s loot and plunder can no longer be ignored and there is uproar in the media, his portfolio is taken away and a less lucrative one allotted.
This background and anger of the people, expressed by protests at the local level all around, only results in one question: when will Zardari go? Quit he will not, despite his constant humiliation. He has already declared that exit in an ambulance is the only option for him. And now that all his corruption cases have been reopened, the only thing keeping him out of jail is the presidential immunity. So he will hold on by the skin of his teeth. The basic cause of all the harm that has been endured in the post-Musharraf era is Zardari and his inability to provide leadership and good governance. It is not surprising that those around him are not only shielding him from accountability but also proclaiming him as a hero on the same level as Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. For this, on the one hand, they have mounted a visibly massive campaign to gag the critics (including, it seems, that knight in shinning armour, Ayaz Amir); on the other hand, they are holding on to straws like the 18th Amendment, which only emphasises the desperateness of their situation.
The 18th Amendment is fine, but certainly not a panacea. Nor can it mitigate the harm caused by this government. It has done away with the dictatorial powers of the president, which Zardari could not exercise anyway. Every effort by him to assert himself had ended in his own humiliation. He passed orders transferring the ISI into civilian control but had to hastily withdraw them the next day. We have seen that he surrendered under pressure on the questions of reinstatement and appointment of judges. He had to quickly lift the emergency he imposed in Punjab and was forced to transfer the National Security Authority to the prime minister. As for dissolving parliament and appointing the chiefs of the armed services, Zardari simply does not have the stature and strength to even think of doing so. This is different from ordering transfers and postings of bureaucrats with shady records for services rendered, or rewarding jail mates and being a “friend of friends” to favourites at public expense.
The 18th Amendment, which is essentially a damage-control ploy, has come very late and under pressure, giving little while generating much controversy. The boast that it has restored democracy and blocked subversion of the Constitution is absurd. By removing the requirement of elections within political parties, nurseries for dictators have been opened up as heads of parties have been given absolute powers over their party men. A constitution did not stop Ayub Khan from taking over. Zia tore up and threw away the Constitution with impunity, in spite of Article 6, which made such contempt punishable with death. He hanged the framer of the Constitution instead. Musharraf also violated the Constitution, imposed the 17th Amendment and ruled for ten years. The 18th Amendment is no Great Wall of China. It cannot stop a takeover or save the Constitution and democracy.
There is no escape from the truth that it is only the people who are the protectors of their land and rights, and this is where the weakness lies.
The systematic plan initiated by Zia to corrupt politics for the purpose of shielding unworthy rulers has culminated in Zardari’s mind-blowing rise to power, with immunity against all forms of accountability. Unfortunately, in Pakistan the curse of corruption has become so endemic that even the man on the street has become contaminated. He is also running in the rat race for personal enrichment rather than the collective benefits derived from honest and good governance. But this has only delayed the inevitable. Thanks to Zardari, the foundation for a bloody revolution has been laid. When the president refuses to obey the orders of the Supreme Court and continues to hide from corruption cases, aided and abetted by his all-too-willing party men and women, the end has been reached and something has got to give.
We know that the French Revolution, followed by the other great revolutions, started with downtrodden and deprived people being forced to come out in scattered groups to protest. This started a momentum which threw up new leaderships and brought unity among the angry crowds, who then focused on complete change and real solutions. In recent years, we have seen uprisings in Ukraine and Georgia. Only a few days ago, the people of Kyrgyzstan rose to remove their corrupt and incompetent government and install a new one, headed by a woman president.
Who knows what is around the corner for Pakistan.
Pakistan is ready to explode. The politicians, despite their deep differences, are entwined in the net of reconciliation which is a poor camouflage for abandoning all conflicting ideologies, principles and pride to join the feast of government. This has smothered all complaint and objections, opening the door to a state of hear no evil and see no evil, just do all evil.
Transparency International has disclosed that whereas in 2004 Rs45 billion were pilfered from Pakistan’s treasury, in 2009 corruption has cost the people Rs195 billion. This is in addition to the nurturing of the useless MNAs and MPAs, each of whom is paid about 500,000 rupees per month, hordes of ministers, each of whom receives a salary of around three million rupees per month. The prime minister costs about 25 million a month and the president 30 million. The VIPs’ security costs us Rs165 billion per year. Last but not least, Rs860 billion is the up-to-date cost of the civil war going on in the north. Of course, the cost of lives lost and property damaged is unfathomable, but Amnesty International has said that in the drone attacks alone, while only five high-value targets have been eliminated, more than 700 innocent lives have been lost as the government just looks on.
Of course, the above is not all that afflicts the nation. The process of accountability has been buried so deep that not a single case has been filed against anyone in the top echelons of government and politics since the Musharraf takeover in 1999, even though the stench of corruption reaches the sky. When a minister’s loot and plunder can no longer be ignored and there is uproar in the media, his portfolio is taken away and a less lucrative one allotted.
This background and anger of the people, expressed by protests at the local level all around, only results in one question: when will Zardari go? Quit he will not, despite his constant humiliation. He has already declared that exit in an ambulance is the only option for him. And now that all his corruption cases have been reopened, the only thing keeping him out of jail is the presidential immunity. So he will hold on by the skin of his teeth. The basic cause of all the harm that has been endured in the post-Musharraf era is Zardari and his inability to provide leadership and good governance. It is not surprising that those around him are not only shielding him from accountability but also proclaiming him as a hero on the same level as Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. For this, on the one hand, they have mounted a visibly massive campaign to gag the critics (including, it seems, that knight in shinning armour, Ayaz Amir); on the other hand, they are holding on to straws like the 18th Amendment, which only emphasises the desperateness of their situation.
The 18th Amendment is fine, but certainly not a panacea. Nor can it mitigate the harm caused by this government. It has done away with the dictatorial powers of the president, which Zardari could not exercise anyway. Every effort by him to assert himself had ended in his own humiliation. He passed orders transferring the ISI into civilian control but had to hastily withdraw them the next day. We have seen that he surrendered under pressure on the questions of reinstatement and appointment of judges. He had to quickly lift the emergency he imposed in Punjab and was forced to transfer the National Security Authority to the prime minister. As for dissolving parliament and appointing the chiefs of the armed services, Zardari simply does not have the stature and strength to even think of doing so. This is different from ordering transfers and postings of bureaucrats with shady records for services rendered, or rewarding jail mates and being a “friend of friends” to favourites at public expense.
The 18th Amendment, which is essentially a damage-control ploy, has come very late and under pressure, giving little while generating much controversy. The boast that it has restored democracy and blocked subversion of the Constitution is absurd. By removing the requirement of elections within political parties, nurseries for dictators have been opened up as heads of parties have been given absolute powers over their party men. A constitution did not stop Ayub Khan from taking over. Zia tore up and threw away the Constitution with impunity, in spite of Article 6, which made such contempt punishable with death. He hanged the framer of the Constitution instead. Musharraf also violated the Constitution, imposed the 17th Amendment and ruled for ten years. The 18th Amendment is no Great Wall of China. It cannot stop a takeover or save the Constitution and democracy.
There is no escape from the truth that it is only the people who are the protectors of their land and rights, and this is where the weakness lies.
The systematic plan initiated by Zia to corrupt politics for the purpose of shielding unworthy rulers has culminated in Zardari’s mind-blowing rise to power, with immunity against all forms of accountability. Unfortunately, in Pakistan the curse of corruption has become so endemic that even the man on the street has become contaminated. He is also running in the rat race for personal enrichment rather than the collective benefits derived from honest and good governance. But this has only delayed the inevitable. Thanks to Zardari, the foundation for a bloody revolution has been laid. When the president refuses to obey the orders of the Supreme Court and continues to hide from corruption cases, aided and abetted by his all-too-willing party men and women, the end has been reached and something has got to give.
We know that the French Revolution, followed by the other great revolutions, started with downtrodden and deprived people being forced to come out in scattered groups to protest. This started a momentum which threw up new leaderships and brought unity among the angry crowds, who then focused on complete change and real solutions. In recent years, we have seen uprisings in Ukraine and Georgia. Only a few days ago, the people of Kyrgyzstan rose to remove their corrupt and incompetent government and install a new one, headed by a woman president.
Who knows what is around the corner for Pakistan.
The art of inventing problems
By Ayaz Amir
A week is indeed a long time in politics. It has only been a few days since the 18th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly and already the shine is wearing off that ‘historic’ achievement. The only thing historic about it was its unanimous passage by the National Assembly. Unanimity is a virtue but since when was it alone a measure of great accomplishment?
To slow minds – and I stress the adjective – it was never very clear in what way the constitution as inherited from Pervez Musharraf was an impediment in the path of good governance? Was there any inherent disability in it which prevented decisive action, say, on power shutdowns or inflation? Did the constitution prevent the prime minister from streamlining his cabinet and making it more efficient? Did it in any manner impede the war against extremism?
And with the constitution cleansed, how precisely will things improve? Will the amended constitution induce national clarity? Will it light the path towards a common education policy or the improvement of public transport? Will we get better municipal services? Will the nation be finally convinced to get rid of that number one nuisance, the plastic shopping bag? Will the mounting tide of sectarian divisiveness be checked? Will Balochistan’s anger somehow be appeased?
A constitution is a set of guiding principles much as the Quran, as Muslims believe, is a compendium of divinely-ordained principles. But just as the Quran does not automatically produce good Muslims or lead to the perfect society – for that to happen action must take precedence over lip-service – the best constitution in the world contains no guarantees that it will lead to the promised kingdom.
The 1973 Constitution when first passed was also a unanimous document (although the Baloch leadership of the time has a different take on this point). Doubtless Pakistan would be poorer without it. But merely having that constitution never led to the transformation of Pakistan. And it never stopped tinpot dictators from marching in and seizing power, and adding to the nation’s woes.
The 18th Amendment too by itself will work no wonders. But it has already led to one problem, the turmoil in Hazara over the renaming of the Frontier province as Pakhtunkhwa, which is a rebuke to the orgy of celebrations which got going after the National Assembly’s passage of the 18th Amendment.
Stemming from the Hazara unrest are (1) calls for a new Hazara province and (2) renewed focus on the demand for a Seraiki province in the south of Punjab. The 18th Amendment was supposed to settle old problems, not open fresh wounds.
The original sin – or call it the first blunder – was the formation of the constitutional reforms committee representing all parties in parliament. Its composition was almost guaranteed to encourage every party to raise its own flag. The ANP’s favourite horse, which it was bound to ride, was the Pakhtunkhwa issue. The MQM had its eyes from the start on undoing the Concurrent List. For obvious reasons, it also wanted ports to become a provincial subject (something which, mercifully, hasn’t come to pass).
Raza Rabbani and the PPP seemed to have no clear aim apart from wanting to gain credit and political mileage out of shepherding through parliament a consensus document. The PML-N was primarily interested in trimming the president’s overweening powers. But in gunning for this it found itself slipping into a swamp in which fresh issues kept rearing their heads.
The first rule the committee imposed upon itself was to keep its deliberations away from the public eye. So well was this injunction obeyed that much of parliament was clueless about what was afoot behind the curtains. The inordinate stretching-out of the committee’s deliberations – nine months – was also enough to put parliament to sleep. The parliamentary vigilance that should have been exercised was thus sadly missing. And there were those who doubted that President Asif Zardari would willingly shed his powers. So they convinced themselves that the committee’s deliberations were a charade.
The doubters of course were proved wrong and, against commonly-held expectations, Zardari agreed to become a figurehead president, in line with the intent of the 1973 Constitution. But this was just one aspect of the situation. Thecommittee’s report when it came, and was ready for signing, was almost a fait accompli. The various parties should have examined it more thoroughly earlier. Not having done that at the proper time, it was too late to go through the contents with a fine comb or suggest meaningful changes at the last minute.
Indeed, when Mian Nawaz Sharif raised two objections which in hindsight – the clearest sight of all – seem entirely valid, this triggered such a storm of criticism that it almost seemed as if he was the Judas bent upon betraying the will of the rest of parliament. True, the timing of the objections was awkward and put the PML-N in a spot. I too was of the opinion that this was no time to quibble. But the fact remains, and as the explosive turn of events in Hazara has amply indicated, the objections were not wholly without merit.
Towards the end, the hype generated became so powerful that endorsing the consensus report seemed more important than examining its contents. Nawaz Sharif had tried to swim against the tide. But he had no choice but to go along with the mainstream when public pressure became overwhelming. Even then he managed to extract two minor concessions, the Khyber prefix to Pakhtunkhwa and a small change in the agreed formula regarding the appointment of senior judges. But as we have seen, the prefix was not enough to forestall the emotional backlash in Hazara.
How much nicer it would have been if instead of the nine-month marathon which the Raza Rabbani committee chose to run over high mountain and plunging valley, it had agreed on just a one-line amendment that the constitution stood restored to its shape as on the evening of July 4th, 1977, the eve of Zia’s coup?
As Zia’s first victim, the second victim being the nation, the PPP should have gone for this option. But it chose the longer route, thereby opening a Pandora’s box whose first contents we have seen in Hazara (although it is not a little pathetic to see the defeated remnants of Musharraf’s Hazara supporters, in the shape of the local PML-Q, trying to draw political advantage out of this sad affair. What will discarded politicians not do to attract attention?)
As stated above, the ANP, to the exclusion of anything else, had its eyes on Pakhtunkhwa. The MQM single-mindedly had its eyes on the Concurrent List. When the clause doing away with it was passed in the National Assembly, and the MQM members went giddy with excitement, shouting Altaf Hussain slogans at the top of their voices, I had a feeling that we had rushed into something without fully gauging its consequences.
On closer examination therefore the 18th Amendment looks to be more and more of a half-cooked affair. Consider the deletion of Zia’s name from the constitution. His name has gone but his spirit lingers on. The articles he inserted into the constitution (62 and 63 – setting out standards of rectitude for candidates) are still there. They have no practical import. But if something is rubbish what wisdom in preserving it? More to the point, the 8th Amendment validating Zia’s coup is still part of the constitution. What does it matter then if Zia’s name has been taken out?
Zia and no one else, through an executive order, made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the constitution. Of no practical significance, it merely adds to the wordiness of a document already weighted down by unnecessary verbiage, at least in the principles of policy.
Which lends itself to the conclusion that where the committee could have been radical it seized the path of caution, while things best avoided it chose to embrace. Pakistan’s problems lie not in the realm of law-making. It’s getting things done, of making them work, which require to be the focus of its national energies.
A week is indeed a long time in politics. It has only been a few days since the 18th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly and already the shine is wearing off that ‘historic’ achievement. The only thing historic about it was its unanimous passage by the National Assembly. Unanimity is a virtue but since when was it alone a measure of great accomplishment?
To slow minds – and I stress the adjective – it was never very clear in what way the constitution as inherited from Pervez Musharraf was an impediment in the path of good governance? Was there any inherent disability in it which prevented decisive action, say, on power shutdowns or inflation? Did the constitution prevent the prime minister from streamlining his cabinet and making it more efficient? Did it in any manner impede the war against extremism?
And with the constitution cleansed, how precisely will things improve? Will the amended constitution induce national clarity? Will it light the path towards a common education policy or the improvement of public transport? Will we get better municipal services? Will the nation be finally convinced to get rid of that number one nuisance, the plastic shopping bag? Will the mounting tide of sectarian divisiveness be checked? Will Balochistan’s anger somehow be appeased?
A constitution is a set of guiding principles much as the Quran, as Muslims believe, is a compendium of divinely-ordained principles. But just as the Quran does not automatically produce good Muslims or lead to the perfect society – for that to happen action must take precedence over lip-service – the best constitution in the world contains no guarantees that it will lead to the promised kingdom.
The 1973 Constitution when first passed was also a unanimous document (although the Baloch leadership of the time has a different take on this point). Doubtless Pakistan would be poorer without it. But merely having that constitution never led to the transformation of Pakistan. And it never stopped tinpot dictators from marching in and seizing power, and adding to the nation’s woes.
The 18th Amendment too by itself will work no wonders. But it has already led to one problem, the turmoil in Hazara over the renaming of the Frontier province as Pakhtunkhwa, which is a rebuke to the orgy of celebrations which got going after the National Assembly’s passage of the 18th Amendment.
Stemming from the Hazara unrest are (1) calls for a new Hazara province and (2) renewed focus on the demand for a Seraiki province in the south of Punjab. The 18th Amendment was supposed to settle old problems, not open fresh wounds.
The original sin – or call it the first blunder – was the formation of the constitutional reforms committee representing all parties in parliament. Its composition was almost guaranteed to encourage every party to raise its own flag. The ANP’s favourite horse, which it was bound to ride, was the Pakhtunkhwa issue. The MQM had its eyes from the start on undoing the Concurrent List. For obvious reasons, it also wanted ports to become a provincial subject (something which, mercifully, hasn’t come to pass).
Raza Rabbani and the PPP seemed to have no clear aim apart from wanting to gain credit and political mileage out of shepherding through parliament a consensus document. The PML-N was primarily interested in trimming the president’s overweening powers. But in gunning for this it found itself slipping into a swamp in which fresh issues kept rearing their heads.
The first rule the committee imposed upon itself was to keep its deliberations away from the public eye. So well was this injunction obeyed that much of parliament was clueless about what was afoot behind the curtains. The inordinate stretching-out of the committee’s deliberations – nine months – was also enough to put parliament to sleep. The parliamentary vigilance that should have been exercised was thus sadly missing. And there were those who doubted that President Asif Zardari would willingly shed his powers. So they convinced themselves that the committee’s deliberations were a charade.
The doubters of course were proved wrong and, against commonly-held expectations, Zardari agreed to become a figurehead president, in line with the intent of the 1973 Constitution. But this was just one aspect of the situation. Thecommittee’s report when it came, and was ready for signing, was almost a fait accompli. The various parties should have examined it more thoroughly earlier. Not having done that at the proper time, it was too late to go through the contents with a fine comb or suggest meaningful changes at the last minute.
Indeed, when Mian Nawaz Sharif raised two objections which in hindsight – the clearest sight of all – seem entirely valid, this triggered such a storm of criticism that it almost seemed as if he was the Judas bent upon betraying the will of the rest of parliament. True, the timing of the objections was awkward and put the PML-N in a spot. I too was of the opinion that this was no time to quibble. But the fact remains, and as the explosive turn of events in Hazara has amply indicated, the objections were not wholly without merit.
Towards the end, the hype generated became so powerful that endorsing the consensus report seemed more important than examining its contents. Nawaz Sharif had tried to swim against the tide. But he had no choice but to go along with the mainstream when public pressure became overwhelming. Even then he managed to extract two minor concessions, the Khyber prefix to Pakhtunkhwa and a small change in the agreed formula regarding the appointment of senior judges. But as we have seen, the prefix was not enough to forestall the emotional backlash in Hazara.
How much nicer it would have been if instead of the nine-month marathon which the Raza Rabbani committee chose to run over high mountain and plunging valley, it had agreed on just a one-line amendment that the constitution stood restored to its shape as on the evening of July 4th, 1977, the eve of Zia’s coup?
As Zia’s first victim, the second victim being the nation, the PPP should have gone for this option. But it chose the longer route, thereby opening a Pandora’s box whose first contents we have seen in Hazara (although it is not a little pathetic to see the defeated remnants of Musharraf’s Hazara supporters, in the shape of the local PML-Q, trying to draw political advantage out of this sad affair. What will discarded politicians not do to attract attention?)
As stated above, the ANP, to the exclusion of anything else, had its eyes on Pakhtunkhwa. The MQM single-mindedly had its eyes on the Concurrent List. When the clause doing away with it was passed in the National Assembly, and the MQM members went giddy with excitement, shouting Altaf Hussain slogans at the top of their voices, I had a feeling that we had rushed into something without fully gauging its consequences.
On closer examination therefore the 18th Amendment looks to be more and more of a half-cooked affair. Consider the deletion of Zia’s name from the constitution. His name has gone but his spirit lingers on. The articles he inserted into the constitution (62 and 63 – setting out standards of rectitude for candidates) are still there. They have no practical import. But if something is rubbish what wisdom in preserving it? More to the point, the 8th Amendment validating Zia’s coup is still part of the constitution. What does it matter then if Zia’s name has been taken out?
Zia and no one else, through an executive order, made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the constitution. Of no practical significance, it merely adds to the wordiness of a document already weighted down by unnecessary verbiage, at least in the principles of policy.
Which lends itself to the conclusion that where the committee could have been radical it seized the path of caution, while things best avoided it chose to embrace. Pakistan’s problems lie not in the realm of law-making. It’s getting things done, of making them work, which require to be the focus of its national energies.
An embarrassing obsession
By Jawed Naqvi
Mirza Ghalib presciently captured the futility of India’s Pakistan-centric foreign policy in the following self-mocking verse he penned in the 19th century:
‘Maine kaha jo bazm e naaz, chahiye ghair se tihi
Sun ke sitam-zareef ne, mujhko utha diya ki yun!’
(‘I asked the sweetheart to evict the intruder from the boudoir. She acquiesced, and instead had me thrown out quite far!’)
The verse written a century before the two countries were created still depicts the way most world leaders have responded to India’s unending petitions against Pakistan as Delhi seeks to check its own waning influence in Afghanistan and over its other quests including what has proved to be elusive access to a mysterious terror mastermind locked up in an American jail.
This man has a Pakistani connection but is also believed to have worked for US intelligence. So that’s a big quandary.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s plea in Washington for “zero tolerance” for nuclear delinquents had Pakistan in its crosshairs. The cliché of zero tolerance is of course best applied to traffic rules. Its excessive emphasis for serious problems could convey the impression that all other issues have been settled, i.e. zero tolerance for terrorism, communalism, corruption, poverty, internal rebellions and so on.
To use a cricketing idiom the Indian prime minister’s appeal against Pakistan’s nuclear waywardness can be seen as a wicket-keeper’s ploy to distract the umpire from calling a wide ball. Nobody believes India’s nuclear weapons are not ill-gotten, or that under the terms of the NPT they are any more legal than Pakistan’s or Iran’s if it acquires them.
Kolkata’s Telegraph newspaper ran a Ghalib-like assessment of India’s habit of venting its spleen about its difficult neighbour to all and sundry. In a dispatch from Washington, where the nuclear summit was the main agenda, the newspaper’s correspondent counted at least 30 direct or indirect references to Pakistan by India’s foreign secretary Nirupama Rao in a briefing which should have been about global proliferation.
This was of course not Ms Rao’s fault. As India’s spokesperson at the Agra summit in July 2001 she faithfully followed a totally different tack on Pakistan only because then foreign minister Jaswant Singh was keen to walk the “high road to peace” with the neighbour. It was in response to the Indian media’s 13 questions in Washington, all related to Pakistan instead of nuclear worries, that the 30 references to Islamabad became perhaps inevitable.
The Pakistan-obsession may not be a problem of the Indian media alone. It runs deeper and is clearly more systemic. I asked a foreign ministry official in Delhi about the procedure for Indian journalists to get accreditation to the Saarc summit in Thimpu this month. My friend said with concern: “Good question, boss. We are going too slowly on this. I am sure the Pakistanis will land there with a huge delegation.”
Of course the India-Pakistan obsession is a mutually counter-productive element in South Asian diplomacy. Pakistan has its own bee in the bonnet with regard to India. Its leaders never tire of complaining bitterly about Delhi to anyone they can buttonhole.
On one occasion a high-profile listener didn’t know who the petitioner was and who the accused. On April 6, 1995, recalls The Telegraph’s correspondent, when Benazir Bhutto was escorted to the US Senate floor by the late Jesse Helms, he introduced her thus: “The Foreign Relations Committee has had the honour of welcoming the distinguished prime minister of India and I wish to bring her to the floor.”
With Benazir looking horrified, the Republican senator compounded the error by saying he had just completed “a delightful hour-and-a-half conversation” with the Pakistani prime minister and she was talking mostly about India.
Perhaps the most embarrassing moment for any sovereign country should be when a visitor tells its leaders how he or she was responsible for mending the host’s ties with their neighbours. And this is precisely what President Bill Clinton was allowed to get away with when he addressed India’s parliament in March 2000. To add to the embarrassment, fawning MPs milled around him to touch him after he told them tersely how he had helped India evict the Pakistanis from Kargil, not militarily as New Delhi claimed, but with America’s diplomatic help.
Similarly, does any Indian or Pakistani leader realise how ridiculous they look when they allow themselves to be shepherded to shake hands by their foreign hosts? Dr Singh has been prime minister for more than six years but there is nothing on the horizon to indicate that that he is planning a visit to Pakistan any time soon. He is, however, strangely happy to meet a Pakistani counterpart on foreign soil.
Not only this, the meeting often results in path-breaking pronouncements, more often than not to ease the tensions. Sharm el Sheikh and Havana come to mind where landmark decisions were made. Why not in Delhi or Islamabad?
A significant fallout for India in this attitude of Brahminical aloofness is the contradictory signals it sends to foreign interlocutors. It tells them on the one hand to assiduously avoid hyphenating India-Pakistan issues. On the other its diplomats and politicians spare no opportunity to snarl at each other in self-wounding public spats. To make it worse they then start to highlight the negatives of each other in witless conversations with a third party. There are several ways for India and Pakistan to develop a more mature policy regarding each other.
The most successful of these could be to listen to their people — not the TV watching sound-byte fanatics, but ordinary people who seek visas only to be cruelly denied them. These people want to move on to a durable and trusting relationship between their countries. Whatever be the grouse between their countries — terrorism, the water dispute, Kashmir or ways to find influence in Afghanistan — none of these could or should be resolved by foreign mediators.
Practically all visitors to Delhi are subjected to a routine question. Do they support India’s quest to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council? They all say it is a good idea. However, few go on to discuss the big impediment in this. How can one nuclear gate-crasher be offered the exalted seat it covets when it cannot conduct a simple dialogue with a nuclear neighbour without being nudged by others?
If the leaders of India and Pakistan cannot find the courage to take the first step, they should go back to Ghalib’s simple sagacity. Why should any of the two countries grovel before Washington or any other capital? How about learning from China or Russia or Venezuela or even Iran on how to keep their dignity and be a global player.
Mirza Ghalib presciently captured the futility of India’s Pakistan-centric foreign policy in the following self-mocking verse he penned in the 19th century:
‘Maine kaha jo bazm e naaz, chahiye ghair se tihi
Sun ke sitam-zareef ne, mujhko utha diya ki yun!’
(‘I asked the sweetheart to evict the intruder from the boudoir. She acquiesced, and instead had me thrown out quite far!’)
The verse written a century before the two countries were created still depicts the way most world leaders have responded to India’s unending petitions against Pakistan as Delhi seeks to check its own waning influence in Afghanistan and over its other quests including what has proved to be elusive access to a mysterious terror mastermind locked up in an American jail.
This man has a Pakistani connection but is also believed to have worked for US intelligence. So that’s a big quandary.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s plea in Washington for “zero tolerance” for nuclear delinquents had Pakistan in its crosshairs. The cliché of zero tolerance is of course best applied to traffic rules. Its excessive emphasis for serious problems could convey the impression that all other issues have been settled, i.e. zero tolerance for terrorism, communalism, corruption, poverty, internal rebellions and so on.
To use a cricketing idiom the Indian prime minister’s appeal against Pakistan’s nuclear waywardness can be seen as a wicket-keeper’s ploy to distract the umpire from calling a wide ball. Nobody believes India’s nuclear weapons are not ill-gotten, or that under the terms of the NPT they are any more legal than Pakistan’s or Iran’s if it acquires them.
Kolkata’s Telegraph newspaper ran a Ghalib-like assessment of India’s habit of venting its spleen about its difficult neighbour to all and sundry. In a dispatch from Washington, where the nuclear summit was the main agenda, the newspaper’s correspondent counted at least 30 direct or indirect references to Pakistan by India’s foreign secretary Nirupama Rao in a briefing which should have been about global proliferation.
This was of course not Ms Rao’s fault. As India’s spokesperson at the Agra summit in July 2001 she faithfully followed a totally different tack on Pakistan only because then foreign minister Jaswant Singh was keen to walk the “high road to peace” with the neighbour. It was in response to the Indian media’s 13 questions in Washington, all related to Pakistan instead of nuclear worries, that the 30 references to Islamabad became perhaps inevitable.
The Pakistan-obsession may not be a problem of the Indian media alone. It runs deeper and is clearly more systemic. I asked a foreign ministry official in Delhi about the procedure for Indian journalists to get accreditation to the Saarc summit in Thimpu this month. My friend said with concern: “Good question, boss. We are going too slowly on this. I am sure the Pakistanis will land there with a huge delegation.”
Of course the India-Pakistan obsession is a mutually counter-productive element in South Asian diplomacy. Pakistan has its own bee in the bonnet with regard to India. Its leaders never tire of complaining bitterly about Delhi to anyone they can buttonhole.
On one occasion a high-profile listener didn’t know who the petitioner was and who the accused. On April 6, 1995, recalls The Telegraph’s correspondent, when Benazir Bhutto was escorted to the US Senate floor by the late Jesse Helms, he introduced her thus: “The Foreign Relations Committee has had the honour of welcoming the distinguished prime minister of India and I wish to bring her to the floor.”
With Benazir looking horrified, the Republican senator compounded the error by saying he had just completed “a delightful hour-and-a-half conversation” with the Pakistani prime minister and she was talking mostly about India.
Perhaps the most embarrassing moment for any sovereign country should be when a visitor tells its leaders how he or she was responsible for mending the host’s ties with their neighbours. And this is precisely what President Bill Clinton was allowed to get away with when he addressed India’s parliament in March 2000. To add to the embarrassment, fawning MPs milled around him to touch him after he told them tersely how he had helped India evict the Pakistanis from Kargil, not militarily as New Delhi claimed, but with America’s diplomatic help.
Similarly, does any Indian or Pakistani leader realise how ridiculous they look when they allow themselves to be shepherded to shake hands by their foreign hosts? Dr Singh has been prime minister for more than six years but there is nothing on the horizon to indicate that that he is planning a visit to Pakistan any time soon. He is, however, strangely happy to meet a Pakistani counterpart on foreign soil.
Not only this, the meeting often results in path-breaking pronouncements, more often than not to ease the tensions. Sharm el Sheikh and Havana come to mind where landmark decisions were made. Why not in Delhi or Islamabad?
A significant fallout for India in this attitude of Brahminical aloofness is the contradictory signals it sends to foreign interlocutors. It tells them on the one hand to assiduously avoid hyphenating India-Pakistan issues. On the other its diplomats and politicians spare no opportunity to snarl at each other in self-wounding public spats. To make it worse they then start to highlight the negatives of each other in witless conversations with a third party. There are several ways for India and Pakistan to develop a more mature policy regarding each other.
The most successful of these could be to listen to their people — not the TV watching sound-byte fanatics, but ordinary people who seek visas only to be cruelly denied them. These people want to move on to a durable and trusting relationship between their countries. Whatever be the grouse between their countries — terrorism, the water dispute, Kashmir or ways to find influence in Afghanistan — none of these could or should be resolved by foreign mediators.
Practically all visitors to Delhi are subjected to a routine question. Do they support India’s quest to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council? They all say it is a good idea. However, few go on to discuss the big impediment in this. How can one nuclear gate-crasher be offered the exalted seat it covets when it cannot conduct a simple dialogue with a nuclear neighbour without being nudged by others?
If the leaders of India and Pakistan cannot find the courage to take the first step, they should go back to Ghalib’s simple sagacity. Why should any of the two countries grovel before Washington or any other capital? How about learning from China or Russia or Venezuela or even Iran on how to keep their dignity and be a global player.
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