By Rahimullah Yusufzai
The debate on renaming the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is serious business because it concerns the identity of its people and their place in the federation of Pakistan. However, the direction it has taken is sometimes comical, and at best uninformed and politicised. Coining a new name for the province has become a favourite pastime for many people and, surprisingly, even those not belonging to it appear keen to select, if not impose, a name of their own choices.
Names such as Neelab, Nuristan and Darul Islam have been proposed for NWFP. People with fertile imaginations and unconcerned that the issue was to provide identity to its majority Pakhtun population came up with still more bizarre names that don’t even deserve to be discussed. Abaseen and Khyber were pushed into the limelight after receiving backing from the PML-N and PML-Q. Abaseen is a name used for River Indus that runs not just through the NWFP but also Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab and Sindh, while Khyber is the name of a mountain pass that links Afghanistan with Pakistan.
Khyber Pass is the most famous of them, but we also have the Gomal, Tochi, Khojak, Nawa and other passes that connect the two countries. Naming educational institutions, banks and other institutions after Khyber has been a popular option because it is non-controversial and possibly also for want of more suitable names. But neither Abaseen nor Khyber could confer the identity that most people in NWFP seek in demanding the renaming of their province.
Lately, compound names have been proposed for NWFP as a compromise to overcome the deadlock between the two major parties to the dispute, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the PML-N. Hyphenation to “Pakhtunkhwa” of names including “Abaseen,” “Khyber,” “Hazara” and “Afghania” have been suggested as a way out of the stalemate. But not only will this make the new name long, but there will be no end to demands by other parts of NWFP, including Dera Ismail Khan and Chitral, seeking the addition of the names of the own regions. Certain politicians from Dera Ismail Khan even suggested “Pakhtunkhwa-Dera-Hazara.” One didn’t hear Gandhara, the old Buddhist-era name of the Frontier, as a possible new name, or part of a compound name. Gandhara is certainly better in the historical context than, say, Khyber and Abaseen.
It is understandable if politicians with an eye to their respective vote banks adopt unreasonable attitudes on the issue. But it is disappointing if respected people such as Air Marshal (r) M Asghar Khan and retired civil servant Kunwar Idris don’t check their facts before commenting on the question. Writing in a newspaper on March 28, Asghar Khan commented that “in a province in which the Pakhtuns are a little over half its population, insisting on renaming it Pakhtunkhwa could prove a divisive one.” He also proposed Sarhad, which means “border” and is already used in reference to the province in Urdu, as the new name. In the same paper, Dawn, the same day, Kunwar Idris wrote that “most Punjabi- and Hindko-speaking inhabitants of the province (who, perhaps, outnumber the Pashto speakers)…” He also said that Pakhtunkhwa would carry a ring of Pakhtunistan for the devout Muslim Leaguers opposed to the ANP, which is spearheading the campaign for the name Pakhtunkhwa.
For the information of Asghar Khan, Kunwar Idris and others, the 1998 census showed that 73.9 per cent of NWFP’s population spoke Pashto, 3.86 per cent, largely in Dera Ismail Khan, spoke Saraiki, 0.97 per cent Punjabi, 0.78 per cent Urdu, 0.04 per cent Sindhi and 0.01 per cent Balochi. A significant 20.43 per cent people listed in the “Others” column obviously included speakers of Hindko (believed to around 18 per cent), Chitrali, Gojri and other languages. The next population census must have separate columns for Hindko and the other languages to avoid future controversies.
73.9 per cent Pakhtuns in the census mentioned Pashto as their mother tongue, though there are many others in Dera Ismail Khan, including the Jadoons, Tarins, Mashwanis and Swatis in Hazara region and Miankhels, Gandapurs and Kundis, who are Pakhtuns but have forgotten Pashto. Challenge them that they aren’t Pakhtun, and there is a chance they might come to blows with you.
The census figures for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), which are geographically and politically part of NWFP, are even more revealing in terms of the Pakhtun identity of the population. In 1998 an overwhelming 99.1 per cent of the 3.176 million population of Fata, to which the change of name will also apply, declared Pashto as their mother tongue. Even though the tribal areas have a largely separate administrative setup, it is headed by the governor of NWFP. If the Fata figures are added to those of the settled areas or districts falling under NWFP, the percentage of Pakhtuns and Pashto-speakers will rise even further.
In opposing the renaming of the province to Pakhtunkhwa, the two Muslim League factions led by Mian Nawaz Sharif and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain are driven by the fear of losing votes in certain non-Pashto-speaking areas. These are the only two significant political parties represented in parliament that object to the name Pakhtunkhwa. The Jamaat-e-Islami and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf — lacking representation in the parliament after unwisely boycotting the 2008 general elections and now keen to contest every by-election to get back into the assemblies — also have reservations about Pakhtunkhwa and would likely support a provincial referendum on the issue. Almost all other political parties support Pakhtunkhwa, or in case of a stalemate, the alternative names Pakhtunistan and Afghania.
If democratic norms are to be followed, then the wishes of the majority need to be respected in the renaming. The NWFP Assembly, reflecting the will of the people, a passed resolution in favour of Pakhtunkhwa by majority vote in November 1997, with only the Saifullah brothers, Salim and Humayun, opposing it, and lawmakers from the PML-N, which was then a coalition partner of the ANP in NWFP, abstaining from the vote.
Abstention isn’t opposition and the decision not to oppose the resolution was taken to save the coalition government from collapsing. Politics rather than principles was behind this decision by the then PML-affiliated chief minister Sardar Mahtab Ahmad Khan, Pir Sabir Shah and other Hazara politicians now in the forefront of opposition to Pakhtunkhwa. It is intriguing that the PML-N, according to Pir Sabir Shah, was willing to accept Afghania as the new name for NWFP. Though the ANP leadership too appears ready to agree to Afghania, it is difficult to understand how this name would protect the identity of non-Pakhtuns in Hazara or elsewhere who believe Pakhtunkhwa would wipe out their identity. Abaseen, Khyber and other names too cannot give an identity to the non-Pakhtun populations, but they would certainly deprive the majority Pakhtuns of their identity.
The argument against Pakhtunkhwa that it is ethnic-based is neutralised by the fact that all other provinces in Pakistan carry names that identify the majority ethnic groups living there. Even if Punjab is named after its five rivers or Sindh after the River Indus, the majority populations in the two provinces have come to be known as Punjabis and Sindhis. Balochistan is obviously named after the Baloch, the majority ethnic group in the province along with their Brahvi cousins.
Controversies would erupt if Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan were to be renamed today. The number of Saraiki-speakers in Punjab are 17.36 per cent of its population, compared to 75.23 Punjabis; in Sindh only 59.73 per cent of the population speaks Sindhi, while 21.05 per cent speaks Urdu; 6.99 per cent speak Punjabi and 4.19 per cent Pashto; in Balochistan, not more than 54.76 per cent of the population name Balochi as their mother tongue, compared to 29.64 per cent naming Pashto, 5.58 per cent Sindhi, 2.52 per cent Punjabi, and 2.42 per cent Saraiki. In fact, Pashto-speakers in NWFP and Fata form the largest group of a single ethnicity in any province in Pakistan.
Ignoring the aspirations of the Pakhtun people (15.42 per cent), who form the second-largest ethnic group in Pakistan after Punjabis (44.15 per cent) and refusing to provide them an identity in the renaming of their province, would be both undemocratic and unjust.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
We must never forget Ziaul Haq
By Kamran Shafi
We are told that Ziaul Haq, yes the very same Ziaul Haq at whose door the responsibility of unleashing the demons responsible for most of our present travails can and should be placed, is to be excised from the nation’s history by his name being struck off the list of Pakistani presidents.
One has to immediately ask if this act will also take away the spectre of religious extremism that the man gave birth to and nurtured until it became a scourge that we Pakistanis have to face every moment of our lives; or that the baradari (clan) politics he (re-)introduced will simply go away; or that it will automatically rid the country of his horrendous Hudood Ordinances under which tens of poor women have been horribly violated and hundreds of our minority brothers and sisters have been murdered and tortured and jailed?
No, a thousand times no. Instead of removing his name from the squalid history of our poor country, Ziaul Haq’s name must be kept alive so that succeeding generations are reminded of the tyrant and his doings that so completely destroyed Pakistan and its social fabric.
Statues of the dictator, resplendent in his general’s uniform gongs, ribbons, medals, sashes, toshdans and all, should be raised in all the major cities of Pakistan with his crimes against the people inscribed in large letters on marble plaques at the base of the statues.
Rather than forgetting the man, the government should periodically run paid advertisements in the newspapers and on television stations enumerating his acts that have brought the country to near ruin.
Indeed, these ads could be run immediately after another heartrending bombing carried out by the religious terrorists who can rightly be called ‘Zia’s grandchildren’; bombings that kill and maim and terrorise even women and children. No, friends, we must never forget the dictator and what he did to us.
On to other matters; first to the NRO. Enough already, as the Americans say. I was absolutely against the NRO when it was first mooted as a way that would facilitate Benazir’s return to the country, as also the return of others from her party who had been charged with wrongdoing by Musharraf’s dictatorship.
It was akin to throwing the dictator a lifeline I thought, when he was weakened by the lawyers movement against the dismissal of the superior judiciary. In hindsight I was wrong: if there hadn’t been an NRO, Musharraf would still have been sitting at the top of the heap; the political parties would still have been out in the cold, and let alone being restored, the judges would still have been under house arrest.
No NRO, no giving up his uniform (his ‘second skin’, remember?), no political parties; no political parties, no elections; no elections, no parliament; no parliament, no political manoeuvring; no political manoeuvring, no long march; no long march, no restoration of judges, and so on and on and on.
Seriously, does anyone think that Musharraf could have been dislodged by the lawyers backed by a handful of ‘civil society’? On deep reflection, I think not. So, enough already on the NRO. The point has been made that it was a bad law: can we just let go of it now; give elected people the chance to complete their terms and the people the chance to vote them out in the next election? As I have said before, if this government does not complete its term, neither will the next.
And another thing. Will everyone stop hounding the so-called ‘NRO beneficiaries’? Everyone and Charlie’s Aunt knows that in most cases trumped-up charges were made against their detractors by successive Pakistani governments, dictatorships and others.
However, if those who are demanding action now that the NRO has been declared null and void feel they must go on regardless, it is their moral duty to also demand that the armed forces and the judiciary be made accountable under the same accountability laws too. Let us have no holy cows.
Enough already on the Kerry-Lugar Bill, now law, too. Look at it this way: since the army high command which started it all (‘furious’ was a term used to describe the feelings of the brass hats), has just been to Washington D.C. and sued (as in beg for something) for this and that and the other, is it not time that others who thought that the Kerry-Lugar law took away Pakistan’s ‘sovereignty’ stopped criticising it? It is a perfectly worded law, may it live long.
A word on the judicial crisis. The slapping of a senior civil judge (in court, mark) by a lawyer in Faisalabad, and before that the thrashing of journalists and police officials by other lawyers in the Lahore courts, should make it very clear to My Lords of the superior judiciary that the sense of conquering all before them is turning very ugly indeed.
It ought to be realised that lawyers are not storm-troopers, ready to attack all comers, even judges sitting on the bench, at the slightest provocation. This will not happen unless it is realised that lawyers, as also the judiciary, are mortal too, that they are not all-powerful. And this will not happen unless the judiciary sets parameters for itself and says clearly that there are matters of governance that should be left to the elected parliament and the government that comes from parliament.
The judiciary should look back and see the trials and tribulations it has come through, the many ups and downs it has seen, mainly downs. It should look back and see the many episodes that did not exactly paint it in a kindly light, more than anything else the judicial murder of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at the behest of the man we must never forget.
It needs to understand more than anything else that it was only a civilian dispensation that gave it back the freedom so cruelly taken from it by an army dictator. The very best start to this will be My Lord the Chief Justice immediately recusing himself and his office from any committee set up to appoint judges. If he sends the message that parliament, which embodies the peoples will is supreme, he will go down in history as a truly great man.
We are told that Ziaul Haq, yes the very same Ziaul Haq at whose door the responsibility of unleashing the demons responsible for most of our present travails can and should be placed, is to be excised from the nation’s history by his name being struck off the list of Pakistani presidents.
One has to immediately ask if this act will also take away the spectre of religious extremism that the man gave birth to and nurtured until it became a scourge that we Pakistanis have to face every moment of our lives; or that the baradari (clan) politics he (re-)introduced will simply go away; or that it will automatically rid the country of his horrendous Hudood Ordinances under which tens of poor women have been horribly violated and hundreds of our minority brothers and sisters have been murdered and tortured and jailed?
No, a thousand times no. Instead of removing his name from the squalid history of our poor country, Ziaul Haq’s name must be kept alive so that succeeding generations are reminded of the tyrant and his doings that so completely destroyed Pakistan and its social fabric.
Statues of the dictator, resplendent in his general’s uniform gongs, ribbons, medals, sashes, toshdans and all, should be raised in all the major cities of Pakistan with his crimes against the people inscribed in large letters on marble plaques at the base of the statues.
Rather than forgetting the man, the government should periodically run paid advertisements in the newspapers and on television stations enumerating his acts that have brought the country to near ruin.
Indeed, these ads could be run immediately after another heartrending bombing carried out by the religious terrorists who can rightly be called ‘Zia’s grandchildren’; bombings that kill and maim and terrorise even women and children. No, friends, we must never forget the dictator and what he did to us.
On to other matters; first to the NRO. Enough already, as the Americans say. I was absolutely against the NRO when it was first mooted as a way that would facilitate Benazir’s return to the country, as also the return of others from her party who had been charged with wrongdoing by Musharraf’s dictatorship.
It was akin to throwing the dictator a lifeline I thought, when he was weakened by the lawyers movement against the dismissal of the superior judiciary. In hindsight I was wrong: if there hadn’t been an NRO, Musharraf would still have been sitting at the top of the heap; the political parties would still have been out in the cold, and let alone being restored, the judges would still have been under house arrest.
No NRO, no giving up his uniform (his ‘second skin’, remember?), no political parties; no political parties, no elections; no elections, no parliament; no parliament, no political manoeuvring; no political manoeuvring, no long march; no long march, no restoration of judges, and so on and on and on.
Seriously, does anyone think that Musharraf could have been dislodged by the lawyers backed by a handful of ‘civil society’? On deep reflection, I think not. So, enough already on the NRO. The point has been made that it was a bad law: can we just let go of it now; give elected people the chance to complete their terms and the people the chance to vote them out in the next election? As I have said before, if this government does not complete its term, neither will the next.
And another thing. Will everyone stop hounding the so-called ‘NRO beneficiaries’? Everyone and Charlie’s Aunt knows that in most cases trumped-up charges were made against their detractors by successive Pakistani governments, dictatorships and others.
However, if those who are demanding action now that the NRO has been declared null and void feel they must go on regardless, it is their moral duty to also demand that the armed forces and the judiciary be made accountable under the same accountability laws too. Let us have no holy cows.
Enough already on the Kerry-Lugar Bill, now law, too. Look at it this way: since the army high command which started it all (‘furious’ was a term used to describe the feelings of the brass hats), has just been to Washington D.C. and sued (as in beg for something) for this and that and the other, is it not time that others who thought that the Kerry-Lugar law took away Pakistan’s ‘sovereignty’ stopped criticising it? It is a perfectly worded law, may it live long.
A word on the judicial crisis. The slapping of a senior civil judge (in court, mark) by a lawyer in Faisalabad, and before that the thrashing of journalists and police officials by other lawyers in the Lahore courts, should make it very clear to My Lords of the superior judiciary that the sense of conquering all before them is turning very ugly indeed.
It ought to be realised that lawyers are not storm-troopers, ready to attack all comers, even judges sitting on the bench, at the slightest provocation. This will not happen unless it is realised that lawyers, as also the judiciary, are mortal too, that they are not all-powerful. And this will not happen unless the judiciary sets parameters for itself and says clearly that there are matters of governance that should be left to the elected parliament and the government that comes from parliament.
The judiciary should look back and see the trials and tribulations it has come through, the many ups and downs it has seen, mainly downs. It should look back and see the many episodes that did not exactly paint it in a kindly light, more than anything else the judicial murder of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at the behest of the man we must never forget.
It needs to understand more than anything else that it was only a civilian dispensation that gave it back the freedom so cruelly taken from it by an army dictator. The very best start to this will be My Lord the Chief Justice immediately recusing himself and his office from any committee set up to appoint judges. If he sends the message that parliament, which embodies the peoples will is supreme, he will go down in history as a truly great man.
Saturday, March 27, 2010
Brave new world or the past revisited?
By Ayaz Amir
If there’s a cross on which Pakistan has found itself frequently crucified, it is the one carrying the legend ’strategic’. What follies have we not committed in the pursuit of strategic goals? Even our present preoccupation with terrorism is a product of our strategic labours in times past (hopefully, never to return).
So when a fresh batch of graduates out of higher strategy school speak of a ’strategic dialogue’ with the United States — our principal ally and, often, the cause of our biggest headaches — there is reason to be wary.
We have been here before, travelled down this route many times, our obsessive insecurity driving us time and again into American arms, each time to be left high and dry when the initial enthusiasm, or necessity, had passed. But we never seem to learn and each time begin our quest for the holy grail — of permanence in our American connection — as if there were never any heartbreaks before.
Barely six months ago the US viewed Pakistan through sceptical, even distrustful, eyes. The army had yet to go into South Waziristan and the phrase Quetta Shura was on the lips of every half-baked security analyst across the Atlantic. South Waziristan, the unspoken acceptance of drone strikes and greater cooperation with the CIA in nabbing shadowy Taliban figures in Pakistan changed all this. American faces now light up at the mention of Pakistan, no smile more beaming than on the face of Gen David Petraeus.
As part of this mood swing, the Americans have taken to lionizing Pakistan’s army commander, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, who is very much the flavour of the moment, just as — frightening thought — Pervez Musharraf was once upon a time. It is sobering to remember that when Musharraf signed on with the US post-Sept 11, conceding far more than anyone in the Bush administration was expecting, no leader on earth was more feted than him.
So we should try and keep things in perspective. The Americans may be gushing over us now but that’s only because we are crucial, perhaps indispensable, for the success of their mission in Afghanistan. Or even for a face-saving exit from that quagmire. There are two fronts to this war, the one in Pakistan being by far the most important.
The ’strategic dialogue’ is thus not pegged to any abstract love for Pakistan. It arises from the grim necessity of the war in Afghanistan. We should be under no illusions about the window of opportunity that this dialogue offers. This window will remain open and serviceable only up to the moment when the Americans begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. To assume otherwise, and give way to misplaced euphoria — something at which we are rather good — is to court the ways of folly and set ourselves up for another ‘betrayal’ at American hands.
The wish-list Pakistan has carried to Washington has Kayani’s thumbprint all over it. It has not been lost on anyone that in the driving seat as far as our delegation is concerned sits not the foreign minister or anyone else but him. It would also not have been lost on anyone that the brief prepared by our side for the talks was put together not in the prime minister’s office or anywhere else but in General Headquarters, with key federal secretaries in attendance and Kayani, not the prime minister, presiding.
Kayani is a smart man, very articulate and extremely good at putting his point of view across (his presentation at Nato Hqs in Brussels has been widely talked about). But what is this we are hearing about the shopping list prepared under his aegis? Which world are we living in? Which planet does GHQ still inhabit?
We have just a year and a half, not eternity, to get what we want from the US. It behoves us ill to ask the US to help restart our composite dialogue with India. If India is playing hard-to-get on this count, we should be able to keep our cool and wait for India’s attitude to change. Even if the composite dialogue doesn’t get going for the next two years, the glaciers will not melt and the Himalayas will not march down to the seas.
We should be mature enough to understand a few things clearly. America is not going to ask India to talk Kashmir with us. It is not going to solve our water problems with India. It is not going to give us the kind of nuclear deal it has concluded with India.
To go by the hype generated in official quarters, it almost appeared as if we were expecting a string of nuclear power plants from the US. And what happens? Hillary Clinton announces a gift of 125 million dollars to set up thermal power plants. A colder splash of water on the fires of our misplaced ardour could not have been poured. What Burke said of England in the context of America’s war of independence: “Light lie the dust on the ashes of English pride” — we can use to define our predicament: light lie the dust on the embers of our strategic relationship.
Sooner or later we will have to discover the reasons for this talent for selling ourselves cheap. We have always behaved thus in our dealings with the US, assuming obligations unthinkingly, never asking for the right price and then moaning about betrayal and the like when the Americans, taking us at our word, leave us with very little.
Mobarak got Egypt’s American debt (7 billion dollars, and this was in 1991) written off when he joined America’s first Gulf war. The Turks asked for 25 billion dollars to allow American troops territorial passage prior to the Iraq war in 2003. That the US refused is beside the point. The Turks did not allow themselves to be taken for granted. We settle for peanuts and call it a ’strategic relationship’.
Kayani, as I have said, is a smart man. But there is too much of India and Afghanistan in his world-view. More than with the US, we need to be conducting a strategic dialogue with ourselves. Why can’t we rid ourselves of the fixation of managing things in Afghanistan? We can’t manage ourselves, yet we want to fix the neighbourhood. Managing Afghanistan may be a worthy ambition. But it is poor compensation for mismanaging Pakistan.
GHQ is aghast at the thought of the Indians training the Afghan army. In Kayani’s phrase, even when trainers depart, they leave their mindset behind. Given the vehemence of our position on this point, maybe the Americans give us ground on this. And we will hail it as a major victory. But we should be playing for higher stakes instead of tilting at windmills.
We should have been gunning for something tangible. We are a debtor nation, strapped for cash. It is money we should have been asking for. In concrete terms, a writing off of all our debt. A one-point agenda, clearly stated and firmly put, without all the mumbo-jumbo of a ’strategic relationship’. Water, energy, India and Afghanistan were best left out of our wish list, more an exercise in fantasy than anything to do with the real world.
This government is too scatterbrained and too preoccupied with other problems to have been able to get things right and concentrate on the essentials of this ’strategic dialogue’ right. The vacuum created by its ineptitude was filled by a GHQ pluming itself on the laurels won in Swat and FATA. But for all its slickness under Kayani, GHQ, alas, remains trapped in the morass of its old conceits and prejudices.
So the old questions remain: how to emerge from the darkness into the light? How to manage Pakistan’s affairs better? Most important of all: whence will come the liberation of the Pakistani mind? One thing is for sure: not from GHQ.
Afterthought: the army had denounced the Kerry-Lugar Bill. What’s so great about the ’strategic dialogue’?
If there’s a cross on which Pakistan has found itself frequently crucified, it is the one carrying the legend ’strategic’. What follies have we not committed in the pursuit of strategic goals? Even our present preoccupation with terrorism is a product of our strategic labours in times past (hopefully, never to return).
So when a fresh batch of graduates out of higher strategy school speak of a ’strategic dialogue’ with the United States — our principal ally and, often, the cause of our biggest headaches — there is reason to be wary.
We have been here before, travelled down this route many times, our obsessive insecurity driving us time and again into American arms, each time to be left high and dry when the initial enthusiasm, or necessity, had passed. But we never seem to learn and each time begin our quest for the holy grail — of permanence in our American connection — as if there were never any heartbreaks before.
Barely six months ago the US viewed Pakistan through sceptical, even distrustful, eyes. The army had yet to go into South Waziristan and the phrase Quetta Shura was on the lips of every half-baked security analyst across the Atlantic. South Waziristan, the unspoken acceptance of drone strikes and greater cooperation with the CIA in nabbing shadowy Taliban figures in Pakistan changed all this. American faces now light up at the mention of Pakistan, no smile more beaming than on the face of Gen David Petraeus.
As part of this mood swing, the Americans have taken to lionizing Pakistan’s army commander, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, who is very much the flavour of the moment, just as — frightening thought — Pervez Musharraf was once upon a time. It is sobering to remember that when Musharraf signed on with the US post-Sept 11, conceding far more than anyone in the Bush administration was expecting, no leader on earth was more feted than him.
So we should try and keep things in perspective. The Americans may be gushing over us now but that’s only because we are crucial, perhaps indispensable, for the success of their mission in Afghanistan. Or even for a face-saving exit from that quagmire. There are two fronts to this war, the one in Pakistan being by far the most important.
The ’strategic dialogue’ is thus not pegged to any abstract love for Pakistan. It arises from the grim necessity of the war in Afghanistan. We should be under no illusions about the window of opportunity that this dialogue offers. This window will remain open and serviceable only up to the moment when the Americans begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. To assume otherwise, and give way to misplaced euphoria — something at which we are rather good — is to court the ways of folly and set ourselves up for another ‘betrayal’ at American hands.
The wish-list Pakistan has carried to Washington has Kayani’s thumbprint all over it. It has not been lost on anyone that in the driving seat as far as our delegation is concerned sits not the foreign minister or anyone else but him. It would also not have been lost on anyone that the brief prepared by our side for the talks was put together not in the prime minister’s office or anywhere else but in General Headquarters, with key federal secretaries in attendance and Kayani, not the prime minister, presiding.
Kayani is a smart man, very articulate and extremely good at putting his point of view across (his presentation at Nato Hqs in Brussels has been widely talked about). But what is this we are hearing about the shopping list prepared under his aegis? Which world are we living in? Which planet does GHQ still inhabit?
We have just a year and a half, not eternity, to get what we want from the US. It behoves us ill to ask the US to help restart our composite dialogue with India. If India is playing hard-to-get on this count, we should be able to keep our cool and wait for India’s attitude to change. Even if the composite dialogue doesn’t get going for the next two years, the glaciers will not melt and the Himalayas will not march down to the seas.
We should be mature enough to understand a few things clearly. America is not going to ask India to talk Kashmir with us. It is not going to solve our water problems with India. It is not going to give us the kind of nuclear deal it has concluded with India.
To go by the hype generated in official quarters, it almost appeared as if we were expecting a string of nuclear power plants from the US. And what happens? Hillary Clinton announces a gift of 125 million dollars to set up thermal power plants. A colder splash of water on the fires of our misplaced ardour could not have been poured. What Burke said of England in the context of America’s war of independence: “Light lie the dust on the ashes of English pride” — we can use to define our predicament: light lie the dust on the embers of our strategic relationship.
Sooner or later we will have to discover the reasons for this talent for selling ourselves cheap. We have always behaved thus in our dealings with the US, assuming obligations unthinkingly, never asking for the right price and then moaning about betrayal and the like when the Americans, taking us at our word, leave us with very little.
Mobarak got Egypt’s American debt (7 billion dollars, and this was in 1991) written off when he joined America’s first Gulf war. The Turks asked for 25 billion dollars to allow American troops territorial passage prior to the Iraq war in 2003. That the US refused is beside the point. The Turks did not allow themselves to be taken for granted. We settle for peanuts and call it a ’strategic relationship’.
Kayani, as I have said, is a smart man. But there is too much of India and Afghanistan in his world-view. More than with the US, we need to be conducting a strategic dialogue with ourselves. Why can’t we rid ourselves of the fixation of managing things in Afghanistan? We can’t manage ourselves, yet we want to fix the neighbourhood. Managing Afghanistan may be a worthy ambition. But it is poor compensation for mismanaging Pakistan.
GHQ is aghast at the thought of the Indians training the Afghan army. In Kayani’s phrase, even when trainers depart, they leave their mindset behind. Given the vehemence of our position on this point, maybe the Americans give us ground on this. And we will hail it as a major victory. But we should be playing for higher stakes instead of tilting at windmills.
We should have been gunning for something tangible. We are a debtor nation, strapped for cash. It is money we should have been asking for. In concrete terms, a writing off of all our debt. A one-point agenda, clearly stated and firmly put, without all the mumbo-jumbo of a ’strategic relationship’. Water, energy, India and Afghanistan were best left out of our wish list, more an exercise in fantasy than anything to do with the real world.
This government is too scatterbrained and too preoccupied with other problems to have been able to get things right and concentrate on the essentials of this ’strategic dialogue’ right. The vacuum created by its ineptitude was filled by a GHQ pluming itself on the laurels won in Swat and FATA. But for all its slickness under Kayani, GHQ, alas, remains trapped in the morass of its old conceits and prejudices.
So the old questions remain: how to emerge from the darkness into the light? How to manage Pakistan’s affairs better? Most important of all: whence will come the liberation of the Pakistani mind? One thing is for sure: not from GHQ.
Afterthought: the army had denounced the Kerry-Lugar Bill. What’s so great about the ’strategic dialogue’?
Turning a new page
By Ayesha Siddiqa
That Pakistan needs an alternative vision and leadership is beyond doubt. Any forward movement will depend on our national ability to recreate ourselves in our own eyes before we can have an impact on how people think about us or what they are willing to offer.
Such were my thoughts as I stood in the company of some 300 Pakistani expatriates at the US State Department. We were all there at a reception during the US-Pakistan strategic talks.
The Pakistani embassy staff was jubilant about the positive atmospherics. They believe that the US is being positive and forthcoming in dealing with Pakistan. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, spoke about bilateral relations turning a new page where ties would not be focused on military security but would involve socio-economic development as well. Washington hopes to cooperate in areas such as water, energy, education, health and larger social development. Apparently, both sides also agreed to use a better framework for communication to build confidence at all levels, especially with reference to fighting the war on terror.
One of the new dimensions of this strategic dialogue is that it will bring in the private sector to collaborate with the public sector and take on board the Pakistani expatriate community to share its rich experience and capital for the development of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who spoke next, also endorsed that the strategic dialogue was about a new chapter in bilateral relations. He also implored the Pakistani expat communicate to use its expertise and resources to build Pakistan.
There was definitely a lot of positive energy in the room and one could have a sense of the US turning the page. But the million-dollar question is whether Pakistan is ready to do the same. We must bring about change at two levels: bilateral and domestic.
From the standpoint of US-Pakistan ties the major question is whether we are willing to deliver more to the US in exchange for a broader role in the region than what we delivered before. The US is back to talking to the military as well. The fact that the army chief received greater attention and better treatment than visiting army chiefs from other states normally get in Washington, indicated the Obama administration’s desire to take both the civilian and military leadership together.
For Senator David Lugar, who was present, the US couldn’t do much if the Pakistanis wanted a lame civilian government. America’s demand is for Islamabad to clamp down on all terror networks including those we are fighting and others that we have links with. This demand is linked to the US concern about rabid elements taking over weapons of mass destruction after assuming control of the Pakistani state.
We have been keeping some of the ‘strategic assets’ because of the Pakistani military’s concern for India’s nefarious activities in Afghanistan. Let’s say that we manage to convince the US to give us a role in Afghanistan where we could ensure our larger strategic interests. Would we then be willing to shut down the jihad machine?
These are tough questions which we cannot answer without, as my friend Sabira Qureshi pointed out, starting a strategic dialogue inside Pakistan.
The conspiracy theorists will naturally question America’s logic for treating Pakistan fairly this time. Perhaps, political realism buffs may understand that in this changing world no country can afford to adopt neo-conservative tools and attitudes any more. Washington might have realised that it will have to listen to Pakistan and feel concerned about Pakistan’s inherent insecurity vis-à-vis India’s role in Afghanistan. The fact of the matter is that the Afghanistan problem cannot be solved without the US, India and Pakistan abandoning their neo-conservative approach and adopting realism, which is not about the use of force all the time, but that involves measured movement.
This means using both force and negotiations depending on a particular situation. It also means understanding the inherent limitations of the use of force. Brute power cannot be advantageous all the time nor is overestimating one’s strength. Pakistan’s internal dialogue would require an assessment of how far it can go in using force to draw benefits and estimating strategic benefits and costs. While it must aim for gaining a foothold in Afghanistan to secure its position, a policy to force other neighbours out would prove counter-productive. It would help if Islamabad combined the acquisition of a role in Afghanistan with multilateral assurances that India or any other country would not threaten its core interests.
Furthermore, an internal dialogue entails building and strengthening institutions at all levels. The foreign minister spoke of the expat community investing in Pakistan. However, he did not mention improving accountability and ensuring transparency in governance. Perhaps that was not the right forum to give guarantees of improving the state system. Nevertheless, nothing that he said demonstrated a willingness to do so.
A glance at the audience indicated that those present might be very intelligent and successful, but they were also part of a crowd that eventually didn’t allow reforms to happen and opportunities to reach a larger group of people than the most affluent and well-connected.
The bottom-line is about the need to change our mindset first and adopt a new framework that will help in maximising our gains domestically, regionally and internationally. Realism is not about muscle power but about the sense to make a good bargain. We will not be able to force our competitors out of South Asia even if we wanted to. The best option, hence, would be to learn to coexist and make gains by adding to the peace initiative. So, when the US seems prepared to broaden the nature of the relationship the question we must ask ourselves is whether we are ready to turn a new leaf.
That Pakistan needs an alternative vision and leadership is beyond doubt. Any forward movement will depend on our national ability to recreate ourselves in our own eyes before we can have an impact on how people think about us or what they are willing to offer.
Such were my thoughts as I stood in the company of some 300 Pakistani expatriates at the US State Department. We were all there at a reception during the US-Pakistan strategic talks.
The Pakistani embassy staff was jubilant about the positive atmospherics. They believe that the US is being positive and forthcoming in dealing with Pakistan. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, spoke about bilateral relations turning a new page where ties would not be focused on military security but would involve socio-economic development as well. Washington hopes to cooperate in areas such as water, energy, education, health and larger social development. Apparently, both sides also agreed to use a better framework for communication to build confidence at all levels, especially with reference to fighting the war on terror.
One of the new dimensions of this strategic dialogue is that it will bring in the private sector to collaborate with the public sector and take on board the Pakistani expatriate community to share its rich experience and capital for the development of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who spoke next, also endorsed that the strategic dialogue was about a new chapter in bilateral relations. He also implored the Pakistani expat communicate to use its expertise and resources to build Pakistan.
There was definitely a lot of positive energy in the room and one could have a sense of the US turning the page. But the million-dollar question is whether Pakistan is ready to do the same. We must bring about change at two levels: bilateral and domestic.
From the standpoint of US-Pakistan ties the major question is whether we are willing to deliver more to the US in exchange for a broader role in the region than what we delivered before. The US is back to talking to the military as well. The fact that the army chief received greater attention and better treatment than visiting army chiefs from other states normally get in Washington, indicated the Obama administration’s desire to take both the civilian and military leadership together.
For Senator David Lugar, who was present, the US couldn’t do much if the Pakistanis wanted a lame civilian government. America’s demand is for Islamabad to clamp down on all terror networks including those we are fighting and others that we have links with. This demand is linked to the US concern about rabid elements taking over weapons of mass destruction after assuming control of the Pakistani state.
We have been keeping some of the ‘strategic assets’ because of the Pakistani military’s concern for India’s nefarious activities in Afghanistan. Let’s say that we manage to convince the US to give us a role in Afghanistan where we could ensure our larger strategic interests. Would we then be willing to shut down the jihad machine?
These are tough questions which we cannot answer without, as my friend Sabira Qureshi pointed out, starting a strategic dialogue inside Pakistan.
The conspiracy theorists will naturally question America’s logic for treating Pakistan fairly this time. Perhaps, political realism buffs may understand that in this changing world no country can afford to adopt neo-conservative tools and attitudes any more. Washington might have realised that it will have to listen to Pakistan and feel concerned about Pakistan’s inherent insecurity vis-à-vis India’s role in Afghanistan. The fact of the matter is that the Afghanistan problem cannot be solved without the US, India and Pakistan abandoning their neo-conservative approach and adopting realism, which is not about the use of force all the time, but that involves measured movement.
This means using both force and negotiations depending on a particular situation. It also means understanding the inherent limitations of the use of force. Brute power cannot be advantageous all the time nor is overestimating one’s strength. Pakistan’s internal dialogue would require an assessment of how far it can go in using force to draw benefits and estimating strategic benefits and costs. While it must aim for gaining a foothold in Afghanistan to secure its position, a policy to force other neighbours out would prove counter-productive. It would help if Islamabad combined the acquisition of a role in Afghanistan with multilateral assurances that India or any other country would not threaten its core interests.
Furthermore, an internal dialogue entails building and strengthening institutions at all levels. The foreign minister spoke of the expat community investing in Pakistan. However, he did not mention improving accountability and ensuring transparency in governance. Perhaps that was not the right forum to give guarantees of improving the state system. Nevertheless, nothing that he said demonstrated a willingness to do so.
A glance at the audience indicated that those present might be very intelligent and successful, but they were also part of a crowd that eventually didn’t allow reforms to happen and opportunities to reach a larger group of people than the most affluent and well-connected.
The bottom-line is about the need to change our mindset first and adopt a new framework that will help in maximising our gains domestically, regionally and internationally. Realism is not about muscle power but about the sense to make a good bargain. We will not be able to force our competitors out of South Asia even if we wanted to. The best option, hence, would be to learn to coexist and make gains by adding to the peace initiative. So, when the US seems prepared to broaden the nature of the relationship the question we must ask ourselves is whether we are ready to turn a new leaf.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
نگہت اورکزئی نے امریکہ کو خوش کر دیا
یہی تو امریکہ چاہتا ہے کہ مسلمان عورت بھی مغرب کی عورت کی طرح ننگی ہو جائے۔ حجاب اتار دے۔بھرے مجمع میں سروں سے دوپٹے اور چادریں اتار پھینکے۔دوپٹہ ۔۔۔ چادر۔۔۔ حجاب۔۔۔یا برقع نہ پہننا کسی عورت کا ذاتی فعل ہے مگر اسے بھرے پنڈال میں اتار کر پھینک دینا ایک شرمناک فعل ہے ۔غیرتمند پٹھانوں کی بیٹی نگہت اورکزئی نے نہ صرف پوری دنیا کے سامنے اپنا سر ننگا کیا ہے بلکہ مسلمان عورت کی چادر کی توہین کی ہے۔ پٹھانوں کی غیرت کو اچھالا ہے۔۔۔ وہ پٹھان برادری جو نیویارک میں نصب سکین مشین کے سامنے برہنہ ہونا برداشت نہ کر سکے اور امریکہ کے منہ پر طمانچہ رسید کرکے وطن لوٹ آئے نگہت بی بی نے ان پٹھانوں کی غیرت پر طمانچہ رسید کیا ہے۔۔۔ نیویارک سے مجھے ایک پٹھان کا نہایت جذباتی فون آیا ،اس نے کہا کہ پٹھان غیرت کا نام ہے۔ نگہت اورکزئی اصلی پٹھان نہیں۔ ”قاف پٹھان“ ہے۔اس کاتعلق ”لوٹا“ پارٹی سے ہے ۔ جو موسم اور ماحول دیکھ کر پینترا بدل لیتی ہیں۔ کل نواز شریف کے ساتھ تھے پھر مشرف کا تانگہ بنے اور اب زرداری کے زیر سایہ پرورش پا رہے ہیں۔ اس نے مزید کہاکہ نگہت اورکزئی کو دوپٹہ اتار نے سے پہلے اپنے ”لیڈر“ مشرف کو ٹیکا اور سندھور بھیجنا چاہئے تھے جس کی وجہ سے پاکستان آج طالبان کی دہشت گردی کا نشانہ بنا ہوا ہے۔ یہ کہتے ہوئے کہ ”اپنی عزت مردوں کے پیروں میں پھینکنے والیMental Disorder ہے“ پٹھان بھائی نے فون بند کر دیا۔ اس بی بی کا تعلق مشرف پارٹی سے ہے جس نے جامعہ حفصہ کی با حیاءبچیوں کو دوپٹوں سمیت جلا ڈالا تھا۔ اس عورت کا تعلق اس پارٹی ہے جس نے چند ڈالروں کے عوض وطن کی باحیاءبیٹی ڈاکٹر عافیہ کو بیچ ڈالا تھا۔ یہ لوگ کیا جانیں عورت کی عزت اور وقار کی قدر و قیمت۔۔۔ بھرے مجمع میں دوپٹہ ہی نہیں اتارتے سیاست کی خاطر ماﺅں بہنوں بیٹیوں کے سودے بھی کر دیتے ہیں۔ صوبائیت کو ہوا دینے والے سندھی ٹوپی کا ایشو بھول گئے ہیں۔۔۔؟ سندھی مرد اپنی ٹوپی کی تعظیم کےلئے جذباتی ہو سکتا ہے تو ایک پاکستانی عورت اپنے دوپٹے کی تذلیل کیسے برداشت کر سکتی ہے۔۔۔؟ صوبائیت کو ہوا دینے والے سندھ کارڈ کا ناجائز استعمال بھی شاید بھول گئے ہیں۔۔۔؟ زرداری کی دُم پر پیر آنے لگے تو سندھ کا پتر بن جاتا ہے اور جب پنجاب پر ڈاکہ مارنا ہو تو ”پنجاب میں بھی بھٹو کے نعرے وجن گے“ کا ڈھول بجانے لگتا ہے۔ بلھے شاہ کے شعر گنگنانے لگتا ہے۔ طالبان ان سیاستدانوں کی خانہ جنگی کی وجہ سے شیر ہو رہے ہیں۔ نگہت اورکزئی کا ڈرامہ غالبََا مشرف کی نئی پارٹی میں شمولیت کےلئے جواز تھا جس کو مشرف نے بھی انجوائے کیا ہے۔ چونکہ مشرف نے قاف اپنے ہاتھوں سے”اکٹھی“ کی ہے لہذا وہ اس کی رگ رگ سے واقف ہے۔ موصوف جانتے ہیں کہ پاکستانیوں کو ”سائیکل فوبیا“ ہو گیا ہے لہذا اس نے بھی اعجا زالحق اور شیخ رشید کی طرح اپنی الگ پارٹی رجسٹر کروا لی ہے۔ برادری سے ووٹ لینے کے لئے اعجاز الحق نے اپنے نام کے ساتھ چودھری لگا لیا۔ آرائیں برادری کا دعویٰ ہے کہ انہوں نے ”مشرف کی باقیات“ اعجاز الحق کو نہیں بلکہ اپنی برادری کو ووٹ دیا ہے جبکہ شیخ رشید کو اس کی برادری نے بھی ووٹ نہیں دیا۔ مشرف نے امریکہ کے شہر سیاٹل میں اپنی ایک تقریر کے دوران پاکستان میں ”آل پاکستان مسلم لیگ“ نامی تنظیم کے رجسٹر ہونے کا اعتراف کرتے ہوئے کہا ہے کہ وہ اس پارٹی کی لیڈر شپ سنبھالیں گے۔۔۔ اور یقیناً ”قاف پٹھانی“ کی دلیری کو دیکھتے ہوئے اسے اعلیٰ عہدے سے بھی نوازیں گے۔ پٹھانی کی دیدہ دلیری سے گو کہ پٹھانوں کا دل دکھا ہے لیکن اس عورت نے اہل مغرب کے سینے میں ٹھنڈ ڈال دی ہے۔ اس کی حرکت کوامریکہ نے خوش آمدید کہا ہے۔ افغان عورت کا برقع اتروانے کےلئے ”غیرت مند امریکہ“ افغانستان گیا تھا لیکن نو برس بیت گئے ہیں ہرجائی ابھی تک واپس نہیں لوٹا اور نہ ہی افغان عورت کا برقع اتروانے میں کامیاب ہو سکا۔ وہ طالبان جو کبھی امریکہ کے مجاہدین تھے، ہیرو تھے نے اپنی ماﺅں‘ بہنوں اور بیٹیوں کے سر ڈھانپ دئیے تھے آج اپنی پٹھان بہن کی حرکت سے ان کے سر شرمندگی سے جھک گئے ہیں۔ سرحد کے غیور پٹھان جو اپنی عورتوں کو چھپا کر رکھتے ہیں کیا نگہت اورکزئی کے فعل کو معاف کر سکیں گے۔۔۔؟ طالبان بھی امریکہ کو خوش کرنے کےلئے دھماکے کرتے ہیں اور ان کی ”بہن“ نے بھی اپنی حرکت سے امریکہ کو خوش کردیا ہے۔۔۔ خادم پنجاب کی غیرت کو للکارنے والی ”پنجابی فلم کی ہیروئین“ سلمان تاثیر کو بھی درجن بھر چوڑیاں بھیج دیتی۔ اسمبلی میں کوئی مرد اپنی پگڑی یا ٹوپی اتار کر نہیں پھینکتا۔ ایک عورت سستی شہرت کی خاطر بھرے مجمع میں تماشہ بنی اور کسی نے اس کا دوپٹہ اٹھا کر اس کے سر پر نہ رکھا۔۔۔؟ سیاسی ایشو کو سیاسی پلیٹ فارم پر اٹھانا چاہئے۔ آئین اور قانون میں رہتے ہوئے حل تلاش کرنا چاہئے۔ تہذیب اور شرافت کے دائرے میں رہ کرآواز بلند کرنا چاہئے۔ مغرب مسلمان عورت کے ساتھ توہین آمیز سلوک کرتا ہے۔ متعصبانہ رویہ اختیار کرتا ہے۔ ہوائی اڈوں پر سکین مشینوں پر اسے ننگا کرتا ہے۔ مسلمان عورت احتجاج کرتی ہے۔ مقدمات کرتی ہے۔ ملازمتوں کا بائیکاٹ کرتی ہے۔ اپنی چادر اور حجاب کےلئے جہاد کرتی ہے اور ایک پاکستانی عورت سستی شہرت کی خاطر اس کی جدوجہد کو یوں پامال کر دیتی ہے۔۔۔؟ طالبان، لال مسجد اور جامعہ حفصہ کارد عمل ہیں۔ قاف کے عمل کا جواب ہیں۔ مشرف کی پیداوار ہیں۔ بی بی نگہت کے شرمناک رویے سے مشرقی عورت کے جذبات مجروح ہوئے ہیں جس کی اسے معافی مانگنا ہو گی۔ ڈاکٹر فردوس اعوان اور نگہت اورکزئی بولنے سے پہلے سوچا کریں کہ ان کی ”گلفشانیاں“ ان کے ”لیڈران“ ہی نہیں ایک زمانہ دیکھ رہا ہوتا ہے۔ اس قسم کے فضول ڈراموں سے پاکستان کے مخالفین محظوظ ہوتے ہیں۔ میاں شہباز شریف نے صوبائیت کا مظاہرہ کیا ہے تو بی بی نگہت نے بھرے پنڈال میں سر سے دوپٹہ اتار کر سرحد کی غیرت کو بدنام کر دیا ہے!
Monday, March 8, 2010
Women through the governance lens
By Sania Nishtar
Although effective governance—or the lack thereof—has an impact on every aspect of our societal, social and economic lives, nowhere is its imprint more vivid than in determining the status of women in a society. This comment uses the International Women’s Day, which is being globally observed today as a peg to briefly outline the linkages. This year’s theme of the International Women’s day, “Equal rights, equal opportunities: progress for all”, is particularly relevant to governance, since upholding women’s political, economic and social rights and striving towards achieving equity and equality of opportunities in a national political context cannot be ensured without effective governance.
Before we examine the relationship, let us be reminded that the status of women in Pakistan is fraught with an ironic and highly polarised paradox, implicit within which are many inequities and inequalities. These are evident in many areas. On the one hand, women are well-represented in parliament, but on the other, exceptions notwithstanding, this largely represents an extension of elite and feudal capture. The professional institutions of higher learning have 50 per cent or higher enrollment of women, but at the same time, there is a literacy gap of 45 per cent between men and women and educational opportunities for rural women remain elusive. Similarly, we see a growing number of women in the traditional, male-dominated professions such as engineering, law, medicine, business, the police and the military. But alongside this trend, the nationally representative labour market statistics speak of gender discrepancies, under-remuneration, systemic impediments to mainstreaming women into the country’s workforce and restricted employment options outside of the informal sectors for socially marginalised and disadvantaged women. Furthermore, it can be argued — and correctly so with reference to a segment belonging to the higher social stratum — that women appear freer than ever to express themselves in the choice of appearance, speech, clothing, arts and entertainment and that they are becoming increasingly progressive, empowered and globalised. However, many others in their close geographic midst are relegated to the strictest confines of purdah, isolation and disempowerment. Moreover, many Pakistani women of today enjoy a better status than most of the Middle Eastern women. But at the same time, these trends, which are true for a minority, haven’t changed some of the deep-seated social behaviours and fundamental prejudices against women, which translate both into discrimination as well as some of the severest forms of violence.
Some may argue that violence against women is globally pervasive. Indeed, it may come as no surprise that 70-90 per cent of women in Pakistan encounter domestic violence and that there are an estimated eight cases of rape every 24 hours. However, what is unfortunately unique to Pakistan is the prevalence of some horrific crimes.
We generally tend to attribute all these abhorrent practices to our tribal and feudal traditions and norms and to the systemic subordination of women vis-à-vis men. That may well be the case to some extent. However, what is not fully appreciated is the role that many other systemic factors play in perpetuating these traditions. Poverty, illiteracy, and social exclusion have a chicken and egg relationship with organised vested interests, of which feudalism is a part, and which promote state capture. A democratic dispensation should be able to break through the strongholds of vested interests, but unfortunately, it sometimes helps to strengthen them.
If the state was governed effectively over the years and Pakistan had sped on the road to development with its economic and social benefits accruing to its population, as has been the case with many Asian countries; if the state had delivered education universally to its population and if an honest government had weakened the organised vested interests that form the bedrock of undesirable tribal and feudal traditions, perhaps heinous crimes such as honour killings and burying alive, would not be condoned as social customs and tribal traditions today. In the absence of these fundamental attributes, which determine the status of women in a society, the impact of legal reforms to improve the status of women introduced by successive governments has been, at best, marginal. Similarly, standalone gender empowerment programmes, measures to enhance the access of women to financial services, and others for skill enhancement have had limited impact whilst the adverse fundamentals remain unchanged. This is the first, and perhaps the most illustrative of the pathways through which failure of governance can be shown to impact the lives of women. Here, it must be appreciated that the term governance is the subject of many interpretations, but in the current sense it is being scoped to the policy making and implementation realms and use of public resources and regulatory power.
The status of women and issues implicit within it, also underscore the importance of another governance impediment — one that relates to ensuring compliance with stated policy norms and standards and enforcement of the laws. In theory, Pakistan ensures respect for women’s rights and fundamental freedoms, as is evidenced by the ratification of many global conventions and declarations. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence. Pakistan’s constitution has many provisions, which stipulate that “All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law” and that “There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone” – Article 25(1) and 25 (2) respectively. Also, Article 35 specifically states that “steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life”.
Several laws are additionally in place, including the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006. The experts are of the opinion that although all the discriminatory provisions embodied within earlier statutes were not addressed through this statute, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction. Recently, the Women at Workplace Act 2009 has been enacted which aims to “protect women from harassment and (is intended to) make them feel more secure”. In addition, laws are in place to ensure women’s right to inheritance — an important element in the socio economic and political empowerment of women.
However, there are two issues with the implementation of these laws. One set of issues is generic to the implementation of laws in Pakistan. Secondly, the fact that regardless of what the statutes may stipulate, these are conditional on social norms and traditions, which the vast majority of women in the society have to bear with. These issues are further compounded by the biases against women in the criminal justice system — but more important than that, poor performance of the justice system and the relative intransigence with which it dispenses justice to women.
In sum, the status of women is deeply linked with many elements of the society — legal, political, religious, economic, and cultural. Governance can play a key role in shaping most if not all of the societal characteristics through ensuring respect for women’s political, economic and social rights.
So, whilst the enlightened women’s groups draw attention to horrific crimes and discriminatory practices against women — honour killings, live burials, disfigurement by acid, stove deaths, and other undesirable practices, such as childhood marriages, watta satta, vini, marriage to the Quran — to mark the International Women’s Day, we should be reminded that quantum leaps in addressing these challenges can only be made with slow and steady structural solutions.
The writer is the founding- president of the NGO think-tank, Heartfile.
Although effective governance—or the lack thereof—has an impact on every aspect of our societal, social and economic lives, nowhere is its imprint more vivid than in determining the status of women in a society. This comment uses the International Women’s Day, which is being globally observed today as a peg to briefly outline the linkages. This year’s theme of the International Women’s day, “Equal rights, equal opportunities: progress for all”, is particularly relevant to governance, since upholding women’s political, economic and social rights and striving towards achieving equity and equality of opportunities in a national political context cannot be ensured without effective governance.
Before we examine the relationship, let us be reminded that the status of women in Pakistan is fraught with an ironic and highly polarised paradox, implicit within which are many inequities and inequalities. These are evident in many areas. On the one hand, women are well-represented in parliament, but on the other, exceptions notwithstanding, this largely represents an extension of elite and feudal capture. The professional institutions of higher learning have 50 per cent or higher enrollment of women, but at the same time, there is a literacy gap of 45 per cent between men and women and educational opportunities for rural women remain elusive. Similarly, we see a growing number of women in the traditional, male-dominated professions such as engineering, law, medicine, business, the police and the military. But alongside this trend, the nationally representative labour market statistics speak of gender discrepancies, under-remuneration, systemic impediments to mainstreaming women into the country’s workforce and restricted employment options outside of the informal sectors for socially marginalised and disadvantaged women. Furthermore, it can be argued — and correctly so with reference to a segment belonging to the higher social stratum — that women appear freer than ever to express themselves in the choice of appearance, speech, clothing, arts and entertainment and that they are becoming increasingly progressive, empowered and globalised. However, many others in their close geographic midst are relegated to the strictest confines of purdah, isolation and disempowerment. Moreover, many Pakistani women of today enjoy a better status than most of the Middle Eastern women. But at the same time, these trends, which are true for a minority, haven’t changed some of the deep-seated social behaviours and fundamental prejudices against women, which translate both into discrimination as well as some of the severest forms of violence.
Some may argue that violence against women is globally pervasive. Indeed, it may come as no surprise that 70-90 per cent of women in Pakistan encounter domestic violence and that there are an estimated eight cases of rape every 24 hours. However, what is unfortunately unique to Pakistan is the prevalence of some horrific crimes.
We generally tend to attribute all these abhorrent practices to our tribal and feudal traditions and norms and to the systemic subordination of women vis-à-vis men. That may well be the case to some extent. However, what is not fully appreciated is the role that many other systemic factors play in perpetuating these traditions. Poverty, illiteracy, and social exclusion have a chicken and egg relationship with organised vested interests, of which feudalism is a part, and which promote state capture. A democratic dispensation should be able to break through the strongholds of vested interests, but unfortunately, it sometimes helps to strengthen them.
If the state was governed effectively over the years and Pakistan had sped on the road to development with its economic and social benefits accruing to its population, as has been the case with many Asian countries; if the state had delivered education universally to its population and if an honest government had weakened the organised vested interests that form the bedrock of undesirable tribal and feudal traditions, perhaps heinous crimes such as honour killings and burying alive, would not be condoned as social customs and tribal traditions today. In the absence of these fundamental attributes, which determine the status of women in a society, the impact of legal reforms to improve the status of women introduced by successive governments has been, at best, marginal. Similarly, standalone gender empowerment programmes, measures to enhance the access of women to financial services, and others for skill enhancement have had limited impact whilst the adverse fundamentals remain unchanged. This is the first, and perhaps the most illustrative of the pathways through which failure of governance can be shown to impact the lives of women. Here, it must be appreciated that the term governance is the subject of many interpretations, but in the current sense it is being scoped to the policy making and implementation realms and use of public resources and regulatory power.
The status of women and issues implicit within it, also underscore the importance of another governance impediment — one that relates to ensuring compliance with stated policy norms and standards and enforcement of the laws. In theory, Pakistan ensures respect for women’s rights and fundamental freedoms, as is evidenced by the ratification of many global conventions and declarations. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence. Pakistan’s constitution has many provisions, which stipulate that “All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law” and that “There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone” – Article 25(1) and 25 (2) respectively. Also, Article 35 specifically states that “steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life”.
Several laws are additionally in place, including the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006. The experts are of the opinion that although all the discriminatory provisions embodied within earlier statutes were not addressed through this statute, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction. Recently, the Women at Workplace Act 2009 has been enacted which aims to “protect women from harassment and (is intended to) make them feel more secure”. In addition, laws are in place to ensure women’s right to inheritance — an important element in the socio economic and political empowerment of women.
However, there are two issues with the implementation of these laws. One set of issues is generic to the implementation of laws in Pakistan. Secondly, the fact that regardless of what the statutes may stipulate, these are conditional on social norms and traditions, which the vast majority of women in the society have to bear with. These issues are further compounded by the biases against women in the criminal justice system — but more important than that, poor performance of the justice system and the relative intransigence with which it dispenses justice to women.
In sum, the status of women is deeply linked with many elements of the society — legal, political, religious, economic, and cultural. Governance can play a key role in shaping most if not all of the societal characteristics through ensuring respect for women’s political, economic and social rights.
So, whilst the enlightened women’s groups draw attention to horrific crimes and discriminatory practices against women — honour killings, live burials, disfigurement by acid, stove deaths, and other undesirable practices, such as childhood marriages, watta satta, vini, marriage to the Quran — to mark the International Women’s Day, we should be reminded that quantum leaps in addressing these challenges can only be made with slow and steady structural solutions.
The writer is the founding- president of the NGO think-tank, Heartfile.
Who is a citizen of India, who decides who is not?
By Jawed Naqvi
Citizenship is a modern concept and a self-limiting notion. A detailed survey of a mix of Indian citizens, including Kashmiris, published by the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) in its latest edition gives the discussion a more meaningful and complex character than it is traditionally granted. But before we take a look at its findings, it would be useful to bear in mind that references to a foreigner or a “pardesi” in popular idiom – such as folk songs and traditional poetry – are at variance with the issue of citizenship the survey puts under the scanner.
Much like the loose idiom that thus defines a foreigner vis-à-vis a native, Allama Iqbal too was responsible for causing confusion about the idea of India – which he called Hindustan – and about those inhabiting what he declaimed was a fabled region. After declaring in a popular eulogy that Hindustan was the best nation (or country or territory, he doesn’t define it) he simultaneously supported nascent Muslim separatism, which many Pakistanis see as an early endorsement of their nationhood.
“Pardesi” or its Persianised variant “Begaana”, which also refers to a stranger, forms the spine of popular romance across the Hindi/Urdu belt though by today’s standards the foreigner of yore would usually have belonged to a nearby village or precincts of a different but neighbouring principality. “Balam pardesi” or beloved foreigner could thus be referring to a neighbour by today’s perceptions of what constitutes a foreigner. I have been perplexed since as long as I can remember, however, as to why an Indian’s national sentiment, which comes with Indian citizenship, should require him to feel a greater bonding with a Naga from Nagaland, for example, but not with a Nepali whose language Indians understand better.
A popular word used by many Indians working in the Gulf states in the 1980s was “muluk”. And when they said they were off to their “muluk” (distinct from the more refined mulk) for a holiday, they usually meant a village or a qasbah though sometimes also a city or a town, but it seldom conveyed the sense of a country as the word is generally thought to mean.
The EPW survey on how Indians see or don’t see themselves as citizens of their country throws up some unexpected results. The number of Kashmiris who do not consider themselves as Indians is relatively higher than other regional groups except those from the far eastern Tripura state. However, in absolute terms a majority of Kashmiris still acknowledge their Indian citizenship. Similarly, the average of Indian Muslims who accept the parameters of citizenship is lower by four percentage points than the national average of 89 per cent.
A representative sample of 8,000 men and women were interviewed in their own languages by specially trained investigators. The respondents were asked in a neutral manner questions such as – “Some people think of themselves as Indian citizens, while some others do not think of themselves as citizens of India. Talking about yourself, do you consider yourself a citizen of India?”
Who then are the 89 per cent who claim the status of citizens and who are the non-citizens? Says Subrata Mitra who analysed the data for EPW: “In terms of their self-perception, citizens as well as non-citizens do not have any distinct social profile. The higher educated tend to have a slightly greater tendency to see themselves as citizens.”
Those surveyed were asked simple questions. For example did they agree or not that all citizens enjoyed equal rights. Only 44.7 per cent said they did. More than 11 per cent completely disagreed. Were people free to speak their minds without fear? About 39 per cent said they did and 13 per cent totally disagreed. Did people have the power to change the government they did not like? More than 45 per cent felt they did nearly 17 per cent disagreed. Most citizens had basic necessities like food, clothing shelter? As many as 33.4 per cent affirmed it while 12.6 per cent said it was not true.
In the survey, in terms of social characteristics, Mitra sees no clear social profile that would radically distinguish the self-perception as citizens from that of non-citizens. State averages showed a distinct swing though. “Clearly, context matters, for in Jammu and Kashmir, at 19.6 per cent, the average of non-citizens is almost three times that of the national average. In Tripura, it climbs even higher, reaching an astounding 27 per cent.”
The peculiar situation of Jammu and Kashmir marked a deviation from the national average in other ways. “First of all, let this be clear that 69 per cent of people interviewed in Jammu and Kashmir think of themselves as Indian citizens,” says Mitra. “Even among Muslims the percentage is 59 per cent. There is no clear relationship with education; and contrary to the national trend, urban residents are less inclined to count themselves as citizens.”
Mitra says that the national trend of a positive relationship with class does not hold in Kashmir, “with the rich and the very poor pulling level with regard to the probability of counting themselves as citizens of India.”
Within the framework of the findings, “the split between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley carries the shadow of the separatist movement”. In other words 83 per cent of the residents of Jammu count themselves as citizens of India compared to 53 per cent for the Kashmir Valley.”
In Jammu and Kashmir, according to Mitra, men perform better than women when it comes to the strength of citizenship. However, the rural respondents perform better than their urban counterparts. The upper castes of Jammu and Kashmir (most of them from Jammu region) perform better whereas the proportion of low citizenship is “alarmingly high” among Muslims.
In the big picture there are even more glaring differences in the way Kashmiris see themselves vis-à-vis India and how others approach the issue. The same scale that shows 43.6 per cent of the national sample to be in the category of ‘high’ citizenship reveals that in Jammu and Kashmir, only 20.2 per cent are at the highest level of citizenship.
The survey looks at a comparative data between Kashmiri Muslims and Muslims from the rest of India. “Strong citizenship among educated Muslims outside Jammu and Kashmir reaches 59.4 per cent, compared with to 54.2 per cent for all Indians with a comparable level of education. Equally surprising is the effect of age: young Muslims (up to 25 years) outside Jammu and Kashmir contain 52.3 per cent strong citizens compared to 44.6 per cent for Indians as a whole.”
It sounds like an interesting survey and probably needs to be followed up more scrupulously. Would it however make much difference to the way Muslims – Kashmiris and non-Kashmiris – are perceived in the paradigm of them and us. Or as the songs described the pardesis and the begaanas.
Citizenship is a modern concept and a self-limiting notion. A detailed survey of a mix of Indian citizens, including Kashmiris, published by the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) in its latest edition gives the discussion a more meaningful and complex character than it is traditionally granted. But before we take a look at its findings, it would be useful to bear in mind that references to a foreigner or a “pardesi” in popular idiom – such as folk songs and traditional poetry – are at variance with the issue of citizenship the survey puts under the scanner.
Much like the loose idiom that thus defines a foreigner vis-à-vis a native, Allama Iqbal too was responsible for causing confusion about the idea of India – which he called Hindustan – and about those inhabiting what he declaimed was a fabled region. After declaring in a popular eulogy that Hindustan was the best nation (or country or territory, he doesn’t define it) he simultaneously supported nascent Muslim separatism, which many Pakistanis see as an early endorsement of their nationhood.
“Pardesi” or its Persianised variant “Begaana”, which also refers to a stranger, forms the spine of popular romance across the Hindi/Urdu belt though by today’s standards the foreigner of yore would usually have belonged to a nearby village or precincts of a different but neighbouring principality. “Balam pardesi” or beloved foreigner could thus be referring to a neighbour by today’s perceptions of what constitutes a foreigner. I have been perplexed since as long as I can remember, however, as to why an Indian’s national sentiment, which comes with Indian citizenship, should require him to feel a greater bonding with a Naga from Nagaland, for example, but not with a Nepali whose language Indians understand better.
A popular word used by many Indians working in the Gulf states in the 1980s was “muluk”. And when they said they were off to their “muluk” (distinct from the more refined mulk) for a holiday, they usually meant a village or a qasbah though sometimes also a city or a town, but it seldom conveyed the sense of a country as the word is generally thought to mean.
The EPW survey on how Indians see or don’t see themselves as citizens of their country throws up some unexpected results. The number of Kashmiris who do not consider themselves as Indians is relatively higher than other regional groups except those from the far eastern Tripura state. However, in absolute terms a majority of Kashmiris still acknowledge their Indian citizenship. Similarly, the average of Indian Muslims who accept the parameters of citizenship is lower by four percentage points than the national average of 89 per cent.
A representative sample of 8,000 men and women were interviewed in their own languages by specially trained investigators. The respondents were asked in a neutral manner questions such as – “Some people think of themselves as Indian citizens, while some others do not think of themselves as citizens of India. Talking about yourself, do you consider yourself a citizen of India?”
Who then are the 89 per cent who claim the status of citizens and who are the non-citizens? Says Subrata Mitra who analysed the data for EPW: “In terms of their self-perception, citizens as well as non-citizens do not have any distinct social profile. The higher educated tend to have a slightly greater tendency to see themselves as citizens.”
Those surveyed were asked simple questions. For example did they agree or not that all citizens enjoyed equal rights. Only 44.7 per cent said they did. More than 11 per cent completely disagreed. Were people free to speak their minds without fear? About 39 per cent said they did and 13 per cent totally disagreed. Did people have the power to change the government they did not like? More than 45 per cent felt they did nearly 17 per cent disagreed. Most citizens had basic necessities like food, clothing shelter? As many as 33.4 per cent affirmed it while 12.6 per cent said it was not true.
In the survey, in terms of social characteristics, Mitra sees no clear social profile that would radically distinguish the self-perception as citizens from that of non-citizens. State averages showed a distinct swing though. “Clearly, context matters, for in Jammu and Kashmir, at 19.6 per cent, the average of non-citizens is almost three times that of the national average. In Tripura, it climbs even higher, reaching an astounding 27 per cent.”
The peculiar situation of Jammu and Kashmir marked a deviation from the national average in other ways. “First of all, let this be clear that 69 per cent of people interviewed in Jammu and Kashmir think of themselves as Indian citizens,” says Mitra. “Even among Muslims the percentage is 59 per cent. There is no clear relationship with education; and contrary to the national trend, urban residents are less inclined to count themselves as citizens.”
Mitra says that the national trend of a positive relationship with class does not hold in Kashmir, “with the rich and the very poor pulling level with regard to the probability of counting themselves as citizens of India.”
Within the framework of the findings, “the split between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley carries the shadow of the separatist movement”. In other words 83 per cent of the residents of Jammu count themselves as citizens of India compared to 53 per cent for the Kashmir Valley.”
In Jammu and Kashmir, according to Mitra, men perform better than women when it comes to the strength of citizenship. However, the rural respondents perform better than their urban counterparts. The upper castes of Jammu and Kashmir (most of them from Jammu region) perform better whereas the proportion of low citizenship is “alarmingly high” among Muslims.
In the big picture there are even more glaring differences in the way Kashmiris see themselves vis-à-vis India and how others approach the issue. The same scale that shows 43.6 per cent of the national sample to be in the category of ‘high’ citizenship reveals that in Jammu and Kashmir, only 20.2 per cent are at the highest level of citizenship.
The survey looks at a comparative data between Kashmiri Muslims and Muslims from the rest of India. “Strong citizenship among educated Muslims outside Jammu and Kashmir reaches 59.4 per cent, compared with to 54.2 per cent for all Indians with a comparable level of education. Equally surprising is the effect of age: young Muslims (up to 25 years) outside Jammu and Kashmir contain 52.3 per cent strong citizens compared to 44.6 per cent for Indians as a whole.”
It sounds like an interesting survey and probably needs to be followed up more scrupulously. Would it however make much difference to the way Muslims – Kashmiris and non-Kashmiris – are perceived in the paradigm of them and us. Or as the songs described the pardesis and the begaanas.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Scope for hope on the subcontinent?
By Mahir Ali
There is precious little risk of anyone putting too much store by last week’s talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan.
Although Nirupama Rao and Salman Bashir parted on a vaguely civil note by agreeing that the channels of communication would remain open, there has thus far been little indication of plans for further meetings.
It has been speculated that Rao could visit Islamabad this month, ahead of the opportunity for prime ministerial talks on the sidelines of the Saarc summit in Bhutan in April, but the insistence of both sides on differing agendas for future encounters sharply diminishes the scope for optimism. As far as New Delhi is concerned, terrorism needs to be tackled before meaningful negotiations can be conducted on any other matter. Islamabad, on the other hand, has been seeking a return to the so-called composite dialogue, whereby a range of subjects can simultaneously be addressed.
Although the resumption of a broad dialogue would indeed be welcome, Pakistan evidently finds it difficult to understand the extent to which India’s mood has been soured by the November 2008 terrorist rampage in Mumbai, when a fourth war between the neighbours was narrowly avoided — not least because Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was adamantly opposed to it.
A surprisingly large number of otherwise rational Indians were convinced at the time that the most appropriate response would be to ‘teach Pakistan a lesson’ through military means, unwilling to recognise that a conflagration was likely to unleash terrorism on a considerably wider scale, or provoke a nuclear exchange, with unspeakable consequences.
The sensible alternative was to take up the Pakistani government’s offer of cooperation, despite the suspicion that not much — or at least not enough — would come of it. In Delhi last week, Pakistan’s foreign secretary was handed another three dossiers containing information and demands related to Islamist militants suspected of involvement in terrorist activities on Indian soil — and it is hardly likely that Bashir’s description of a previous dossier as ‘literature’ rather than evidence went down well among his hosts. He also expressed his resentment over being ‘lectured’ on terrorism, pointing out that Pakistan had ‘suffered many, many hundreds of Mumbais’.
That is not, strictly speaking, an accurate claim. Terrorists have indeed inflicted a series of wounds on Pakistan, many of them serious, all of them painful. But the equivalent of Mumbai would be a bunch of armed Indian fanatics wreaking havoc in Pakistan’s commercial centre or another large city. The fury such an incident would unleash would undoubtedly be of a different order of magnitude, given that — to put it euphemistically — India and Pakistan have a bit of a history.
This history cannot be wished away. That does not mean it can’t be overcome. But the task is obviously rendered much harder by instances such as the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, followed by the impression that the authorities in Pakistan have been lackadaisical in pursuing the perpetrators. The constant complaints about insufficient evidence from India are muddied by the fact that it ought to be possible to gather more than enough incriminating evidence within the country where the plot was hatched.
What’s more, there have been indications that 26/11 wasn’t a one-off. Responsibility for the recent bomb blast at the German Bakery in Pune has been claimed by an organisation calling itself Lashkar-i-Taiba al-Alami. While the credibility of the claim — and any connection with Pakistan — has yet to be established, it isn’t exactly unnatural for people to jump to conclusions, not least because a series of sports fixtures in India, from the current Hockey World Cup to the Commonwealth Games in October, face terrorist threats.
Hopefully, if they turn out to be anything more than empty boasts, the plots will be foiled. But circumstances such as these should help to clarify why New Delhi’s insistence on attaching primacy to terrorism isn’t purely a product of paranoia.
It is also well worth remembering that, not all that long ago, a decidedly positive strain in bilateral relations, at a time when rightwing governments were in power on both sides of the border, was decisively thwarted by Pakistan’s stupendously ill-advised Kargil misadventure, spearheaded not by a terrorist outfit such as Lashkar-i-Taiba, but by the army — which, tragically, has more or less throughout its existence perceived the confrontation with India as its primary raison d’être.
Of course, Pakistan too has its dossiers of complaints on subjects ranging from water flow to purported Indian assistance to nationalist insurgents in Balochistan and even to elements among the Taliban, the latter supported by ‘photographic evidence’. It is hardly unknown for the two sides to lend succour to separatist movements on each other’s terrain, but it would so obviously be self-defeating for India to help the Taliban in any way that the charge seems like little more than a red herring (although one mustn’t forget that realpolitik occasionally overrides logic and produces very strange bedfellows).
Deeply ingrained prejudices are, of course, not exclusive to either protagonist. Nor is political posturing. It appears that pressure from Washington played a decisive role in rekindling a dialogue between India and Pakistan. If so, that’s a nudge in the right direction, even it’s based chiefly on Uncle Sam’s own interests — and these, deplorably, include increased arms sales to both countries. However, even if the two sides were eventually to kiss and make up under a heart-shaped umbrella provided by the US State Department, the residual venom in their arteries would make it at best an artificial and temporary conciliation.
A far more desirable alternative would be a permanent peace and goodwill treaty that springs from the heart, from the gut instinct that it is profoundly in the interests of people on both sides of the border to overcome the post-traumatic stress disorder that is arguably the cruellest legacy of partition. Will New Delhi and Islamabad ever be able to muster the reciprocal audacity required for such a mutually beneficial feat? At the moment, the most optimistic answer one can come up with is an equivocal ‘maybe’.
There is precious little risk of anyone putting too much store by last week’s talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan.
Although Nirupama Rao and Salman Bashir parted on a vaguely civil note by agreeing that the channels of communication would remain open, there has thus far been little indication of plans for further meetings.
It has been speculated that Rao could visit Islamabad this month, ahead of the opportunity for prime ministerial talks on the sidelines of the Saarc summit in Bhutan in April, but the insistence of both sides on differing agendas for future encounters sharply diminishes the scope for optimism. As far as New Delhi is concerned, terrorism needs to be tackled before meaningful negotiations can be conducted on any other matter. Islamabad, on the other hand, has been seeking a return to the so-called composite dialogue, whereby a range of subjects can simultaneously be addressed.
Although the resumption of a broad dialogue would indeed be welcome, Pakistan evidently finds it difficult to understand the extent to which India’s mood has been soured by the November 2008 terrorist rampage in Mumbai, when a fourth war between the neighbours was narrowly avoided — not least because Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was adamantly opposed to it.
A surprisingly large number of otherwise rational Indians were convinced at the time that the most appropriate response would be to ‘teach Pakistan a lesson’ through military means, unwilling to recognise that a conflagration was likely to unleash terrorism on a considerably wider scale, or provoke a nuclear exchange, with unspeakable consequences.
The sensible alternative was to take up the Pakistani government’s offer of cooperation, despite the suspicion that not much — or at least not enough — would come of it. In Delhi last week, Pakistan’s foreign secretary was handed another three dossiers containing information and demands related to Islamist militants suspected of involvement in terrorist activities on Indian soil — and it is hardly likely that Bashir’s description of a previous dossier as ‘literature’ rather than evidence went down well among his hosts. He also expressed his resentment over being ‘lectured’ on terrorism, pointing out that Pakistan had ‘suffered many, many hundreds of Mumbais’.
That is not, strictly speaking, an accurate claim. Terrorists have indeed inflicted a series of wounds on Pakistan, many of them serious, all of them painful. But the equivalent of Mumbai would be a bunch of armed Indian fanatics wreaking havoc in Pakistan’s commercial centre or another large city. The fury such an incident would unleash would undoubtedly be of a different order of magnitude, given that — to put it euphemistically — India and Pakistan have a bit of a history.
This history cannot be wished away. That does not mean it can’t be overcome. But the task is obviously rendered much harder by instances such as the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, followed by the impression that the authorities in Pakistan have been lackadaisical in pursuing the perpetrators. The constant complaints about insufficient evidence from India are muddied by the fact that it ought to be possible to gather more than enough incriminating evidence within the country where the plot was hatched.
What’s more, there have been indications that 26/11 wasn’t a one-off. Responsibility for the recent bomb blast at the German Bakery in Pune has been claimed by an organisation calling itself Lashkar-i-Taiba al-Alami. While the credibility of the claim — and any connection with Pakistan — has yet to be established, it isn’t exactly unnatural for people to jump to conclusions, not least because a series of sports fixtures in India, from the current Hockey World Cup to the Commonwealth Games in October, face terrorist threats.
Hopefully, if they turn out to be anything more than empty boasts, the plots will be foiled. But circumstances such as these should help to clarify why New Delhi’s insistence on attaching primacy to terrorism isn’t purely a product of paranoia.
It is also well worth remembering that, not all that long ago, a decidedly positive strain in bilateral relations, at a time when rightwing governments were in power on both sides of the border, was decisively thwarted by Pakistan’s stupendously ill-advised Kargil misadventure, spearheaded not by a terrorist outfit such as Lashkar-i-Taiba, but by the army — which, tragically, has more or less throughout its existence perceived the confrontation with India as its primary raison d’être.
Of course, Pakistan too has its dossiers of complaints on subjects ranging from water flow to purported Indian assistance to nationalist insurgents in Balochistan and even to elements among the Taliban, the latter supported by ‘photographic evidence’. It is hardly unknown for the two sides to lend succour to separatist movements on each other’s terrain, but it would so obviously be self-defeating for India to help the Taliban in any way that the charge seems like little more than a red herring (although one mustn’t forget that realpolitik occasionally overrides logic and produces very strange bedfellows).
Deeply ingrained prejudices are, of course, not exclusive to either protagonist. Nor is political posturing. It appears that pressure from Washington played a decisive role in rekindling a dialogue between India and Pakistan. If so, that’s a nudge in the right direction, even it’s based chiefly on Uncle Sam’s own interests — and these, deplorably, include increased arms sales to both countries. However, even if the two sides were eventually to kiss and make up under a heart-shaped umbrella provided by the US State Department, the residual venom in their arteries would make it at best an artificial and temporary conciliation.
A far more desirable alternative would be a permanent peace and goodwill treaty that springs from the heart, from the gut instinct that it is profoundly in the interests of people on both sides of the border to overcome the post-traumatic stress disorder that is arguably the cruellest legacy of partition. Will New Delhi and Islamabad ever be able to muster the reciprocal audacity required for such a mutually beneficial feat? At the moment, the most optimistic answer one can come up with is an equivocal ‘maybe’.
Turkey takes on its ‘deep state’
By Irfan Husain
I first went to Turkey as a young student in the early Sixties, and have returned many times to meet old friends, and explore this fascinating country. And while it has much to offer tourists, my attachment to it goes far deeper than the interest a casual visitor takes in a place he is travelling through briefly.
Over the years, I have followed the twists and turns of its politics, and have been happy to see the huge economic progress Turkey has made. I remember well the failed coup launched by the commandant of the military academy in 1963: a friend and I sneaked out of our university dormitory at dawn despite the curfew to watch as government troops ruthlessly put down the cadets. One was shot a dozen feet away from me.
Against this backdrop, the current tussle between the Turkish defence forces and the government carries echoes from the distant past. Ever since the Kemalist Revolution changed Turkey’s direction after the First World War, and declared it a republic after centuries of being the home of the Islamic Caliphate, the military has been seen as the guardian of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s secular, Western vision.
This worldview is enshrined in the Turkish constitution, and any attempt to subvert it is a crime. It was under this constitutional provision that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party has almost been disbarred from governing by the Constitutional Court. A mildly Islamic party, AK has stunned the secular establishment by winning two elections in a row with thumping majorities.
The party’s success reflects the ascendancy the conservative middle-class has acquired. The economy’s steady improvement has resulted in a transformation of the power balance, with the Westernised Istanbul elites now having to watch as their devout Anatolian cousins have captured the political high ground.
Although Erdogan has been mindful of the military’s sensitivities, he has been forced into the present confrontation by the constant destablization efforts he has had to contend with. Shadowy members of the so-called ‘deep state’ have agitated against what they see as an effort to Islamize Turkey. Journalists, politicians and businessmen have joined this campaign.
Indeed, the army openly expressed its opposition to the election of Abdullah Gul as the President as his wife wears the hijab, and under Turkish law, a woman wearing the headscarf is not allowed to attend official functions. Given these slights and provocations, it is easy to see why the government has chosen to counter-attack, using leaked details of a planned coup in 2003. A number of serving and retired military officers, including several generals, have been arrested as the investigation continues to reveal more lurid details. This follows on the heels of an earlier coup plot (known as the Ergenekon plot) in which scores of officers are being tried.
These episodes reveal two major fault-lines in Turkey’s political landscape. The first one is the growing divide between the urban, sophisticated elites and the conservative, but increasingly rich, middle class living in small towns and new suburbs. Secular Turks have wielded power, backed by the army, for decades, and now find it hard to come to terms with the changed political reality.
Most visitors to Turkey see Istanbul and the beautiful coastline along the Aegean Sea, but overlook the Anatolian heartland. For the foreseeable future, this is where political power will reside, barring the remote possibility of a military coup. Although the AK party has been hurt by scandals and charges of mismanagement, the truth is that it has been very successful in its handling of the economy.
The one thing that has united both sections of Turkish society is the burning desire to become members of the European Union. Over the years, their frustration at Brussels’s foot-dragging over its application has increased. Turks have watched angrily as others from East Europe have jumped the queue to join the Union, while Turkish aspirations have been placed on hold. Nevertheless, this government has skilfully used the requirements for joining the EU to chip away at the army’s powers. The need to implement the EU’s human rights clauses has served as a useful tool.
For the defence forces, this ongoing struggle has been a sobering experience. For senior officers to be arrested under the glare of publicity is an unprecedented humiliation for a proud and powerful institution. Just a few years ago, this political drama would have been unthinkable.
The military is one of the few remaining forces in the world to retain compulsory service by all adult male Turks. Thus, it is truly a national institution in which every citizen serves. But as the majority moves away from Ataturk’s secularist ideals, the generals and the ‘deep state’ become more and more isolated from the mainstream.
This brings us to the second major fault-line: the growing gap between the political leadership and the military high command. Long accustomed to calling the shots where defence and foreign policy were concerned, the generals now find they are subservient to the elected politicians they despise.
A case in point is the refusal to allow Turkish soil to be used by the Americans during their invasion of Iraq in 2003. Membership of Nato and a close alliance with the US has been a cornerstone of Turkish defence policy for decades, and both American and Turkish generals were aghast when the National Assembly voted to deny facilities to the invading forces.
Another major shift caused by the assertive civilian government is a distancing from Israel. Traditionally, the Turkish military cooperated closely with the Israeli Defence Forces, conducting joint exercises, and permitting Israeli pilots to train in Turkish airspace. But a recent incident in which the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv was humiliated by the Israeli foreign minister has soured relations between the two countries, a trend begun when the Turkish PM publicly rebuked the Israeli president for his country’s outrageous conduct in Gaza last year.
It is clear that power has seeped away from the secular elites of Istanbul and Ankara; simultaneously, the High Command is feeling the ground shift from under its feet. Both developments are good for Turkey’s future as a modern, democratic state. My friends in Istanbul might feel their lifestyle is being threatened by the steady encroachment of conservative forces, but that’s what democracy is about.
Having lived there as a boy, Musharraf has expressed his admiration for Turkey on more than one occasion. In later life, the Turkish military’s unquestioned power no doubt made him see the country as a role model for Pakistan. But what is much more relevant for us now is the way the military has been made to accept that it is subordinate to the elected government. Even though this remains a distant goal for us, this is what we need to strive for.
I first went to Turkey as a young student in the early Sixties, and have returned many times to meet old friends, and explore this fascinating country. And while it has much to offer tourists, my attachment to it goes far deeper than the interest a casual visitor takes in a place he is travelling through briefly.
Over the years, I have followed the twists and turns of its politics, and have been happy to see the huge economic progress Turkey has made. I remember well the failed coup launched by the commandant of the military academy in 1963: a friend and I sneaked out of our university dormitory at dawn despite the curfew to watch as government troops ruthlessly put down the cadets. One was shot a dozen feet away from me.
Against this backdrop, the current tussle between the Turkish defence forces and the government carries echoes from the distant past. Ever since the Kemalist Revolution changed Turkey’s direction after the First World War, and declared it a republic after centuries of being the home of the Islamic Caliphate, the military has been seen as the guardian of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s secular, Western vision.
This worldview is enshrined in the Turkish constitution, and any attempt to subvert it is a crime. It was under this constitutional provision that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party has almost been disbarred from governing by the Constitutional Court. A mildly Islamic party, AK has stunned the secular establishment by winning two elections in a row with thumping majorities.
The party’s success reflects the ascendancy the conservative middle-class has acquired. The economy’s steady improvement has resulted in a transformation of the power balance, with the Westernised Istanbul elites now having to watch as their devout Anatolian cousins have captured the political high ground.
Although Erdogan has been mindful of the military’s sensitivities, he has been forced into the present confrontation by the constant destablization efforts he has had to contend with. Shadowy members of the so-called ‘deep state’ have agitated against what they see as an effort to Islamize Turkey. Journalists, politicians and businessmen have joined this campaign.
Indeed, the army openly expressed its opposition to the election of Abdullah Gul as the President as his wife wears the hijab, and under Turkish law, a woman wearing the headscarf is not allowed to attend official functions. Given these slights and provocations, it is easy to see why the government has chosen to counter-attack, using leaked details of a planned coup in 2003. A number of serving and retired military officers, including several generals, have been arrested as the investigation continues to reveal more lurid details. This follows on the heels of an earlier coup plot (known as the Ergenekon plot) in which scores of officers are being tried.
These episodes reveal two major fault-lines in Turkey’s political landscape. The first one is the growing divide between the urban, sophisticated elites and the conservative, but increasingly rich, middle class living in small towns and new suburbs. Secular Turks have wielded power, backed by the army, for decades, and now find it hard to come to terms with the changed political reality.
Most visitors to Turkey see Istanbul and the beautiful coastline along the Aegean Sea, but overlook the Anatolian heartland. For the foreseeable future, this is where political power will reside, barring the remote possibility of a military coup. Although the AK party has been hurt by scandals and charges of mismanagement, the truth is that it has been very successful in its handling of the economy.
The one thing that has united both sections of Turkish society is the burning desire to become members of the European Union. Over the years, their frustration at Brussels’s foot-dragging over its application has increased. Turks have watched angrily as others from East Europe have jumped the queue to join the Union, while Turkish aspirations have been placed on hold. Nevertheless, this government has skilfully used the requirements for joining the EU to chip away at the army’s powers. The need to implement the EU’s human rights clauses has served as a useful tool.
For the defence forces, this ongoing struggle has been a sobering experience. For senior officers to be arrested under the glare of publicity is an unprecedented humiliation for a proud and powerful institution. Just a few years ago, this political drama would have been unthinkable.
The military is one of the few remaining forces in the world to retain compulsory service by all adult male Turks. Thus, it is truly a national institution in which every citizen serves. But as the majority moves away from Ataturk’s secularist ideals, the generals and the ‘deep state’ become more and more isolated from the mainstream.
This brings us to the second major fault-line: the growing gap between the political leadership and the military high command. Long accustomed to calling the shots where defence and foreign policy were concerned, the generals now find they are subservient to the elected politicians they despise.
A case in point is the refusal to allow Turkish soil to be used by the Americans during their invasion of Iraq in 2003. Membership of Nato and a close alliance with the US has been a cornerstone of Turkish defence policy for decades, and both American and Turkish generals were aghast when the National Assembly voted to deny facilities to the invading forces.
Another major shift caused by the assertive civilian government is a distancing from Israel. Traditionally, the Turkish military cooperated closely with the Israeli Defence Forces, conducting joint exercises, and permitting Israeli pilots to train in Turkish airspace. But a recent incident in which the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv was humiliated by the Israeli foreign minister has soured relations between the two countries, a trend begun when the Turkish PM publicly rebuked the Israeli president for his country’s outrageous conduct in Gaza last year.
It is clear that power has seeped away from the secular elites of Istanbul and Ankara; simultaneously, the High Command is feeling the ground shift from under its feet. Both developments are good for Turkey’s future as a modern, democratic state. My friends in Istanbul might feel their lifestyle is being threatened by the steady encroachment of conservative forces, but that’s what democracy is about.
Having lived there as a boy, Musharraf has expressed his admiration for Turkey on more than one occasion. In later life, the Turkish military’s unquestioned power no doubt made him see the country as a role model for Pakistan. But what is much more relevant for us now is the way the military has been made to accept that it is subordinate to the elected government. Even though this remains a distant goal for us, this is what we need to strive for.
Plastic bags playing havoc with environment
By Khawar Ghumman
ISLAMABAD: Despite the existence of laws banning production and sale of polythene bags in three provinces of the country, the industry continues to flourish, choking drainage systems in major cities and blotting the landscape in every nook and corner of the country.
Ironically, the issue did come up for discussion more than once in the present National Assembly, but failed to attract attention of lawmakers who let it go without seeking any policy statement by the environment minister.
Talking to Dawn, a senior official of the environment ministry said there was no dearth of laws to control unauthorised use of polythene bags, but it needed political will on the part of government. The official said Pakistan was probably the only country in the world where polythene bags were used with impunity.
The official argued that the federal government needed to come up with a plan to fight the menace of plastic shopping bags.
Led by Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh had enacted necessary laws to discourage use of plastic shopping bags, but circumstantial evidence suggests there is no let up, and the industry continues to pollute the environment. The government of the NWFP is yet to do necessary legislation in this regard.
According to official documents available with Dawn, the Balochistan government was the first one to promulgate an ordinance on March 17, 2001, to prohibit the sale and use of polythene bags in the province.
Next was the government of Punjab which promulgated an ordinance on Feb 18, 2002, to prohibit manufacture, sale, use and import of black polythene bags or any other polythene bag below 15 micron thickness in the province. However, anyone who has recently travelled on the G.T. road could easily see plastic bags littering both sides of the road.
Taking a cue from Punjab and Balochistan, the Sindh government promulgated an ordinance on Feb 1, 2006, to prohibit, manufacture, sale and use of black polythene bags including polythene bags below 30 micron thickness in the province.
The ministry of environment has also proposed legislation to ban non-biodegradable bags and in their place encourage oxo-biodegradable bags. The private and public sector organisations, including utility stores, have been asked to introduce biodegradable bags.
The ministry has also recommended to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) that duty on import of oxo-biodegradable additive for the manufacturing of biodegradable bags be reduced from 6 to 0 per cent.
Polythene bags cause environmental pollution if solid waste containing these bags is not collected and disposed of properly. Leftover used plastic shoppers chock drainage system and create an unaesthetic view of environment. The practice of burning them produces dioxins and furans, which are persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and extremely harmful to human and animal health.
ISLAMABAD: Despite the existence of laws banning production and sale of polythene bags in three provinces of the country, the industry continues to flourish, choking drainage systems in major cities and blotting the landscape in every nook and corner of the country.
Ironically, the issue did come up for discussion more than once in the present National Assembly, but failed to attract attention of lawmakers who let it go without seeking any policy statement by the environment minister.
Talking to Dawn, a senior official of the environment ministry said there was no dearth of laws to control unauthorised use of polythene bags, but it needed political will on the part of government. The official said Pakistan was probably the only country in the world where polythene bags were used with impunity.
The official argued that the federal government needed to come up with a plan to fight the menace of plastic shopping bags.
Led by Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh had enacted necessary laws to discourage use of plastic shopping bags, but circumstantial evidence suggests there is no let up, and the industry continues to pollute the environment. The government of the NWFP is yet to do necessary legislation in this regard.
According to official documents available with Dawn, the Balochistan government was the first one to promulgate an ordinance on March 17, 2001, to prohibit the sale and use of polythene bags in the province.
Next was the government of Punjab which promulgated an ordinance on Feb 18, 2002, to prohibit manufacture, sale, use and import of black polythene bags or any other polythene bag below 15 micron thickness in the province. However, anyone who has recently travelled on the G.T. road could easily see plastic bags littering both sides of the road.
Taking a cue from Punjab and Balochistan, the Sindh government promulgated an ordinance on Feb 1, 2006, to prohibit, manufacture, sale and use of black polythene bags including polythene bags below 30 micron thickness in the province.
The ministry of environment has also proposed legislation to ban non-biodegradable bags and in their place encourage oxo-biodegradable bags. The private and public sector organisations, including utility stores, have been asked to introduce biodegradable bags.
The ministry has also recommended to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) that duty on import of oxo-biodegradable additive for the manufacturing of biodegradable bags be reduced from 6 to 0 per cent.
Polythene bags cause environmental pollution if solid waste containing these bags is not collected and disposed of properly. Leftover used plastic shoppers chock drainage system and create an unaesthetic view of environment. The practice of burning them produces dioxins and furans, which are persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and extremely harmful to human and animal health.
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
The ‘happening place’
By Kamran Shafi
“PAKISTAN is the most happening place in the world where there is never a dull moment.” So pronounced the Commando to a “packed audience” at Chatham House in London, to much laughter and mirth.
‘Happening place’ did the man call our poor and bleeding country that is reeling under the onslaught of murderous yahoos who do as they will, wherever they will?
Pakistan is a ‘happening place’ when a women’s bazaar in Peshawar is attacked and over 100 defenceless women and children are blown away to kingdom come? Or when Lahore’s Moon Market is wantonly attacked and over 60 innocents, again mainly women and children, die needlessly and cruelly? Or when an army mosque in the heart of Rawalpindi cantonment is assaulted by people who knew what they were doing, and who identified the children of senior army officers and then brutally killed them? Or and indeed, when a bus full of junior ISI functionaries, clerks and the like is blown up, again in Rawalpindi cantonment?
There is ‘never a dull day’ in Pakistan when according to the latest estimates of none other than the ISPR, 30,457 Pakistanis — 21,672 civilians and 8,785 military personnel — have been killed so far in the war against terror; when in 2009 alone over 10,000 people were killed; when in 2009 and the first two months of 2010, 78 officers and 2,273 soldiers of the Pakistan Army were killed and 6,512 injured, many of them horribly disfigured and maimed?
Never a dull day, what?
Ask the mothers and the fathers who have lost their sons and daughters; ask the sisters and brothers and the sons and daughters who have lost their loved ones to this mad orgy of killing by fiends in human shape. Fiends, let us quickly point out, who were suckled at the ample breast of the security establishment that the man himself headed for far too long. A period, let us also not forget, in which they were allowed to grow stronger and stronger still, due to his own disastrous policies of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
Should he not be deeply ashamed of himself for talking so lightly of the hellfire our poor country is passing through?
But wait. Gen Musharraf also said: “I love Pakistan and I would do anything for Pakistan. I took this oath at the Kakul Academy. For Pakistan one would be prepared to do anything.” Hang on a minute. He took an oath at the ‘Kakul Academy’ did he say?
What was the Kakul Academy to him, a man who violated one of the most basic precepts, an almost holy covenant, upon which every military academy is based: that of the honour system? When as a so-called gentleman cadet, he cheated in the nine-mile run and boasted about it in his nonsensical and ludicrous In the line of fire, even the title of which was plagiarised from one of Clint Eastwood’s films of the same name? (Stand up, Humayun Gauhar).
For the information of the ‘bloody civilians’ who might be reading this, a cadet would be relegated for taking a packet of cigarettes from the mess bar without signing for it.For cheating on the scale that Musharraf indulged in i.e. taking a shortcut in an endurance test, the punishment would be no less than being disgracefully drummed out of the academy after the badges of cadet rank (if any), shoulder flashes and cap badge, were cut off in front of the whole First Pakistan Battalion formed up on the parade ground.
So what ‘oath’, what ‘academy’ does he talk about? I should have thought that the ‘happening place where there is never a dull day’ would be Edgware Road, London and its shisha bars, where he lurks these days and not poor, bleeding Pakistan.
By the by, could he please explain even at this late date especially now that he is, as we say in the vernacular, ‘weighing his wings’ before jumping into Pakistani politics (!), why Adm Shahid Karimullah, the ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia at the time, was present, hands respectfully folded in his lap, as Bilal Musharraf and his boss, one Asad Jamal, chairman and CEO of ePlanet Ventures, Global Venture Capital, were meeting Prince Alwaleed bin Talal?
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the federal government is going on making a laughing stock of itself by repeatedly first doing something stupid and then when the going gets tough, making shameless U-turns. And then doing nothing about the flunky/functionary who put it in difficulty in the first place.
Witness the judges’ appointment issue and the embarrassing loss of face the government had to suffer. I am told by people who should know that Babar Awan (yes, of the judges’ restoration fiasco fame) was principally to blame — surprise, surprise. Yet, the man continues as heretofore as law minister. Whilst one supports democratic rule by the elected representatives of the people one has to condemn such lackadaisical governance.
However, the politicians will be sorted out by the people at the next elections if they are perceived to be inept etc; what upsets me is that no one, not the government, not the opposition reacted when the army announced last week that the COAS needs no such approval to give extensions in service to generals.
What is the difference between giving extensions and promoting generals when an extension can put someone within reach of the next higher rank obviously at the cost of other officers waiting in line to be promoted?
If the army arrogates more and more powers to itself at GHQ outside the writ of the government, nothing is going to work. Doesn’t the opposition understand that whilst it may snigger at the present government’s discomfort when the army takes it head-on (such as the ill-considered public outburst of ‘fury’ by the generals at the Kerry-Lugar Bill, whilst themselves asking for American aid the very next week), it might be the next government of Pakistan. How will it rein in the (already) rampant army then?
As pleaded many times in this column, might one say to the political forces to come together on the main principles of governance, the first of which should be the elected government’s suzerainty over all the departments of the state?
“PAKISTAN is the most happening place in the world where there is never a dull moment.” So pronounced the Commando to a “packed audience” at Chatham House in London, to much laughter and mirth.
‘Happening place’ did the man call our poor and bleeding country that is reeling under the onslaught of murderous yahoos who do as they will, wherever they will?
Pakistan is a ‘happening place’ when a women’s bazaar in Peshawar is attacked and over 100 defenceless women and children are blown away to kingdom come? Or when Lahore’s Moon Market is wantonly attacked and over 60 innocents, again mainly women and children, die needlessly and cruelly? Or when an army mosque in the heart of Rawalpindi cantonment is assaulted by people who knew what they were doing, and who identified the children of senior army officers and then brutally killed them? Or and indeed, when a bus full of junior ISI functionaries, clerks and the like is blown up, again in Rawalpindi cantonment?
There is ‘never a dull day’ in Pakistan when according to the latest estimates of none other than the ISPR, 30,457 Pakistanis — 21,672 civilians and 8,785 military personnel — have been killed so far in the war against terror; when in 2009 alone over 10,000 people were killed; when in 2009 and the first two months of 2010, 78 officers and 2,273 soldiers of the Pakistan Army were killed and 6,512 injured, many of them horribly disfigured and maimed?
Never a dull day, what?
Ask the mothers and the fathers who have lost their sons and daughters; ask the sisters and brothers and the sons and daughters who have lost their loved ones to this mad orgy of killing by fiends in human shape. Fiends, let us quickly point out, who were suckled at the ample breast of the security establishment that the man himself headed for far too long. A period, let us also not forget, in which they were allowed to grow stronger and stronger still, due to his own disastrous policies of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
Should he not be deeply ashamed of himself for talking so lightly of the hellfire our poor country is passing through?
But wait. Gen Musharraf also said: “I love Pakistan and I would do anything for Pakistan. I took this oath at the Kakul Academy. For Pakistan one would be prepared to do anything.” Hang on a minute. He took an oath at the ‘Kakul Academy’ did he say?
What was the Kakul Academy to him, a man who violated one of the most basic precepts, an almost holy covenant, upon which every military academy is based: that of the honour system? When as a so-called gentleman cadet, he cheated in the nine-mile run and boasted about it in his nonsensical and ludicrous In the line of fire, even the title of which was plagiarised from one of Clint Eastwood’s films of the same name? (Stand up, Humayun Gauhar).
For the information of the ‘bloody civilians’ who might be reading this, a cadet would be relegated for taking a packet of cigarettes from the mess bar without signing for it.For cheating on the scale that Musharraf indulged in i.e. taking a shortcut in an endurance test, the punishment would be no less than being disgracefully drummed out of the academy after the badges of cadet rank (if any), shoulder flashes and cap badge, were cut off in front of the whole First Pakistan Battalion formed up on the parade ground.
So what ‘oath’, what ‘academy’ does he talk about? I should have thought that the ‘happening place where there is never a dull day’ would be Edgware Road, London and its shisha bars, where he lurks these days and not poor, bleeding Pakistan.
By the by, could he please explain even at this late date especially now that he is, as we say in the vernacular, ‘weighing his wings’ before jumping into Pakistani politics (!), why Adm Shahid Karimullah, the ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia at the time, was present, hands respectfully folded in his lap, as Bilal Musharraf and his boss, one Asad Jamal, chairman and CEO of ePlanet Ventures, Global Venture Capital, were meeting Prince Alwaleed bin Talal?
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the federal government is going on making a laughing stock of itself by repeatedly first doing something stupid and then when the going gets tough, making shameless U-turns. And then doing nothing about the flunky/functionary who put it in difficulty in the first place.
Witness the judges’ appointment issue and the embarrassing loss of face the government had to suffer. I am told by people who should know that Babar Awan (yes, of the judges’ restoration fiasco fame) was principally to blame — surprise, surprise. Yet, the man continues as heretofore as law minister. Whilst one supports democratic rule by the elected representatives of the people one has to condemn such lackadaisical governance.
However, the politicians will be sorted out by the people at the next elections if they are perceived to be inept etc; what upsets me is that no one, not the government, not the opposition reacted when the army announced last week that the COAS needs no such approval to give extensions in service to generals.
What is the difference between giving extensions and promoting generals when an extension can put someone within reach of the next higher rank obviously at the cost of other officers waiting in line to be promoted?
If the army arrogates more and more powers to itself at GHQ outside the writ of the government, nothing is going to work. Doesn’t the opposition understand that whilst it may snigger at the present government’s discomfort when the army takes it head-on (such as the ill-considered public outburst of ‘fury’ by the generals at the Kerry-Lugar Bill, whilst themselves asking for American aid the very next week), it might be the next government of Pakistan. How will it rein in the (already) rampant army then?
As pleaded many times in this column, might one say to the political forces to come together on the main principles of governance, the first of which should be the elected government’s suzerainty over all the departments of the state?
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