The art of inventing problems

By Ayaz Amir

A week is indeed a long time in politics. It has only been a few days since the 18th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly and already the shine is wearing off that ‘historic’ achievement. The only thing historic about it was its unanimous passage by the National Assembly. Unanimity is a virtue but since when was it alone a measure of great accomplishment?

To slow minds – and I stress the adjective – it was never very clear in what way the constitution as inherited from Pervez Musharraf was an impediment in the path of good governance? Was there any inherent disability in it which prevented decisive action, say, on power shutdowns or inflation? Did the constitution prevent the prime minister from streamlining his cabinet and making it more efficient? Did it in any manner impede the war against extremism?

And with the constitution cleansed, how precisely will things improve? Will the amended constitution induce national clarity? Will it light the path towards a common education policy or the improvement of public transport? Will we get better municipal services? Will the nation be finally convinced to get rid of that number one nuisance, the plastic shopping bag? Will the mounting tide of sectarian divisiveness be checked? Will Balochistan’s anger somehow be appeased?

A constitution is a set of guiding principles much as the Quran, as Muslims believe, is a compendium of divinely-ordained principles. But just as the Quran does not automatically produce good Muslims or lead to the perfect society – for that to happen action must take precedence over lip-service – the best constitution in the world contains no guarantees that it will lead to the promised kingdom.

The 1973 Constitution when first passed was also a unanimous document (although the Baloch leadership of the time has a different take on this point). Doubtless Pakistan would be poorer without it. But merely having that constitution never led to the transformation of Pakistan. And it never stopped tinpot dictators from marching in and seizing power, and adding to the nation’s woes.

The 18th Amendment too by itself will work no wonders. But it has already led to one problem, the turmoil in Hazara over the renaming of the Frontier province as Pakhtunkhwa, which is a rebuke to the orgy of celebrations which got going after the National Assembly’s passage of the 18th Amendment.

Stemming from the Hazara unrest are (1) calls for a new Hazara province and (2) renewed focus on the demand for a Seraiki province in the south of Punjab. The 18th Amendment was supposed to settle old problems, not open fresh wounds.

The original sin – or call it the first blunder – was the formation of the constitutional reforms committee representing all parties in parliament. Its composition was almost guaranteed to encourage every party to raise its own flag. The ANP’s favourite horse, which it was bound to ride, was the Pakhtunkhwa issue. The MQM had its eyes from the start on undoing the Concurrent List. For obvious reasons, it also wanted ports to become a provincial subject (something which, mercifully, hasn’t come to pass).

Raza Rabbani and the PPP seemed to have no clear aim apart from wanting to gain credit and political mileage out of shepherding through parliament a consensus document. The PML-N was primarily interested in trimming the president’s overweening powers. But in gunning for this it found itself slipping into a swamp in which fresh issues kept rearing their heads.

The first rule the committee imposed upon itself was to keep its deliberations away from the public eye. So well was this injunction obeyed that much of parliament was clueless about what was afoot behind the curtains. The inordinate stretching-out of the committee’s deliberations – nine months – was also enough to put parliament to sleep. The parliamentary vigilance that should have been exercised was thus sadly missing. And there were those who doubted that President Asif Zardari would willingly shed his powers. So they convinced themselves that the committee’s deliberations were a charade.

The doubters of course were proved wrong and, against commonly-held expectations, Zardari agreed to become a figurehead president, in line with the intent of the 1973 Constitution. But this was just one aspect of the situation. Thecommittee’s report when it came, and was ready for signing, was almost a fait accompli. The various parties should have examined it more thoroughly earlier. Not having done that at the proper time, it was too late to go through the contents with a fine comb or suggest meaningful changes at the last minute.

Indeed, when Mian Nawaz Sharif raised two objections which in hindsight – the clearest sight of all – seem entirely valid, this triggered such a storm of criticism that it almost seemed as if he was the Judas bent upon betraying the will of the rest of parliament. True, the timing of the objections was awkward and put the PML-N in a spot. I too was of the opinion that this was no time to quibble. But the fact remains, and as the explosive turn of events in Hazara has amply indicated, the objections were not wholly without merit.

Towards the end, the hype generated became so powerful that endorsing the consensus report seemed more important than examining its contents. Nawaz Sharif had tried to swim against the tide. But he had no choice but to go along with the mainstream when public pressure became overwhelming. Even then he managed to extract two minor concessions, the Khyber prefix to Pakhtunkhwa and a small change in the agreed formula regarding the appointment of senior judges. But as we have seen, the prefix was not enough to forestall the emotional backlash in Hazara.

How much nicer it would have been if instead of the nine-month marathon which the Raza Rabbani committee chose to run over high mountain and plunging valley, it had agreed on just a one-line amendment that the constitution stood restored to its shape as on the evening of July 4th, 1977, the eve of Zia’s coup?

As Zia’s first victim, the second victim being the nation, the PPP should have gone for this option. But it chose the longer route, thereby opening a Pandora’s box whose first contents we have seen in Hazara (although it is not a little pathetic to see the defeated remnants of Musharraf’s Hazara supporters, in the shape of the local PML-Q, trying to draw political advantage out of this sad affair. What will discarded politicians not do to attract attention?)

As stated above, the ANP, to the exclusion of anything else, had its eyes on Pakhtunkhwa. The MQM single-mindedly had its eyes on the Concurrent List. When the clause doing away with it was passed in the National Assembly, and the MQM members went giddy with excitement, shouting Altaf Hussain slogans at the top of their voices, I had a feeling that we had rushed into something without fully gauging its consequences.

On closer examination therefore the 18th Amendment looks to be more and more of a half-cooked affair. Consider the deletion of Zia’s name from the constitution. His name has gone but his spirit lingers on. The articles he inserted into the constitution (62 and 63 – setting out standards of rectitude for candidates) are still there. They have no practical import. But if something is rubbish what wisdom in preserving it? More to the point, the 8th Amendment validating Zia’s coup is still part of the constitution. What does it matter then if Zia’s name has been taken out?

Zia and no one else, through an executive order, made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the constitution. Of no practical significance, it merely adds to the wordiness of a document already weighted down by unnecessary verbiage, at least in the principles of policy.

Which lends itself to the conclusion that where the committee could have been radical it seized the path of caution, while things best avoided it chose to embrace. Pakistan’s problems lie not in the realm of law-making. It’s getting things done, of making them work, which require to be the focus of its national energies.