The Indo-Pak waltz

by Irfan Husain

OFFSTAGE, we can almost hear the weary orchestra tuning up for yet another round of the slow one-step forward, two-steps back waltz that constitutes Indo-Pak talks.

We are all familiar with the routine: cynical bureaucrats, terrified of straying from their narrow briefs, delivering carefully prepared statements without any belief they will succeed. After more than 60 years of stonewalling over Kashmir, Pakistani and Indian diplomats are old hands at making sure that the conflict remains frozen. Their political masters are no better: unwilling to give ammunition to their domestic opponents, they lack the courage and the conviction to take risks for the sake of achieving a lasting peace.

Meanwhile, millions of Kashmiris continue to suffer as a result of New Delhi and Islamabad’s intransigence. However, a recent two-page article in the travel section of the London Observer showed the possibilities that could open up for Kashmir if the conflict is ever resolved. Tom Robbins describes a skiing holiday at Gulmarg, India’s leading skiing resort high in the Kashmir Valley.

If and when peace returns to the region, tourism would boom, and the people would prosper. Unfortunately, the conflict has never been about the people. For both India and Pakistan, it’s been about land and ‘principles’.

But for Kashmiris, it has been a long nightmare with no end in sight. Struggling against a stifling and repressive rule imposed by New Delhi, Kashmiris now also face the depredations of extremist infiltrators. These terrorists should not be confused with local freedom fighters who have been striving for their rights for decades.

Now that foreign secretary-level talks have been announced, both sides are warning their respective constituencies not to expect too much. It has been made clear that India has offered these talks in deference to the United States, and Pakistan does not want to be the spoiler.

However, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s foreign minister, has implied he does not have high hopes of any satisfactory outcome. The Indians have meanwhile stated that this meeting does not mean the comprehensive talks put on ice in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack will be resumed any time soon.

Given this wholly negative attitude, one wonders why the two sides are even bothering to go through with the motions. I suppose they want to be able to say to Washington that they tried, but the other side refused to budge.

Although the talks are without a defined agenda, they will focus on terrorism-related issues, something Pakistan is quite uncomfortable with. In Islamabad’s view, this is placing Pakistan in the dock. And quite right, too, retorts India. This rancour and refusal to move on is hardly the formula for successful talks between neighbours with a long history of strife.

Even though the objective conditions for an understanding exist in the form of a common threat from extremism, the reality is that India and Pakistan both view each other as the primary threat. Of course India is now the pre-eminent power in the region, but it nevertheless refuses to show any flexibility over Kashmir.

The Pakistani establishment has always seen India as a mortal enemy, and developments in Afghanistan appear to reinforce this view. The steady inroads New Delhi has made in what was traditionally considered Pakistan’s backyard have rung loud alarm bells in GHQ.

By telling Washington that it cannot move additional troops from its eastern border to North Waziristan, Islamabad is effectively signalling to the US that it cannot do more to combat the Taliban unless there is a settlement with India over Kashmir.

While these games of grand strategy and diplomacy play out in the three capitals, the people of Kashmir continue to be held hostage. Over the years, I have been much criticised by Indian and Pakistani readers for advocating a solution to the problem based on common sense and common decency.

If we move away from outdated UN resolutions and sterile legal arguments, and look at what is best for the people of Kashmir, we may get closer to a sane resolution. Musharraf was guilty of many sins, including the Himalayan blunder of launching the infamous Kargil adventure, but he did genuinely try to achieve peace with India. When he claimed that the two countries were close to an end to the conflict as the result of back channel diplomacy, he was not far wrong.

Qureshi has debunked this claim, saying the Foreign Office has no records to support it. However, I have been talking to Musharraf’s adviser who was deeply involved in these secret talks over the years, and he has kept me in touch with their broad contours. He has also told me that both foreign offices were kept out of the loop, and no formal record was kept.

The point here is that there is some progress to build on, should the two sides wish to. Rather than begin at square one, the present set of negotiators can find out from their predecessors what they had agreed on. Instead of dusting off old FO files, they can get a briefing from the interlocutors who were involved in the back channel talks.

However, this presupposes a desire to resolve issues rather than mark time. On Pakistan’s side, the problem is one of knowing who to talk to in Islamabad. It is clear that unless the army is onside, no progress can be achieved. Thus, Pakistan’s brief will be dictated in GHQ, and not in the Foreign Office. In India, the Congress government cannot afford to alienate the hawks of the Bharatiya Janata Party as well as other extreme right parties. We have the makings of another deadlock, with neither side willing to give an inch.

And yet the main ingredients for a compromise are in place. India wants to be counted as a major player in Afghanistan. However, lacking a common border with it, New Delhi must deal with Pakistan. The Americans are keen to get all three countries involved in security operations once they withdraw. This is only possible by persuading India and Pakistan to mend fences.

Gen Kayani’s recent offer to facilitate talks between Nato forces and the Taliban are an indication that he and his colleagues can be flexible. The growing threat from jihadi terrorists might do more to focus minds than the allure of skiing at Gulmarg.