By Mohsin Qasmi
Oxford professor John Ronald Reuel Tolkien (J.R.R. Tolkien), who created The Lord of the Rings trilogy, was intent on making his magical world real.
An imaginary world must be realistically equipped down to the last whisker of the last monster; Tolkien put close to 20 years into the creation of Middle Earth, the three volumes Lord of the Rings (1954-55) and its predecessor, The Hobbit (1937). He also equipped readers with 157 pages of History, Appendixes, Indexes, Tables of Consanguinity and Philogically impeccable Notes on all the Languages, including Elvish and Sindarin, spoken on Middle Earth.
Professor Tolkien died aged 81 in 1973.
THE HOBBIT
The Hobbit is a tale of high adventure. Bilbo Baggins, a hobbit who enjoys a comfortable, unambitious life, rarely traveling any further than his pantry or his cellar. But his contentment is disturbed when the wizard, Gandalf, and a company of dwarves arrive on his doorstep one-day to whisk him away on an adventure. They have a plot to raid the treasure hoard guarded by Smaug the Magnificent, a large and very dangerous dragon. Bilbo is most reluctant to take part in this quest, but he surprises even himself by his resourcefulness and his skill as a burglar!
Encounters with the trolls, goblins, dwarves, elves and giant spiders, conversation with the dragon, smaug the magnificent and rather unwilling presence at the battle of the five armies are some of the adventures that befall Bilbo. But there are lighter moments as well: Good fellowship, welcome meal laughter and songs.
The Hobbit became an instant success when it was first published in 1937, and more than fifty years later Tolkien's epic tale of elves, dwarves, trolls, goblins, myth, magic and adventure, with its reluctant hero Bilbo Baggins, has lost none of its appeal.
THE LORD OF THE RINGS
Sauron, the Dark Lord, has gathered to him the Rings of power-the means by which he will be able to rule the world. All he lacks in his plan for dominion is the ruling Ring, which has fallen into the hands of the Hobbit Bilbo Baggins.
In a sleepy village in the Shire, young Frodo Baggins finds himself faced with an immense task, as the Ring is entrusted to his care. He must leave his home and make a perilous journey across the realms of Middle-earth to the Cracks of Doom, deep inside the territories of the Dark Lord. There he must destroy the Ring forever and foil the Dark Lord in his evil purpose.
The Lord of the Rings cannot be describe in a few words. J.R.R Tolkien’s great work of imaginary fiction has been labeled both a heroic romance and a classic of science fiction. It is, however, impossible to convey to the new reader all of the book’s qualities, and the range of its creation.
By turns comic, homely, epic, monstrous and diabolic, the narrative moves through countless changes of scenes and character in an imaginary world, which is totally convincing in its detail. Tolkien created a new mythology in an invented world, which has proved timeless in its appeal.
An extraordinary book, it deals with a stupendous theme. It leads us through a succession of strange and astonishing episodes, some of them magnificent, in a region where everything is invented, forest, moors, river, wilderness, town, and the races which inhabit them. As the story goes on the world of the Ring grows more vast and mysterious and crowded with curious figures, horrible, delightful or comic. The story itself is superb.
Since it was first published in 1954, The Lord of the Rings has been a book people have treasured. Steeped in unrivalled magic and other worldliness, its sweeping fantasy has touched the hearts of young and old alike. Fifty million copies of its many editions have been sold around the world, and occasional collectors' editions become prized and valuable items of publishing.
ABOUT SILMARILLION
The tales of The Silmarillion were the underlying inspiration and source of J.R.R. Tolkien's imaginative writing; he worked on the book throughout his life, but never brought it to a final form. Long preceding in its origins The Lord of the Rings, it is the story of the First Age of Tolkien's world, the ancient drama to which characters in The Lord of the Rings look back, and in which some of them, such as Elrond and Galadriel, took part.
The title Silmarillion is shortened from Quenta Silamarillion, 'The History of the Silmarils', the three great jewels created by FÎanor, most gifted of the Elves, in which he imprisoned the light of the Two Trees that illuminated Valinor, the land of the gods. When Morgoth, the first Dark Lord, destroyed the Trees, that light lived on only in the Silmarils; and Morgoth seized them and set them in his crown, guarded in the impenetrable fortress of Angband in the north of Middle-earth. The Silmarillion is the history of the rebellion of FÎanor and his people against the gods, their exile in Middle-earth, and their war, hopeless despite all the heroism of Elves and Men, against the great Enemy.
UNFINISHED TALES
Unfinished Tales is a collection of narratives ranging in time from the Elder Days of Middle-earth to the end of the War of the Ring and provides those who have read The Lord of the Rings with a whole collection of background and new stories from the twentieth century’s most acclaimed popular author. The book concentrates on the realm of Middle-earth and comprises such elements as Gandalf’s lively account of how it was that he came to send the Dwarves to the celebrated party at Bag-End, the emergence of the sea-god Ulmo before the eyes of Tuor on the coast of Beleriand, and an exact description of the military organization of the Riders of Rohan. Unfinished Tales also contains the only story about the long ages of Numenor before its downfall, and all that is known about such matters as the Five Wizards, the Palantiri and the legend of Amroth.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
From protests to movement
By Rahimullah Yusufzai
The campaign for creation of Hazara province is gaining momentum. The “Sooba Hazara Tehrik,” or Movement for Hazara Province, was able to shut down much of Hazara division on May 2 by giving a call for a wheels-jam and shutter-down strike. While continuing to hold public meetings in different parts of Hazara to rally support for its cause, the movement’s leadership is threatening to march on Islamabad as a last resort to force the government to accede to its demand.
Abbottabad, the picturesque hill station known as the City of Schools, has become the nerve centre of the movement. In fact, the movement is strongest in Abbottabad district, followed, in that order, by Haripur and Mansehra. Its weakest link is Battagram, a Pashto-speaking district where most people appear uncomfortable with the idea of their area becoming part of a new province dominated by non-Pashto-speakers. They would be happy to remain part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa after getting a new administrative division by the name of Abaseen comprising Battagram and Kohistan districts of Hazara and Shangla district of Malakand division.
The proposed division of Abaseen, which is the name given locally to the River Indus passing through this area, would also include the Provincially Administered Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka, or Torghar in Pashto, which is presently part of Mansehra district.
Kohistan, the fifth district in Hazara, seems divided on the issue of Hazara province. Its people would certainly support creation of Abaseen division and could eventually back Hazara province if it offers them greater political and economic benefits. The vast Kohistan district has two geographic parts, Swat Kohistan and Indus Kohistan. The main language is Kohistani, though many people are bilingual and can speak Pashto as well. One of its lawmakers, Abdul Sattar Khan of the PML-N, has moved a resolution in the provincial assembly demanding Hazara province while the others are pushing for creation of Abaseen division.
The renaming of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa provoked a strong reaction in Hazara, mostly in its Hindko-speaking areas of Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra. The PML-Q, defeated in Hazara in the 2008 general elections by Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, seized the opportunity and led protests against the new name of the province. It accused PML-N lawmakers from Hazara of failing to protect the identity of Hazarawals. As the protests grew, the campaign turned into a movement for Hazara province.
The movement was lucky to have a leader in the person of Sardar Haider Zaman, a fatherly figure who is largely uncontroversial and could keep Hazara’s often fractious politicians together. He has been contesting almost every assembly election from Abbottabad district and losing, except for a solitary win in the 1985 partyless polls when he went on to become a provincial minister. Twice he lost to Nawaz Sharif and this could be one reason for him to try and settle scores with the PML-N leader. His last and most recent public office was that of District Nazim of Abbottabad.
Defying his age, Baba Haider Zaman, 80, goes about the task of organising and leading public protests. With his flowing white beard, he has been inspiring his followers, promising them a prosperous future once Hazara province comes into being.
He is being helped in this cause by other leading figures of the movement such as former foreign minister and National Assembly Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan and his son Omar Ayub Khan, who served as minister of state for finance in Gen Musharraf’s PML-Q government. In their speeches at public meetings, father and son come up with fantastic figures as to how Hazara would prosper by utilising its abundant forests and minerals, tapping its tourism potential and getting its share of profits from Tarbela Dam, the Ghazi-Barotha Barrage and the proposed Basha-Diamer Dam. It is another matter if, at the end of the day, there is no change in the standard of living of the majority of people and only the rich and powerful benefit from the creation of a new province after getting to rule a smaller, easily manageable administrative unit.
Hazara has been more of an administrative unit than a distinct home of people of the same ethnicity. The term Hazarawal also didn’t confer a cultural, ethnic or linguistic identity on its people. The late Dr Sher Bahadur Khan, in his book Tareekh-e-Hazara, writes that 1,000 Qarliq Turks in 1282 settled in the area now known as Haripur and that is how Haripur alone got the name Hazara. The place now called Abbottabad was in old times known as Rush and Mansehra as Wadi-e-Pakhal. Haripur is named after a Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa from the court of Ranjit Singh, Abbottabad after the British official Major Abbott who administered the area and Mansehra after Man Singh. Those names haven’t been changed even though they belong to the colonial era and remind one of the subjugation of our people by alien rulers.
Though Hindko-speakers are in a majority in Hazara, it also has a fair share of people speaking Pashto, Gojri and Kohistani. But the chant, “Aik hi naara, Sooba Hazara” (One slogan, Hazara province) seems to be galvanising most of Hazara’s population and bringing them together. The idea is catching up and the movement’s leaders are so confident of success that they argue it is a matter of time before Hazara province becomes a reality. They are refusing to hold talks with the ANP-led government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa despite numerous offers from it and would like to negotiate only with the PPP-headed federal government, and that too on the one-point agenda of Hazara province.
The demand for Hazara province isn’t new, but it is now that it has come to occupy centre-stage. Years ago, an Abbottabad lawyer, Asif Malik, launched the movement for Hazara province and never got any significant support. It even put up candidates in elections, only to be trounced by the mainstream parties. Asif Malik is now dead and his group is still a player, though a marginal one, in Hazara politics, but the idea he gave has caught on. Though the intensity of opposition to a Pakhtun-specific name for NWFP was understandable among Hazara’s non-Pakhtun population, the strong criticism of Pakhtuns, or “Attockonpar,” meaning those living beyond Attock, as exploiters was surprising. Many Pakhtuns have been critical of Punjab as the unkind big brother, and here we are faced with a situation in which non-Pakhtuns living in the Pakhtun-majority Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa complaining of exploitation at their hands. For right or wrong reasons, such feelings arise when the cake to be shared is small or there is uneven distribution of resources. The same reasons led to the alienation of the majority Bengalis and separation of East Pakistan. This is also fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan and has enabled ethnic- and region-based political parties to retain substantial followings.
Things could have been different had the ruling PPP and ANP handled the situation wisely. Their insistence on renaming NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa was justified on the ground that it gave an identity to its majority Pakhtun population and this objective was achieved through a democratic process. But there was a need to consult the people not only in Hazara but also in other non-Pashto-speaking areas in the province and address their concerns as well. The issue of identity for Hazarawals was also important and this could have been tackled by prefixing “Hazara” to Pakhtunkhwa, instead of “Khyber.” Nobody demanded it and yet it was added on the insistence of the PML-N. It is probably too late now to think of reconciliation on these lines because the demand for Hazara province seems to have become non-negotiable. The creation of Abaseen division, which the provincial government is promoting, may weaken the Hazara movement, but it won’t be able to stop it.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
The campaign for creation of Hazara province is gaining momentum. The “Sooba Hazara Tehrik,” or Movement for Hazara Province, was able to shut down much of Hazara division on May 2 by giving a call for a wheels-jam and shutter-down strike. While continuing to hold public meetings in different parts of Hazara to rally support for its cause, the movement’s leadership is threatening to march on Islamabad as a last resort to force the government to accede to its demand.
Abbottabad, the picturesque hill station known as the City of Schools, has become the nerve centre of the movement. In fact, the movement is strongest in Abbottabad district, followed, in that order, by Haripur and Mansehra. Its weakest link is Battagram, a Pashto-speaking district where most people appear uncomfortable with the idea of their area becoming part of a new province dominated by non-Pashto-speakers. They would be happy to remain part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa after getting a new administrative division by the name of Abaseen comprising Battagram and Kohistan districts of Hazara and Shangla district of Malakand division.
The proposed division of Abaseen, which is the name given locally to the River Indus passing through this area, would also include the Provincially Administered Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka, or Torghar in Pashto, which is presently part of Mansehra district.
Kohistan, the fifth district in Hazara, seems divided on the issue of Hazara province. Its people would certainly support creation of Abaseen division and could eventually back Hazara province if it offers them greater political and economic benefits. The vast Kohistan district has two geographic parts, Swat Kohistan and Indus Kohistan. The main language is Kohistani, though many people are bilingual and can speak Pashto as well. One of its lawmakers, Abdul Sattar Khan of the PML-N, has moved a resolution in the provincial assembly demanding Hazara province while the others are pushing for creation of Abaseen division.
The renaming of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa provoked a strong reaction in Hazara, mostly in its Hindko-speaking areas of Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra. The PML-Q, defeated in Hazara in the 2008 general elections by Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, seized the opportunity and led protests against the new name of the province. It accused PML-N lawmakers from Hazara of failing to protect the identity of Hazarawals. As the protests grew, the campaign turned into a movement for Hazara province.
The movement was lucky to have a leader in the person of Sardar Haider Zaman, a fatherly figure who is largely uncontroversial and could keep Hazara’s often fractious politicians together. He has been contesting almost every assembly election from Abbottabad district and losing, except for a solitary win in the 1985 partyless polls when he went on to become a provincial minister. Twice he lost to Nawaz Sharif and this could be one reason for him to try and settle scores with the PML-N leader. His last and most recent public office was that of District Nazim of Abbottabad.
Defying his age, Baba Haider Zaman, 80, goes about the task of organising and leading public protests. With his flowing white beard, he has been inspiring his followers, promising them a prosperous future once Hazara province comes into being.
He is being helped in this cause by other leading figures of the movement such as former foreign minister and National Assembly Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan and his son Omar Ayub Khan, who served as minister of state for finance in Gen Musharraf’s PML-Q government. In their speeches at public meetings, father and son come up with fantastic figures as to how Hazara would prosper by utilising its abundant forests and minerals, tapping its tourism potential and getting its share of profits from Tarbela Dam, the Ghazi-Barotha Barrage and the proposed Basha-Diamer Dam. It is another matter if, at the end of the day, there is no change in the standard of living of the majority of people and only the rich and powerful benefit from the creation of a new province after getting to rule a smaller, easily manageable administrative unit.
Hazara has been more of an administrative unit than a distinct home of people of the same ethnicity. The term Hazarawal also didn’t confer a cultural, ethnic or linguistic identity on its people. The late Dr Sher Bahadur Khan, in his book Tareekh-e-Hazara, writes that 1,000 Qarliq Turks in 1282 settled in the area now known as Haripur and that is how Haripur alone got the name Hazara. The place now called Abbottabad was in old times known as Rush and Mansehra as Wadi-e-Pakhal. Haripur is named after a Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa from the court of Ranjit Singh, Abbottabad after the British official Major Abbott who administered the area and Mansehra after Man Singh. Those names haven’t been changed even though they belong to the colonial era and remind one of the subjugation of our people by alien rulers.
Though Hindko-speakers are in a majority in Hazara, it also has a fair share of people speaking Pashto, Gojri and Kohistani. But the chant, “Aik hi naara, Sooba Hazara” (One slogan, Hazara province) seems to be galvanising most of Hazara’s population and bringing them together. The idea is catching up and the movement’s leaders are so confident of success that they argue it is a matter of time before Hazara province becomes a reality. They are refusing to hold talks with the ANP-led government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa despite numerous offers from it and would like to negotiate only with the PPP-headed federal government, and that too on the one-point agenda of Hazara province.
The demand for Hazara province isn’t new, but it is now that it has come to occupy centre-stage. Years ago, an Abbottabad lawyer, Asif Malik, launched the movement for Hazara province and never got any significant support. It even put up candidates in elections, only to be trounced by the mainstream parties. Asif Malik is now dead and his group is still a player, though a marginal one, in Hazara politics, but the idea he gave has caught on. Though the intensity of opposition to a Pakhtun-specific name for NWFP was understandable among Hazara’s non-Pakhtun population, the strong criticism of Pakhtuns, or “Attockonpar,” meaning those living beyond Attock, as exploiters was surprising. Many Pakhtuns have been critical of Punjab as the unkind big brother, and here we are faced with a situation in which non-Pakhtuns living in the Pakhtun-majority Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa complaining of exploitation at their hands. For right or wrong reasons, such feelings arise when the cake to be shared is small or there is uneven distribution of resources. The same reasons led to the alienation of the majority Bengalis and separation of East Pakistan. This is also fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan and has enabled ethnic- and region-based political parties to retain substantial followings.
Things could have been different had the ruling PPP and ANP handled the situation wisely. Their insistence on renaming NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa was justified on the ground that it gave an identity to its majority Pakhtun population and this objective was achieved through a democratic process. But there was a need to consult the people not only in Hazara but also in other non-Pashto-speaking areas in the province and address their concerns as well. The issue of identity for Hazarawals was also important and this could have been tackled by prefixing “Hazara” to Pakhtunkhwa, instead of “Khyber.” Nobody demanded it and yet it was added on the insistence of the PML-N. It is probably too late now to think of reconciliation on these lines because the demand for Hazara province seems to have become non-negotiable. The creation of Abaseen division, which the provincial government is promoting, may weaken the Hazara movement, but it won’t be able to stop it.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
Opaque and unaccountable counter-terror
By Mosharraf Zaidi
The murder of Pakistan’s international man of mystery, Khalid Khawaja, should awaken Pakistanis on all points in the political, religious and social spectrum to the depth and complexity of the terrorists’ challenge to Pakistan. Khawaja was, what many investment bankers would call, a relationship manager. Along with a small group of others, he helped manage Pakistan’s various and increasingly complex relationships with terrorist groups. That he had spent an increasing share of his time in recent months trying to cool down and temper the responses of terrorists to the Pakistani state’s full-scale war on terror is ironic. Khawaja was the quintessential 21st century holy warrior — the anti-thesis of a counter-radicalisation strategy. That he was an asset in Pakistan’s strategy speaks volumes about how poorly prepared Pakistan is for this challenge.
As far back as 1987, Khalid Khawaja was seen to be too blunt, too extreme and too much of a risk for the piety-stricken Gen Ziaul Haq. It is ironic indeed that Daniel Pearl once harangued Khawaja for greater access to some of the Al Qaeda and Taliban figures he was on personal terms with. In the end, the extremist disease that beheaded Daniel Pearl was unable to distinguish between what Pearl represented, and what Khawaja stood for. When Pakistan’s violent extremists cannot tell the difference between Islamist activists like Khalid Khawaja and reporters for the Wall Street Journal like Daniel Pearl, we should all be very scared about what the hell it is, that is actually going on, in Pakistan. (That is of course if you haven’t yet been scared by the more than 25,000 lives that terrorism and counter-terror operations have claimed).
We know through the intrepid reporting of Zafar Abbas and Hamid Mir of course that Khawaja’s killers were not garden variety ‘Taliban’. We know that none of the so-called ‘good’ Pakistani Taliban — Gul Bahadur, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and their ilk — have any control over any of the ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban — Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Ilyas Kashmiri, and their latest ilk, the Asian Tigers. We know that the Asian Tigers, the group that took Khawaja’s life, was inspired by the tragedy at Lal Masjid. We know that the Afghan Taliban, no matter how hard clash-of-civilisations-analysts try, are not the same thing at all, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban, or their splinter groups, like the Asian Tigers.
Yet somehow, the word Taliban continues to be used in the broader Pakistani discourse wantonly, without any context. This enables a sanitised and simplified civilisational version of the world in which black and white caricatures are pitted against one another. On one side are the supposed frappuccino-sipping, sun-block dripping, dogma-ripping globalised liberals, on-side with the west and all things modern. On the other are the ‘Taliban’. If you don’t fit squarely into one group, you are automatically the other. This is why it is so easy to equate criticism of the PPP as a right-wing conspiracy, why it is so easy to label as anti-Pakistan anyone that questions the conduct of the military on and off the field of battle, and why it is so easy to brand those that condemn and oppose the tyranny of terrorists as American and Indian agents.
This “us versus them” formulation of a very complex set of incentives, stimuli and events had produced a dangerous culture of simplified good and evil in Pakistan. As we know from global experience, simpleton good v. evil is bush league — George W Bush League to be precise. If the American people have smartened up to the nuance and delicacy of dealing with different parts of the world, and different Muslim populations, differently, it seems ridiculous that Pakistanis should need any prodding at all to be convinced that nuance and delicacy might be in order in Pakistan’s own struggle against terrorists.
It stands to reason that among terrorist threats, there are both the reconcilables and irreconcilables. The reconcilable may include the so-called ‘good’ Taliban, like Haqqani and Co. Or they may not. We don’t actually know if there are any terrorists that are reconcilable. The possibility of openly exploring the space for armistices has been captured by the military, and shrunk due to the secrecy and failure surrounding previous attempts. The disastrous Nizam-e-Adl fiasco and the ensuing Rah-e-Rast operation in Swat buried the little political space that existed to consider engaging reconcilables. Many that had long advocated a zero-tolerance for terror groups’ demands were buoyed by the shrinkage of space for negotiations and talks with terrorists — at least partly, myself included. But Pakistanis have paid a high institutional price for the shrinking of the space for dialogue.
That price is the relevance of mysterious figures like Khawaja and Hamid Gul in Pakistani public life. In an environment that condemns talking to terrorists as a sign of weakness, and an existential threat, the only way the Pakistani state can communicate with terrorists is through these kinds of interlocutors. These interlocutors do the dirty work of the Pakistani state. The fact that Pakistanis don’t trust these interlocutors, any more than they trust their enemies, is not surprising. Operators like Hamid Gul can never enjoy the legitimacy to act on behalf of the Pakistani people. The only actors in the public space that do enjoy the luxury of legitimate agency are politicians.
Of course, the political space has not demonstrated its capacity for the courage to sit with, stare down, and negotiate with terrorists. Unless the mainstream parties, led by the PPP and the PML-N, produce politicians capable of travelling to the tribal agencies and sitting down with the Sirajuddin Haqqanis and Mullah Nazeers of the world, we can be certain of two things. One, public policy ‘trouble-shooters’ like Khawaja and Hamid Gul will continue to exercise power on behalf of the people of Pakistan, without the burden of accountability. Two, the Pakistani military will continue to conduct military operations — and charge taxpayers in Pakistan (and outside) a sizeable amount of money to do so, without any oversight at all.
If Pakistan’s military will ever be the impregnable wall of defence for Pakistan that it aspires to be, it needs to be subservient to civilian oversight. Only visible and demonstrable civilian oversight can help internalise the human cost of Pakistan’s war on terrorism. That cost begins and ends with innocent civilian casualties, or collateral damage. If there is one single issue that drives and motivates the rank and file of the irreconcilable terrorist threat in Pakistan, it is innocent civilian deaths.
We often speak of innocent civilian deaths in the abstract. The reason is simple. There is very little verifiable information about civilian deaths available to the public. All access to victims is controlled by the state — which is not too keen to allow a balanced national conversation. Still, two events stick out strikingly, in the chronology of the terrorism and counter-terrorism story of Pakistan since 2002. The first is the October 30, 2006, military attack on the Chenagai madressah in Bajaur, which killed more than 80 (mostly children). The second is the July 10, 2007, storming of Lal Masjid.
Innocent civilian deaths are often seen as a Trojan Horse, or a proxy for ideological opposition to war. And perhaps there needs to be an ideological debate about the merits and demerits of a Pakistani war on terrorism. But the implications of innocent civilian deaths on the actual war effort as it exists are here and now. They are real life, not ideological. The Asian Tigers’ are a direct correlate of the killing fields of Lal Masjid. Their murder of Khalid Khawaja is a manifestation of just how irreconcilable these groups have become.
The take-no-prisoners, kill-’em-all approach to the Pakistan’s terrorism problem has been arguably successful in some respects. But if the fallout from Lal Masjid is anything to go by, its failures and their extent is unknowable. That is a dangerous and scary prospect.
Killing innocent civilians is what terrorists do. That’s how terrorists should be branded. Those Pakistani soldiers that are bravely fighting terrorists should never be seen as aggressors of innocent people. The manner in which Pakistan is countering terrorism undermines the sacrifices of its soldiers, and perpetuates the presence of Khalid Khawajas and Hamid Guls in our national conversation. Pakistan and democracy can do better than this.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy.
The murder of Pakistan’s international man of mystery, Khalid Khawaja, should awaken Pakistanis on all points in the political, religious and social spectrum to the depth and complexity of the terrorists’ challenge to Pakistan. Khawaja was, what many investment bankers would call, a relationship manager. Along with a small group of others, he helped manage Pakistan’s various and increasingly complex relationships with terrorist groups. That he had spent an increasing share of his time in recent months trying to cool down and temper the responses of terrorists to the Pakistani state’s full-scale war on terror is ironic. Khawaja was the quintessential 21st century holy warrior — the anti-thesis of a counter-radicalisation strategy. That he was an asset in Pakistan’s strategy speaks volumes about how poorly prepared Pakistan is for this challenge.
As far back as 1987, Khalid Khawaja was seen to be too blunt, too extreme and too much of a risk for the piety-stricken Gen Ziaul Haq. It is ironic indeed that Daniel Pearl once harangued Khawaja for greater access to some of the Al Qaeda and Taliban figures he was on personal terms with. In the end, the extremist disease that beheaded Daniel Pearl was unable to distinguish between what Pearl represented, and what Khawaja stood for. When Pakistan’s violent extremists cannot tell the difference between Islamist activists like Khalid Khawaja and reporters for the Wall Street Journal like Daniel Pearl, we should all be very scared about what the hell it is, that is actually going on, in Pakistan. (That is of course if you haven’t yet been scared by the more than 25,000 lives that terrorism and counter-terror operations have claimed).
We know through the intrepid reporting of Zafar Abbas and Hamid Mir of course that Khawaja’s killers were not garden variety ‘Taliban’. We know that none of the so-called ‘good’ Pakistani Taliban — Gul Bahadur, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and their ilk — have any control over any of the ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban — Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Ilyas Kashmiri, and their latest ilk, the Asian Tigers. We know that the Asian Tigers, the group that took Khawaja’s life, was inspired by the tragedy at Lal Masjid. We know that the Afghan Taliban, no matter how hard clash-of-civilisations-analysts try, are not the same thing at all, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Pakistani Taliban, or their splinter groups, like the Asian Tigers.
Yet somehow, the word Taliban continues to be used in the broader Pakistani discourse wantonly, without any context. This enables a sanitised and simplified civilisational version of the world in which black and white caricatures are pitted against one another. On one side are the supposed frappuccino-sipping, sun-block dripping, dogma-ripping globalised liberals, on-side with the west and all things modern. On the other are the ‘Taliban’. If you don’t fit squarely into one group, you are automatically the other. This is why it is so easy to equate criticism of the PPP as a right-wing conspiracy, why it is so easy to label as anti-Pakistan anyone that questions the conduct of the military on and off the field of battle, and why it is so easy to brand those that condemn and oppose the tyranny of terrorists as American and Indian agents.
This “us versus them” formulation of a very complex set of incentives, stimuli and events had produced a dangerous culture of simplified good and evil in Pakistan. As we know from global experience, simpleton good v. evil is bush league — George W Bush League to be precise. If the American people have smartened up to the nuance and delicacy of dealing with different parts of the world, and different Muslim populations, differently, it seems ridiculous that Pakistanis should need any prodding at all to be convinced that nuance and delicacy might be in order in Pakistan’s own struggle against terrorists.
It stands to reason that among terrorist threats, there are both the reconcilables and irreconcilables. The reconcilable may include the so-called ‘good’ Taliban, like Haqqani and Co. Or they may not. We don’t actually know if there are any terrorists that are reconcilable. The possibility of openly exploring the space for armistices has been captured by the military, and shrunk due to the secrecy and failure surrounding previous attempts. The disastrous Nizam-e-Adl fiasco and the ensuing Rah-e-Rast operation in Swat buried the little political space that existed to consider engaging reconcilables. Many that had long advocated a zero-tolerance for terror groups’ demands were buoyed by the shrinkage of space for negotiations and talks with terrorists — at least partly, myself included. But Pakistanis have paid a high institutional price for the shrinking of the space for dialogue.
That price is the relevance of mysterious figures like Khawaja and Hamid Gul in Pakistani public life. In an environment that condemns talking to terrorists as a sign of weakness, and an existential threat, the only way the Pakistani state can communicate with terrorists is through these kinds of interlocutors. These interlocutors do the dirty work of the Pakistani state. The fact that Pakistanis don’t trust these interlocutors, any more than they trust their enemies, is not surprising. Operators like Hamid Gul can never enjoy the legitimacy to act on behalf of the Pakistani people. The only actors in the public space that do enjoy the luxury of legitimate agency are politicians.
Of course, the political space has not demonstrated its capacity for the courage to sit with, stare down, and negotiate with terrorists. Unless the mainstream parties, led by the PPP and the PML-N, produce politicians capable of travelling to the tribal agencies and sitting down with the Sirajuddin Haqqanis and Mullah Nazeers of the world, we can be certain of two things. One, public policy ‘trouble-shooters’ like Khawaja and Hamid Gul will continue to exercise power on behalf of the people of Pakistan, without the burden of accountability. Two, the Pakistani military will continue to conduct military operations — and charge taxpayers in Pakistan (and outside) a sizeable amount of money to do so, without any oversight at all.
If Pakistan’s military will ever be the impregnable wall of defence for Pakistan that it aspires to be, it needs to be subservient to civilian oversight. Only visible and demonstrable civilian oversight can help internalise the human cost of Pakistan’s war on terrorism. That cost begins and ends with innocent civilian casualties, or collateral damage. If there is one single issue that drives and motivates the rank and file of the irreconcilable terrorist threat in Pakistan, it is innocent civilian deaths.
We often speak of innocent civilian deaths in the abstract. The reason is simple. There is very little verifiable information about civilian deaths available to the public. All access to victims is controlled by the state — which is not too keen to allow a balanced national conversation. Still, two events stick out strikingly, in the chronology of the terrorism and counter-terrorism story of Pakistan since 2002. The first is the October 30, 2006, military attack on the Chenagai madressah in Bajaur, which killed more than 80 (mostly children). The second is the July 10, 2007, storming of Lal Masjid.
Innocent civilian deaths are often seen as a Trojan Horse, or a proxy for ideological opposition to war. And perhaps there needs to be an ideological debate about the merits and demerits of a Pakistani war on terrorism. But the implications of innocent civilian deaths on the actual war effort as it exists are here and now. They are real life, not ideological. The Asian Tigers’ are a direct correlate of the killing fields of Lal Masjid. Their murder of Khalid Khawaja is a manifestation of just how irreconcilable these groups have become.
The take-no-prisoners, kill-’em-all approach to the Pakistan’s terrorism problem has been arguably successful in some respects. But if the fallout from Lal Masjid is anything to go by, its failures and their extent is unknowable. That is a dangerous and scary prospect.
Killing innocent civilians is what terrorists do. That’s how terrorists should be branded. Those Pakistani soldiers that are bravely fighting terrorists should never be seen as aggressors of innocent people. The manner in which Pakistan is countering terrorism undermines the sacrifices of its soldiers, and perpetuates the presence of Khalid Khawajas and Hamid Guls in our national conversation. Pakistan and democracy can do better than this.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy.
Achieving economic stability
By Dr Ashfaque H Khan
Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh is the fourth person appointed by the present government in two years to look after the ministry of finance. Finance is the only portfolio which witnessed changes in faces in quick succession which speaks volume about the importance given to the economy by the present regime.
Dr Sheikh has inherited an extremely fragile economy which was badly handled for the last two years by those who had little understanding of the subject. Adverse internal and external developments of an extraordinary nature apart, the inept handling of the economy for over two years has brought miseries and pain for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic growth has slowed; the economy’s capacity to create jobs has shrunk, unemployment and poverty have risen; persistence of higher double-digit inflation has hurt the poor and the fixed income group the most; senseless borrowing coupled with sharp depreciation of exchange rate has drowned the country into debt (thanks to Shaukat Tarin); the country’s monetary policy has become subservient to fiscal slippages; power shortages and the persistence of circular debt have had crippling effects on the economy; and the confidence of the private sector is at all time low. Dr Sheikh does not have the capacity to address all the challenges simultaneously. He needs to prioritise these challenges and address the core issue first.
Restoring macroeconomic stability in a reasonable time frame should be the top most priority of Dr Sheikh. Empirical evidences suggest that macroeconomic instability has generally been associated with poor growth and a consequent rise in unemployment and poverty. Hence, growth cannot be revived on sustained basis without achieving macroeconomic stability. Thus, macroeconomic stability is sine quo non for achieving higher economic growth and poverty alleviation.
How can we achieve macroeconomic stability? Reducing fiscal deficit by mobilising more resources, rationalising current expenditure and prioritising development expenditure are some of the critical steps that are needed in order to achieve macroeconomic stability. Dr Sheikh must ensure that fiscal deficit remains at 5.1 per cent of the GDP in the current fiscal year. For the next fiscal year (2010-11), budget deficit target should be fixed at 4.0 per cent of the GDP for which he needs the total support of the prime minister.
Budget deficit is the mother of economic problems. It gives birth to many economic ills and hence creates macroeconomic instability. Reduction in budget deficit would reduce the borrowing needs of the government, slow the pace of accumulation of public debt, release pressure on interest rate, would enable the SBP to reduce discount rate which in turn would encourage the private sector to undertake new investments. Reduction in budget deficit would also help improve current account balance.
Bringing inflation down to a single-digit level is also needed for macroeconomic stability. Keeping the budget deficit low, maintaining stability in exchange rate, pursuance of tight monetary policy and freezing the support price of wheat for two more years will help bring inflation down to a single-digit level.
Restoring investors’ confidence should be the second most priority of Dr Sheikh. Establishing a channel of communication with the stakeholders should be the first step in this direction. Dr Sheikh is not communicating either with the print and electronic media or with the private sector and hence the uncertainty on economic policy continues to prevail. He must talk to a select group of economic journalists and TV channels and explain the government’s position on the economy. He must visit the leading chambers of both domestic and foreign investors; talk to the leading industrialists and address the president of the banks. Constant engagement with the private sector is vital for restoring their confidence on economic management.
Resource mobilisation through tax system and tax administration reforms should be the third most priority of Dr Sheikh. An issue at hand is the imposition of the Value Add Tax (VAT) with effect from July 1, 2010. The VAT has gained favour over traditional sales tax worldwide. The government has neither trained the tax collectors nor educated the tax payers about the VAT. As such, the VAT has not been properly understood by the tax payers and hence there is resistance from different quarters. If the VAT is implemented without proper homework, it will create chaos and will hurt the revenue generation efforts of the government.
Let me make a suggestion here. The government should impose VAT with budget 2010-11 but its implementation may take effect from July 1, 2011 instead of 2010. The government must use the time for training the tax collectors and educating the tax payers. The IMF must set some performance criteria regarding the education of the tax payers on quarterly basis. The World Bank must assist the government in educating the tax payers and training the tax collectors on the field. It must assure the IMF through highest level that the VAT will be effective from July 2011.
Addressing the challenges of power management should be the fourth priority of Dr Sheikh. Conservation and augmentation of power should be the guiding principals in addressing such a challenge. The government has already taken several measures to conserve power. On augmentation side, there are 50 power projects totaling 12,150MW in different stages of completion and will come into operation during October 2008 to December 2015. At least four of them have been completed and inaugurated by the prime minister. The government must ensure that these projects are completed in time.
Dr Sheikh has inherited a badly damaged economy. He has to take a pro-active approach to address the challenges. He will also have to take politically difficult decisions to restore macroeconomic stability for which he will need support from the prime minister.
The writer is director general and dean at NUST Business School, Islamabad.
Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh is the fourth person appointed by the present government in two years to look after the ministry of finance. Finance is the only portfolio which witnessed changes in faces in quick succession which speaks volume about the importance given to the economy by the present regime.
Dr Sheikh has inherited an extremely fragile economy which was badly handled for the last two years by those who had little understanding of the subject. Adverse internal and external developments of an extraordinary nature apart, the inept handling of the economy for over two years has brought miseries and pain for the people of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic growth has slowed; the economy’s capacity to create jobs has shrunk, unemployment and poverty have risen; persistence of higher double-digit inflation has hurt the poor and the fixed income group the most; senseless borrowing coupled with sharp depreciation of exchange rate has drowned the country into debt (thanks to Shaukat Tarin); the country’s monetary policy has become subservient to fiscal slippages; power shortages and the persistence of circular debt have had crippling effects on the economy; and the confidence of the private sector is at all time low. Dr Sheikh does not have the capacity to address all the challenges simultaneously. He needs to prioritise these challenges and address the core issue first.
Restoring macroeconomic stability in a reasonable time frame should be the top most priority of Dr Sheikh. Empirical evidences suggest that macroeconomic instability has generally been associated with poor growth and a consequent rise in unemployment and poverty. Hence, growth cannot be revived on sustained basis without achieving macroeconomic stability. Thus, macroeconomic stability is sine quo non for achieving higher economic growth and poverty alleviation.
How can we achieve macroeconomic stability? Reducing fiscal deficit by mobilising more resources, rationalising current expenditure and prioritising development expenditure are some of the critical steps that are needed in order to achieve macroeconomic stability. Dr Sheikh must ensure that fiscal deficit remains at 5.1 per cent of the GDP in the current fiscal year. For the next fiscal year (2010-11), budget deficit target should be fixed at 4.0 per cent of the GDP for which he needs the total support of the prime minister.
Budget deficit is the mother of economic problems. It gives birth to many economic ills and hence creates macroeconomic instability. Reduction in budget deficit would reduce the borrowing needs of the government, slow the pace of accumulation of public debt, release pressure on interest rate, would enable the SBP to reduce discount rate which in turn would encourage the private sector to undertake new investments. Reduction in budget deficit would also help improve current account balance.
Bringing inflation down to a single-digit level is also needed for macroeconomic stability. Keeping the budget deficit low, maintaining stability in exchange rate, pursuance of tight monetary policy and freezing the support price of wheat for two more years will help bring inflation down to a single-digit level.
Restoring investors’ confidence should be the second most priority of Dr Sheikh. Establishing a channel of communication with the stakeholders should be the first step in this direction. Dr Sheikh is not communicating either with the print and electronic media or with the private sector and hence the uncertainty on economic policy continues to prevail. He must talk to a select group of economic journalists and TV channels and explain the government’s position on the economy. He must visit the leading chambers of both domestic and foreign investors; talk to the leading industrialists and address the president of the banks. Constant engagement with the private sector is vital for restoring their confidence on economic management.
Resource mobilisation through tax system and tax administration reforms should be the third most priority of Dr Sheikh. An issue at hand is the imposition of the Value Add Tax (VAT) with effect from July 1, 2010. The VAT has gained favour over traditional sales tax worldwide. The government has neither trained the tax collectors nor educated the tax payers about the VAT. As such, the VAT has not been properly understood by the tax payers and hence there is resistance from different quarters. If the VAT is implemented without proper homework, it will create chaos and will hurt the revenue generation efforts of the government.
Let me make a suggestion here. The government should impose VAT with budget 2010-11 but its implementation may take effect from July 1, 2011 instead of 2010. The government must use the time for training the tax collectors and educating the tax payers. The IMF must set some performance criteria regarding the education of the tax payers on quarterly basis. The World Bank must assist the government in educating the tax payers and training the tax collectors on the field. It must assure the IMF through highest level that the VAT will be effective from July 2011.
Addressing the challenges of power management should be the fourth priority of Dr Sheikh. Conservation and augmentation of power should be the guiding principals in addressing such a challenge. The government has already taken several measures to conserve power. On augmentation side, there are 50 power projects totaling 12,150MW in different stages of completion and will come into operation during October 2008 to December 2015. At least four of them have been completed and inaugurated by the prime minister. The government must ensure that these projects are completed in time.
Dr Sheikh has inherited a badly damaged economy. He has to take a pro-active approach to address the challenges. He will also have to take politically difficult decisions to restore macroeconomic stability for which he will need support from the prime minister.
The writer is director general and dean at NUST Business School, Islamabad.
A committee and a half
Kamran Shafi
The committee set up to fix responsibility for the hosing down of the site of Benazir Bhutto’s dastardly assassination is something to behold: a federal secretary, a provincial additional secretary and the vice chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army.
What a committee indeed, with a real general on it whose presence must strike the fear of God into the other members, one of whom is reportedly best buddies with the general being investigated! Only a very unique government of a very unique country could have set up such a committee.
The point is this: a lowly official such as a CPO (city police officer) would not, even in his wildest imagination, even in a horrible nightmare, on his own order the hosing down of a site where a personage as illustrious as Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated.
Neither would a functionary of state so cockily and with such nonchalance dismiss a senior doctor’s request to carry out a post-mortem on a leader of the stature of Benazir Bhutto, a post-mortem that was legally binding on the state to carry out, mind, unless he had friends in very high (and very secure) places who were egging him on. Don’t we know this; don’t we come from the same country as Mr Saud Aziz and his friends? Are we Martians?
The government must get real; it must bend every sinew to get to the bottom of this horrendous crime. Benazir was no ordinary person: she was the daughter of a very great man in whose name the PPP still gets the votes of the poor and the dispossessed of our country. She herself bravely led the PPP for well on 33 years and had an unusual and strong bond with the poor with whom she empathised in a very real way; never cynically. Why, I have seen her weep hearing an old man tell her his problems, and herself making a call to some minor government functionary asking him to please help.
I write what I write only to point out to those that matter, both in government and ‘outside’, not to take Benazir’s cruel and cold-blooded murder lightly. Benazir’s blood will be avenged, mark my words, for there are too many people out there whose lives she touched very deeply. I would caution anyone whose name is being bandied about in the press in relation to this horrible crime to review their stand immediately: to wit, the threesome of Rehman Malik and Babar Awan and Farhatullah Babar to at the very least agree with each other regarding the minutes immediately following the shooting/bombing.
They must tell us why they drove to Zardari House in Islamabad when, according to some of them, they knew that Benazir had come under attack. Rehman Malik must tell us who it was that told him on the telephone that Benazir had survived the attempt on her life when the fact is that she fell down dead immediately after the second shot of the pistol shooter from barely two metres away, and which made her dupatta flutter at what surely must be the exit point of the bullet.
Let me say here and now, that one of the above mentioned, Farhatullah Babar, is well known to me as a gentleman for 22 years now when both of us worked for Benazir — him as speechwriter, I as her press secretary. I cannot for a moment believe that he could ever tell an untruth, and more than that, that he could ever think a bad thought about Benazir. So why the confusion?
Questions: why did the ‘follow-car’ become an ‘advance car’? Did the occupants hear the blast? If so, why did the car not immediately turn back to see what had happened to the leader? Who told Rehman Malik Benazir was unhurt? Why did the car not stop and wait for Benazir’s SUV to overtake them and then follow her to Zardari House? These questions simply must be answered and answered immediately. Remember, the avenging spirit of the very poor is very great, indeed.
One Shaukat Ali, in a letter reminiscent of many others that are written when the establishment is upset (!) has alleged that I lost my temper while on a TV talk show with Sheikh Rashid and said that the corps commanders had no right to object to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Wrong. I did firmly correct Sheikh Rashid when he suggested that I had ‘abused’ the army which was like a second mother to me for I had served it for 11 of the best years of my life, and that I would not let him get away with raising his voice at me as he was in the habit of doing with others.
As for the Kerry-Lugar Bill, I did not bring it up. Sheikh Rashid did. However, I have always said, and continue to maintain, that it is a perfect piece of legislation that says words to the effect that unless the US secretary of state certifies from time to time that the army is not interfering in the political life of the country it will not receive US aid.
My point has always been that in spite of expressing their ‘fury’ at the KLB the army top brass had no compunction in asking for US aid in a meeting between Generals Kayani and Petraeus exactly nine days after venting their ‘fury’. So why the ‘fury’?
As for our soldiers and officers fighting bravely the enemies of Pakistan, what in the world does that have to do with a handful of senior generals stepping out of line? Indeed, it is because of the wrongheaded policies of our brass hats that we are in the soup we are in, and why brave young men are losing their precious lives.
Incidentally, let me tell Shaukat Ali that while I am well over the age of recall to active duty, I have volunteered my services to my battalion whenever needed. So, no one please lecture me on probity and ‘love’ of the army/country. Not Master Rashid, not Master Ali. Incidentally, a search on the Internet showed that 95 per cent of viewers supported what I had said.
PS I made the mistake of my life when I appeared, against better counsel, on Dr Shahid Masood’s Meray Mutabiq which was recorded and then edited. And by golly was it edited! Suffice it to say that I was shocked out of my wits, and greatly saddened, at the show as aired.
The committee set up to fix responsibility for the hosing down of the site of Benazir Bhutto’s dastardly assassination is something to behold: a federal secretary, a provincial additional secretary and the vice chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army.
What a committee indeed, with a real general on it whose presence must strike the fear of God into the other members, one of whom is reportedly best buddies with the general being investigated! Only a very unique government of a very unique country could have set up such a committee.
The point is this: a lowly official such as a CPO (city police officer) would not, even in his wildest imagination, even in a horrible nightmare, on his own order the hosing down of a site where a personage as illustrious as Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated.
Neither would a functionary of state so cockily and with such nonchalance dismiss a senior doctor’s request to carry out a post-mortem on a leader of the stature of Benazir Bhutto, a post-mortem that was legally binding on the state to carry out, mind, unless he had friends in very high (and very secure) places who were egging him on. Don’t we know this; don’t we come from the same country as Mr Saud Aziz and his friends? Are we Martians?
The government must get real; it must bend every sinew to get to the bottom of this horrendous crime. Benazir was no ordinary person: she was the daughter of a very great man in whose name the PPP still gets the votes of the poor and the dispossessed of our country. She herself bravely led the PPP for well on 33 years and had an unusual and strong bond with the poor with whom she empathised in a very real way; never cynically. Why, I have seen her weep hearing an old man tell her his problems, and herself making a call to some minor government functionary asking him to please help.
I write what I write only to point out to those that matter, both in government and ‘outside’, not to take Benazir’s cruel and cold-blooded murder lightly. Benazir’s blood will be avenged, mark my words, for there are too many people out there whose lives she touched very deeply. I would caution anyone whose name is being bandied about in the press in relation to this horrible crime to review their stand immediately: to wit, the threesome of Rehman Malik and Babar Awan and Farhatullah Babar to at the very least agree with each other regarding the minutes immediately following the shooting/bombing.
They must tell us why they drove to Zardari House in Islamabad when, according to some of them, they knew that Benazir had come under attack. Rehman Malik must tell us who it was that told him on the telephone that Benazir had survived the attempt on her life when the fact is that she fell down dead immediately after the second shot of the pistol shooter from barely two metres away, and which made her dupatta flutter at what surely must be the exit point of the bullet.
Let me say here and now, that one of the above mentioned, Farhatullah Babar, is well known to me as a gentleman for 22 years now when both of us worked for Benazir — him as speechwriter, I as her press secretary. I cannot for a moment believe that he could ever tell an untruth, and more than that, that he could ever think a bad thought about Benazir. So why the confusion?
Questions: why did the ‘follow-car’ become an ‘advance car’? Did the occupants hear the blast? If so, why did the car not immediately turn back to see what had happened to the leader? Who told Rehman Malik Benazir was unhurt? Why did the car not stop and wait for Benazir’s SUV to overtake them and then follow her to Zardari House? These questions simply must be answered and answered immediately. Remember, the avenging spirit of the very poor is very great, indeed.
One Shaukat Ali, in a letter reminiscent of many others that are written when the establishment is upset (!) has alleged that I lost my temper while on a TV talk show with Sheikh Rashid and said that the corps commanders had no right to object to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Wrong. I did firmly correct Sheikh Rashid when he suggested that I had ‘abused’ the army which was like a second mother to me for I had served it for 11 of the best years of my life, and that I would not let him get away with raising his voice at me as he was in the habit of doing with others.
As for the Kerry-Lugar Bill, I did not bring it up. Sheikh Rashid did. However, I have always said, and continue to maintain, that it is a perfect piece of legislation that says words to the effect that unless the US secretary of state certifies from time to time that the army is not interfering in the political life of the country it will not receive US aid.
My point has always been that in spite of expressing their ‘fury’ at the KLB the army top brass had no compunction in asking for US aid in a meeting between Generals Kayani and Petraeus exactly nine days after venting their ‘fury’. So why the ‘fury’?
As for our soldiers and officers fighting bravely the enemies of Pakistan, what in the world does that have to do with a handful of senior generals stepping out of line? Indeed, it is because of the wrongheaded policies of our brass hats that we are in the soup we are in, and why brave young men are losing their precious lives.
Incidentally, let me tell Shaukat Ali that while I am well over the age of recall to active duty, I have volunteered my services to my battalion whenever needed. So, no one please lecture me on probity and ‘love’ of the army/country. Not Master Rashid, not Master Ali. Incidentally, a search on the Internet showed that 95 per cent of viewers supported what I had said.
PS I made the mistake of my life when I appeared, against better counsel, on Dr Shahid Masood’s Meray Mutabiq which was recorded and then edited. And by golly was it edited! Suffice it to say that I was shocked out of my wits, and greatly saddened, at the show as aired.
An open letter to the PM
By Ikramullah
Mr Prime Minister, now that the 18th Amendment has been passed unanimously, I take this as an opportunity to highlight the areas that have been neglected by your government.
One such area is the energy sector. Though the current power crisis has not erupted overnight, but Mr Prime Minister your government has been in power for the past two years. And despite several achievements to your credit, including the 18th Amendment and NFC Awards, many parallel initiatives could have been undertaken at the federal, as well provincial levels, to bring immediate relief to the masses from this constant agony.
Sir, time is running out and who should know it better than the prime minister of the country. Something has to be done, urgently, before the present situation worsens.
Unfortunately, the ‘elected ‘ and ‘selected’ ministers have delivered nothing substantial as far as the water and power crisis is concerned. Please sir, screen them out before you are blamed for their failures or misdeeds and worst involvement in corruption charges.
In my quest, at personal level, to understand and resolve the water and power crisis, presently threatening Pakistan’s national security, my study revealed two major shortcomings. One, I failed to understand why all the successive governments have focussed more on building major dams – doing nothing after constructing Mangla and Tarbela – while ignoring other sources at the local level as many opportunities existed on the ground to complete small hydel projects. Indeed, a fact-finding mission needs to discover whether it was sheer incompetence of the previous governments or their vested interest that motivated them to pursue other high cost projects like thermal and rental.
Two, the natural alternative to hydel source of power is coal and biomass. It is good that both are abundantly available in Pakistan to meet the country’s total shortfall of 4000 MW. My quests, by way of production through coal, lead me to Khushab where I was told that a project is functioning for the last 10 years. Therefore, I visited that plant which is unbelievably producing 8MW for their operational use through coal. The daily requirement of coal for this plant for steam and power generation is 500 tonnes and the supply of which is obtained from Azad Kashmir, Baluchistan, Punjab and Thar. But it is strange that with enough coal available in the country this source has not being utilised extensively to meet the energy shortage at an approximate cost of Rs 3.5 per unit, instead of a rental at Rs 15 per unit.
Various plants in the range of 100 MW or more can be made operational in less than two years on a war-footing. If this initiative had been taken by the present government in 2008, most of these plants would have been operational or nearing completion. Thus, overcoming the present acute shortage and resultant loadshedding.
Mr Prime Minister, you definitely have to do something soon for the progress and solidarity of the nation.
The writer is the president of the Pakistan National Forum.
Mr Prime Minister, now that the 18th Amendment has been passed unanimously, I take this as an opportunity to highlight the areas that have been neglected by your government.
One such area is the energy sector. Though the current power crisis has not erupted overnight, but Mr Prime Minister your government has been in power for the past two years. And despite several achievements to your credit, including the 18th Amendment and NFC Awards, many parallel initiatives could have been undertaken at the federal, as well provincial levels, to bring immediate relief to the masses from this constant agony.
Sir, time is running out and who should know it better than the prime minister of the country. Something has to be done, urgently, before the present situation worsens.
Unfortunately, the ‘elected ‘ and ‘selected’ ministers have delivered nothing substantial as far as the water and power crisis is concerned. Please sir, screen them out before you are blamed for their failures or misdeeds and worst involvement in corruption charges.
In my quest, at personal level, to understand and resolve the water and power crisis, presently threatening Pakistan’s national security, my study revealed two major shortcomings. One, I failed to understand why all the successive governments have focussed more on building major dams – doing nothing after constructing Mangla and Tarbela – while ignoring other sources at the local level as many opportunities existed on the ground to complete small hydel projects. Indeed, a fact-finding mission needs to discover whether it was sheer incompetence of the previous governments or their vested interest that motivated them to pursue other high cost projects like thermal and rental.
Two, the natural alternative to hydel source of power is coal and biomass. It is good that both are abundantly available in Pakistan to meet the country’s total shortfall of 4000 MW. My quests, by way of production through coal, lead me to Khushab where I was told that a project is functioning for the last 10 years. Therefore, I visited that plant which is unbelievably producing 8MW for their operational use through coal. The daily requirement of coal for this plant for steam and power generation is 500 tonnes and the supply of which is obtained from Azad Kashmir, Baluchistan, Punjab and Thar. But it is strange that with enough coal available in the country this source has not being utilised extensively to meet the energy shortage at an approximate cost of Rs 3.5 per unit, instead of a rental at Rs 15 per unit.
Various plants in the range of 100 MW or more can be made operational in less than two years on a war-footing. If this initiative had been taken by the present government in 2008, most of these plants would have been operational or nearing completion. Thus, overcoming the present acute shortage and resultant loadshedding.
Mr Prime Minister, you definitely have to do something soon for the progress and solidarity of the nation.
The writer is the president of the Pakistan National Forum.
Madhuri Gupta – spy or scapegoat?
By Farooq Hameed Khan
Madhuri Gupta, in a Delhi court, said: “I am being framed”, facing charges of passing on “information” to her “Pakistani handlers”, while posted as second secretary in the Media and Information Wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. As per Indian news reports, the 53 year old, unmarried, specialist Urdu interpreter was arrested after being summoned to New Delhi in connection with the SAARC Summit.
Hawks and power groups within the Indian establishment are known to influence the political decision making, especially when related to Pakistan. It is still a widely accepted view that the Mumbai tragedy was staged by the Indian intelligence agencies with external help to derail the peace process. Furthermore, despite PM Manmohan Singh’s agreement with PM Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Sharm El-Sheikh Declaration to delink the peace process with acts of terrorism, yet the Establishment prevailed and Manmohan Singh took a U-turn on his return to India.
Nevertheless, the Indian establishment’s plan to cast a shadow or act as a spoiler over the SAARC Summit was clearly exposed in its timing and the manner that the Madhuri Gupta case hit the Indian media waves. More surprising was the speed at which the Indian media unfolded the “story”. The media hype was observed to be specially high and sensational during the period of the SAARC Summit, slowing down after the summit concluded. However, Pakistan responded with a cool, stating that “it is India’s internal affair.”
The Madhuri Gupta episode raises many questions. Why was the disclosure of this “spy scandal” in Indian media timed to coincide with the SAARC Summit? Was it aimed to malign and embarrass the Pakistani prime minister, who heads the country’s elite intelligence agencies? Was it designed to sabotage the much-awaited Gilani-Manmohan meeting the next day, on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit?
For once, these negative efforts backfired as both prime ministers went ahead with their over an hour long one-to-one meeting. So one hopes that the Indian prime minister will honour his agreement to resume the composite dialogue and not allow it to be hijacked again by the Indian establishment through the well engineered and crafted Madhuri’s breaking news.
A few contradictions seem obvious in this case. It is being stated that Madhuri was a low level “B” grade official with no access to classified material, who had not transferred any vital information to her “Pakistani contacts.” At the same time, she has been booked under the Official Secrets Act for leaking out “Indian plans in Afghanistan.” Who would believe that such a junior level functionary whose primary job was to prepare daily news clippings or monitor local media reports could play around with such critical information?
What’s more, the Indian media reported that Madhuri was discreetly recalled from Islamabad in connection with the SAARC Summit. One wonders, if the Indian government required such a high level pretext when dealing with an official of her status.
Given the unique nature of Indo-Pak relationship, diplomats posted in either country’s High Commission must surely be amongst the best and most trustworthy of the lot. If the experienced Madhuri Gupta, who had reportedly served earlier in other Indian foreign missions, “compromised” while serving in perhaps India’s most sensitive Islamabad mission, it reflects the deep sense of insecurity and disloyalty that seem to permeate Indian officials selected for such prized appointments. More so, when there have been similar cases in the past as reported in Indian media.
When foreign missions host parties and receptions, they aim to improve their country’s image and relations with the host country, by interacting with local personalities of diverse backgrounds. In case of country like India, such occasions also provide a good opportunity to develop contacts with selected personalities and even cultivate them to promote Indian interests.
The Indian High Commission is specially known for its lavish ‘booze parties’ and musical evenings that attract some of the so-called Pakistani secularists, politicians, businessmen, NGO activists, media men and even senior retired government officers etc. While the nation mourned the shocking Parade Lane and Moon Market tragedies in December last year, the Indian High Commission went ahead with one such party that was attended by many from the Islamabad elite.
The commonly employed and easily understandable spying modus operandi would therefore involve cultivation of local Pakistanis by the Indian intelligence sleuths posted in their High Commission. Why would the low ranking Madhuri Gupta take the risk of communicating with Pakistani intelligence officials (and vice versa) in the presence of surveillance and security systems installed in high security missions, like the Indian High Commission? It just does not make sense!
Previously, the Indian media has reported few recent cases of breach of trust and national security by Indian officials, while posted in missions abroad. There have also been reports of some Indian army generals being court martialed on financial corruption charges. Isn’t the betrayal of national trust by the Indian government elite a stain on “Rising and Shining” India? Are these the early signs of a degeneration of Indian pride and nationalism?
Then again, the Indian media’s biggest revelation that Madhuri Gupta may have converted to Shia Islam must come as a bombshell to Hindu India pride. Given the apparent anger and hostility by the Indian media, as well as extremist groups, towards the Shoaib-Sania wedding affair, Madhuri Ji may also be heading for difficult times.
Was Madhuri indeed an undercover Indian intelligence agent? Was she and her undercover boss “recovered” in time to pre-empt the embarrassment of their blown up cover? Will Madhuri Gupta be made the scapegoat for the intra-intelligence rivalry that rocked the Indian High Commission? Her lawyer, Joginder Dahiya, however maintains that his conversation with Madhuri showed that she had not fallen into any “honey trap.”
The writer is a retired brigadier.
Madhuri Gupta, in a Delhi court, said: “I am being framed”, facing charges of passing on “information” to her “Pakistani handlers”, while posted as second secretary in the Media and Information Wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. As per Indian news reports, the 53 year old, unmarried, specialist Urdu interpreter was arrested after being summoned to New Delhi in connection with the SAARC Summit.
Hawks and power groups within the Indian establishment are known to influence the political decision making, especially when related to Pakistan. It is still a widely accepted view that the Mumbai tragedy was staged by the Indian intelligence agencies with external help to derail the peace process. Furthermore, despite PM Manmohan Singh’s agreement with PM Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Sharm El-Sheikh Declaration to delink the peace process with acts of terrorism, yet the Establishment prevailed and Manmohan Singh took a U-turn on his return to India.
Nevertheless, the Indian establishment’s plan to cast a shadow or act as a spoiler over the SAARC Summit was clearly exposed in its timing and the manner that the Madhuri Gupta case hit the Indian media waves. More surprising was the speed at which the Indian media unfolded the “story”. The media hype was observed to be specially high and sensational during the period of the SAARC Summit, slowing down after the summit concluded. However, Pakistan responded with a cool, stating that “it is India’s internal affair.”
The Madhuri Gupta episode raises many questions. Why was the disclosure of this “spy scandal” in Indian media timed to coincide with the SAARC Summit? Was it aimed to malign and embarrass the Pakistani prime minister, who heads the country’s elite intelligence agencies? Was it designed to sabotage the much-awaited Gilani-Manmohan meeting the next day, on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit?
For once, these negative efforts backfired as both prime ministers went ahead with their over an hour long one-to-one meeting. So one hopes that the Indian prime minister will honour his agreement to resume the composite dialogue and not allow it to be hijacked again by the Indian establishment through the well engineered and crafted Madhuri’s breaking news.
A few contradictions seem obvious in this case. It is being stated that Madhuri was a low level “B” grade official with no access to classified material, who had not transferred any vital information to her “Pakistani contacts.” At the same time, she has been booked under the Official Secrets Act for leaking out “Indian plans in Afghanistan.” Who would believe that such a junior level functionary whose primary job was to prepare daily news clippings or monitor local media reports could play around with such critical information?
What’s more, the Indian media reported that Madhuri was discreetly recalled from Islamabad in connection with the SAARC Summit. One wonders, if the Indian government required such a high level pretext when dealing with an official of her status.
Given the unique nature of Indo-Pak relationship, diplomats posted in either country’s High Commission must surely be amongst the best and most trustworthy of the lot. If the experienced Madhuri Gupta, who had reportedly served earlier in other Indian foreign missions, “compromised” while serving in perhaps India’s most sensitive Islamabad mission, it reflects the deep sense of insecurity and disloyalty that seem to permeate Indian officials selected for such prized appointments. More so, when there have been similar cases in the past as reported in Indian media.
When foreign missions host parties and receptions, they aim to improve their country’s image and relations with the host country, by interacting with local personalities of diverse backgrounds. In case of country like India, such occasions also provide a good opportunity to develop contacts with selected personalities and even cultivate them to promote Indian interests.
The Indian High Commission is specially known for its lavish ‘booze parties’ and musical evenings that attract some of the so-called Pakistani secularists, politicians, businessmen, NGO activists, media men and even senior retired government officers etc. While the nation mourned the shocking Parade Lane and Moon Market tragedies in December last year, the Indian High Commission went ahead with one such party that was attended by many from the Islamabad elite.
The commonly employed and easily understandable spying modus operandi would therefore involve cultivation of local Pakistanis by the Indian intelligence sleuths posted in their High Commission. Why would the low ranking Madhuri Gupta take the risk of communicating with Pakistani intelligence officials (and vice versa) in the presence of surveillance and security systems installed in high security missions, like the Indian High Commission? It just does not make sense!
Previously, the Indian media has reported few recent cases of breach of trust and national security by Indian officials, while posted in missions abroad. There have also been reports of some Indian army generals being court martialed on financial corruption charges. Isn’t the betrayal of national trust by the Indian government elite a stain on “Rising and Shining” India? Are these the early signs of a degeneration of Indian pride and nationalism?
Then again, the Indian media’s biggest revelation that Madhuri Gupta may have converted to Shia Islam must come as a bombshell to Hindu India pride. Given the apparent anger and hostility by the Indian media, as well as extremist groups, towards the Shoaib-Sania wedding affair, Madhuri Ji may also be heading for difficult times.
Was Madhuri indeed an undercover Indian intelligence agent? Was she and her undercover boss “recovered” in time to pre-empt the embarrassment of their blown up cover? Will Madhuri Gupta be made the scapegoat for the intra-intelligence rivalry that rocked the Indian High Commission? Her lawyer, Joginder Dahiya, however maintains that his conversation with Madhuri showed that she had not fallen into any “honey trap.”
The writer is a retired brigadier.
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